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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 17, 2002, the Pacific Pintail sailed 18,000 miles back
from Japan to England with multiple oxide (MOX) fuel containing 225
kilograms (562 pounds) of plutonium.' British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL)
1. Protest Flotilla Ready as Shipload of Nuclear Fuel Noses Closer to Britain,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23601926 [hereinafter Protest
Flotilla Ready]. Greenpeace believes that this amount of plutonium is sufficient to produce
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manufactured the MOX fuel at its MOX Demonstration Facility and de-
livered it to a Japanese utility company in 1999.2 However, the Japanese
customer rejected the nuclear fuel because BNFL falsified quality re-
cords.3 This incident further strained relations between Ireland and the
United Kingdom not only because the Pacific Pintail traversed the Irish
Sea with a considerable amount of plutonium, but also because BNFL
will eventually recycle the unwanted nuclear fuel at the Sellafield MOX
Plant, newly built on the Sellafield nuclear industrial site.'
The Sellafield site is located in northwest England on the coast of
the Irish Sea. At Sellafield, BNFL reclaims fissile plutonium and ura-
nium from spent nuclear fuel consigned by foreign utility companies,
and manufactures MOX fuel assemblies for the foreign customers from
50 nuclear bombs. Greenpeace, Countdown to a Deadly Shipment 2, at http://
archive.greenpeace.org/nuclear/bnfl/docs/general-pu-briefing.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
But see Kozo Mizoguchi, Japan Defends Nuclear Fuel Decision, AP ONLINE, July 5, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 23166113 (reporting that Japanese officials and an independent expert
argue that it is theoretically possible but practically difficult to make nuclear weapons from
reactor-grade plutonium).
2. Edward Power, BNFL Head Admits 'Stupidity' of MOX Episode, IRISH TIMES, Sept.
18, 2002, at 6, available at 2002 WL 25947530; Robert MacPherson, Nuclear Fuel Sails Back
to Britain from Japan with Protesters in Tow, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 17, 2002, avail-
able at 2002 WL 23602411; SELLAFIELD: REPROCESSING PLANT IN GREAT BRITAIN 20
(Bellona Foundation, Working Paper No. 5, 2001), at http://www.bellona.no/pdfs/
wp5_2001_SellafieldEnglish.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
3. Mizoguchi, supra note 1; Power, supra note 2, at 6; see also MacPherson, supra
note 2 (stating that BNFL agreed to take the fuel back as well as pay compensation and return
transport costs exceeding £100 million ($155 million)).
4. See Mizoguchi, supra note 1 (quoting the Irish Environment Minister Martin Cullen
that the MOX shipments through the Irish Sea are an unacceptable risk to the environment of
Ireland and the health and economic well-being of its population). Although Ireland recog-
nizes that in principle British vessels carrying nuclear fuel may navigate across the Irish Sea
exercising the right of innocent passage, it does not want the United Kingdom to turn the Irish
Sea into a "nuclear fuel highway'" Lorna Siggins, Greenpeace Unhappy with Stance on N-
Ship, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at 4, available at 2002 WL 25944754 (quoting Mr. Ahem,
the Irish Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources).
5. BNFL plans to recover fissile materials from the returned fuel at a Sellafield
reprocessing--plant. See Protest Flotilla Ready, supra note 1. Eventually, BNFL will
manufacture new MOX fuel from the recovered plutonium and redeliver it to Japan, although
the Japanese are unwilling to take it back until BNFL implements safety measures
recommended by the British authority. See Memorial of Ir., MOX Plant (It. v. U.K.), at 88, 90,




Memorial%20Part%20V.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial];
Power, -supra note 2, at 6; Fuel Will Eventually Be Returned to Japan, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 18,
2002, at 6, available at 2002 WL 25947620. Ireland strongly criticizes the MOX return
shipments as inconsistent with the United Kingdom's assurance given at the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra, at 85-91,
IN 4.74-.102.
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the reclaimed fissile materials.' The Irish people are concerned about
routine radioactive discharges from BNFL's MOX related activities at
Sellafield and frequent transports of nuclear materials over the Irish Sea.
The conflict between the opposite sides of the Irish Sea materialized
in 1992, when BNFL decided to construct the Sellafield MOX Plant,
which is fifty times larger than the MOX Demonstration Facility in terms
of MOX production capacity.8 Alarmed by the likely intensification of
MOX related activities, Ireland urged the United Kingdom to prepare an
environmental impact assessment of the proposed nuclear fuel plant and
sought to obtain environmental and safety information on MOX produc-
tion at Sellafield and associated nuclear transports.9 After years of
unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to obtain relevant information, Ireland
resorted to arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)' ° and Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention)," alleging
that the United Kingdom violated relevant treaty obligations to protect
the marine environment of the Irish Sea. Pending the constitution of the
tribunal under Annex VII of UNCLOS (Annex VII tribunal), Ireland fur-
ther requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
to grant provisional measures that would prevent the plutonium commis-
sioning of the Sellafield MOX Plant.
2
6. See infra notes 102-116 and accompanying text. MOX fuel consists of a mixture of
plutonium and uranium and is used in nuclear power reactors as an alternative to conventional
low-enriched uranium fuel. Nuclear Control Inst. (NCI), Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
About MOX Fuel Shipments by Sea 1, at http://www.nci.org/k-mlmox-qa.htm (updated July
13, 1999). From an economic perspective, MOX might not be an ideal option because uranium
is abundant, and fresh low-enriched uranium fuel is much cheaper than MOX fuel. See Wil-
liam Underhill, Waiting for Nukes: After Five Years in Limbo, a Fuel-Treatment Plant at
Sellafield's Nuclear Complex Is at Last Going Online, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Feb. 11, 2002, at 44;
see also infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
Utility companies in Japan and several other countries use European reprocessing com-
panies to reclaim uranium and plutonium remaining in spent fuel and recycle them into MOX
fuel. See Scott R. Helton, The Legal Problems of Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal, 23 ENERGY
L.J. 179, 180-81 (2002); Underhill, supra, at 44. Through concern about nuclear proliferation,
the United States declined to accept BNFL's offer to reprocess spent fuel. See Helton, supra,
at 181. Nevertheless, the United States, as well as Russia, is interested in MOX use to con-
sume plutonium recovered from dismantled warheads. See Underhill, supra, at 44.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 120-28.
8. British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL), Environmental Statement for the Proposed Sella-
field MOX Plant 6, I 2.7, 2.9 (Oct. 1993) (on file with the author, courtesy of BNFL).
9. See infra notes 170-73, 190 and accompanying text.
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
11. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlan-
tic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention].
12. See Order of Dec. 3, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int'l Trib. for the Law
of the Sea 2001), available at http://www.itlos.orglcase documentsl200l/documenten_
197.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) [hereinafter ITLOS Provisional Measures]. ITLOS may not
[Vol. 25:337
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On December 3, 2001, ITLOS issued the order that rejected the pro-
visional measures requested by Ireland. Instead, the Tribunal required
that the United Kingdom and Ireland cooperate in information exchange,
monitoring, and pollution prevention from the MOX plant. 3 Shortly
thereafter, BNFL commenced plutonium commissioning at the disputed
plant,'4 while the OSPAR tribunal took more than a year and a half to
reach a decision on July 2, 2003." The Annex VII arbitral proceedings
are still pending at The Hague, with further provisional measures issued
on June 24, 2003.16
Although the ITLOS order attempted to facilitate dialogue between
the parties, the Tribunal was incapable of addressing the root cause of
the MOX plant controversy, namely the lack of an adequate mechanism
for transboundary environmental impact assessment at the onset of the
conflict under UNCLOS. Similarly, the OSPAR and Annex VII tribunals
have failed to bring about the efficient resolution of this procedural
environmental dispute. This Article addresses the prevention of similar
incidents by proposing the creation of a marine environmental impact
assessment protocol to UNCLOS to make assessment procedures
operational from the initial stage of controversial projects. Part II offers
background information, including the relationship between international
extend jurisdiction over the merits of the MOX Plant Case because pursuant to Article 287(5)
of UNCLOS, the dispute has been submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal established under
Annex VII of UNCLOS. See ITLOS Provisional Measures, supra, at 2. Pending the constitu-
tion of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, however, ITLOS may prescribe provisional measures
upon request of either party, provided that ITLOS considers that the Annex VII tribunal to be
constituted would have prima facie jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation requires
such measures. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 290(5), 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
It should also be noted that ITLOS and Annex VII tribunals do not have jurisdiction over
a dispute concerning interpretation or application of the OSPAR Convention because the re-
gional sea convention includes no provision authorizing dispute settlements before ITLOS or
ad hoc tribunals established pursuant to UNCLOS. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 288(2),
21 I.L.M at 1323; see also OSPAR Convention, supra, note 11, art. 32, 32 I.L.M. at 1087.
Upon request by a Contracting Party, a dispute involving interpretation or application of the
OSPAR Convention may be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal upon request of a Con-
tracting Party pursuant to Article 32 of the OSPAR Convention. This is why two separate ad
hoc arbitral tribunals under UNCLOS and the OSPAR Convention have dealt with the MOX
Plant dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom.
13. ITLOS Provisional Measures, supra note 12, at 416, 89.1 (a)-(c).
14. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 81-82, 4.54-.57; Judith Perera,
Plutonium Commissioning Begins at MOX Fuel Plant, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Jan. 3, 2002,
at 7, available at 2002 WL 10036350.
15. Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Conven-
tion (Ir. v. U.K.) (Penn. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/OSPAR%2OAward.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter OSPAR Final Award].
16. Order No. 3: Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request
for Further Provisional Measures, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/MOX%200rder%20no3.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter
Annex VII Further Provisional Measures].
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environmental law and the law of the sea, underlying competing interests
of states concerned, and marine environmental protection measures
under UNCLOS. 7 Part III analyzes factual and legal issues in the MOX
plant operation and associated nuclear shipments, with a particular focus
on procedural inadequacies in the environmental impact assessment
process. This Section also deals with the proliferation of tribunals in the
MOX plant dispute and identifies remaining problems under the vague
provisions of UNCLOS. Part IV conducts a comparative analysis of
major regional and international environmental assessment mechanisms,
and proposes a protocol for marine environmental impact assessment to
UNCLOS with an effective dispute settlement mechanism. The article
concludes by calling for the development of such an environmental
impact assessment protocol to UNCLOS.
I. BACKGROUND
A. International Environmental Law and the Law of the Sea
The oceans are vital to the preservation of the global environment.
For example, the oceans provide important ecological services, including
sequestration of carbon, assimilation of wastes, and control of climate.'8
Marine environments also exhibit a considerable degree of biodiversity.'9
Nevertheless, environmental issues were generally marginalized in the
law of the sea until the end of World War II. This was primarily because
marine resources and assimilative capacities were regarded as inex-
haustible, and pollution problems were thought to be mostly confined
and localized. °
17. To focus on the tension between maritime states' rights of the freedom of naviga-
tion and coastal states' rights and duties to protect the marine environment, this Article will
not address in detail environmental issues associated with the use of the continental shelf and
deep seabed. For more information, see R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE
SEA 330 (3d ed. 1999).
18. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 676
(1998); see also A. Charlotte de Fontaubert et al., Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the
Convention on Biological Diversity in Marine and Coastal Habitats, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 753, 761-62 (1998).
19. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 937 (stating that "much of the world's biodiver-
sity is found either in marine or freshwater ecosystems," although terrestrial biodiversity can
be easily studied and appreciated). Oceans and coasts represent impressive ecosystem diver-
sity and varying habitats, such as coral leafs with dense species concentrations and complex
interspecies interactions and deep ocean bottoms with unique species adapted to high pressure
and darkness. See de Fontaubert et al., supra note 18, at 760-61.
20. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 678; W.M. von Zharen, Environmental Govern-
ance of the Seas, the Coastal Zone, and Their Resources, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3
(1995); see also de Fontaubert et al., supra note 18, at 753-54 (stating that the ocean's vast-
[Vol. 25:337
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The law of the sea was initially developed to govern navigation,
which is, along with fishing, the oldest human use of the sea and still
vital to the conduct of international relations and international commer-
cial transactions.2' In the early seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius,
commonly regarded as the founder of modern international law22 and
also known to have taken part in the expansion of the Dutch East Indian
Company, elaborated on the principle of freedom of navigation as fol-
lows: "Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade
with it. 24 Since then, this principle has been widely accepted by states as
a fundamental principle of customary international law. 2 The high seas
acquired the status of a global commons, upon which flagged vessels of
every state could enjoy unimpeded basic rights of navigation and fish-
26ing.
Nevertheless, the freedom of navigation is by no means absolute.
Coastal states enjoy sovereignty over their respective territorial seas,
which were initially confined to a three-mile limit along the coast, but
were extended to twelve miles through commonly observed state prac-
tices that emerged by the mid-twentieth century.27 The modern law of the
sea also recognizes coastal states' exclusive control over natural re-
sources within their respective 200-mile exclusive economic zones
(EEZs).2' As a result, the law of the sea intricately balances maritime
states' interest in navigation with coastal states' interest in territorial con-
trol, as well as the artificial allocation of natural resources between the
two sides along maritime jurisdictional borders.
In addition, during the twentieth century, the principle of state
responsibility has evolved into customary international law. In the
context of the law of the sea, in 1949 the International Court of Justice
held in the Corfu Channel case29 that each state bears an obligation not to
ness and relative inaccessibility to human investigation prevent people from appreciating its
inherent vulnerability and limits in marine resources).
21. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 255.
22. Id. at 4; von Zharen, supra note 20, at 3.
23. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 678 (explaining that Grotius advocated for
"the Netherlands' right to sail in the Indian Ocean and Eastern Seas in order to trade with
India and the East Indies" to protect Dutch interests against the political and commercial do-
minion by Spanish and Portugal and to compete effectively with other mercantile nations).
24. von Zharen, supra note 20, at 3 (quoting H. GROTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 7
(Magoffin trans. 1916)).
25. See Lawrence Marin, Note, Oceanic Transportation of Radioactive Materials: The
Conflict Between the Law of the Seas'Right of Innocent Passage and Duty to the Marine Envi-
ronment, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 361, 364 (2001); von Zharen, supra note 20, at 3.
26. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 678.
27. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 77-79.
28. See id. at 166-68.
29. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9) (finding that Al-
bania responsible for the explosion of mines within its territorial waters where British vessels,
Winter 20041
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knowingly permit its territory to be utilized for acts adverse to the rights
of other states. Similarly, Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas requires states to pay "reasonable regard to the interests of other
States in their exercise of freedom of the high seas."3 ° In the context of
environmental protection, in 1921 the arbitration tribunal in the Trail
Smelter case 3' found Canada liable for U.S. citizens' injuries from
transboundary air pollution caused by sulfur dioxide exhaustion from a
privately owned smelter within Canadian territory. This is because "no
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another."
32
The principle was further crystallized into Principle 21 of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which requires
states to "ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. 33 These two threads of state responsibility
during innocent passage through the North Corfu Strait, struck the mines and suffered severe
damages); see also von Zharen, supra note 20, at 4.
30. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, 84
[hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1958]; see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at
332.
31. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
32. Id. at 1965; see also CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 17, at 332.
33. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration,
June 16, 1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration]; see also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 21, at 8, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONFI51/26 (Vol. I) (1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration] (reaffirming an identical principle); Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 15, 15, 29 (July 8) ("The existence of the general obli-
gation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now a part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment."); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 348 ("Most
commentators assumed that Principle 21 reflected customary international law as supported
by Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel."); Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International
Law: An Environmental Perspective, 1989 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 257, 271-72 & n.103 [hereinaf-
ter Nuclear Energy] (stating that at the Stockholm Conference, many states recognized that
environmental state responsibility codified in Principle 21 embodied existing international
law). But see Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Law, 3 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 114-16 (1995) (asserting that core international environmental
norms including environmental state responsibility, which many commentators regard as "cus-
tomary," are rather "declaratory" without corresponding state practice); Developments in the
Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L REV. 1484, 1515 n.7 (1991) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law] (arguing that environmental state responsibility is not grounded in
common interests among states); John Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 319 (2002) (contending that contrary to
the dominant view, the state responsibility not to cause transboundary harm does not consti-
tute customary international law but instead belongs to a "myth system" of international
environmental law consisting of "collective ideal"). The dissenting view is based primarily on
the fact that international environmental law and underlying state practice apparently tolerate
insignificant transboundary environmental damages. See Bodansky, supra, at 115; Develop-
ments in the Law, supra, at 1515; Knox, supra, at 298. The majority view recognizes that the
[Vol. 25:337
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principles have merged into "a general rule of customary international
law that States must not permit their nationals to discharge into the sea
matter that could cause harm to the nationals of other States.
34
However, this customary rule of state responsibility has limitations,
as it does not provide the means to impose collective responsibilities on
states to protect the marine environment. 3 Although individual states are
responsible for controlling environmental pollution within their respec-
tive territorial seas, the vast oceans remain as collective goods. By the
end of 1973, nearly two thirds of the oceans were still insulated from
coastal states' national jurisdiction.36 Moreover, since the end of World
War II, industrialization and population growth have caused growing
amounts of marine pollutants to be discharged from a variety of sources,
including land-based activities and vessels. This has overwhelmed the
assimilative capacity of marine ecosystems, in particular in closed and
,,3semi-closed seas.37 In an attempt to avoid a "tragedy of commons,""
states have cooperated in establishing international and regional institu-
tions that supply detailed safety and environmental standards.39
duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm is not absolute and regard that environ-
mental state responsibility entails due diligence to take all practicable steps to prevent
transboundary environmental harm. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 391-96, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Commentaries]; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 349;
Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements, 1996
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 280; see also Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International
Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Neces-
sary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 15 (1990) [hereinafter State Responsibility]
(supporting the view that due diligence reflects actual state practice).
34. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 332; see von Zharen, supra note 20, at 4;
see also Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 347, 349 (1985) (stating that under customary international law, only the principle of
state responsibility provides affected coastal states with some general protection from trans-
boundary pollution and the rights of redress against the originating state without wide
recognition of coastal states' prescriptive jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea); Jon M. Van
Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 399, 400 (1993)
(referencing the duty to avoid causing injury to others and the duty to prevent transboundary
environmental pollution as basic norms of international law from which the general duty to
protect the marine environment derives).
35. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 679.
36. Id. at 680.
37. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 331; see also de Fontaubert, supra note
18, at 763 (stating that land-based sources are the primary cause of marine pollution, although
airborne and vessel sources also have significant impacts on the marine ecosystems).
38. "The tragedy of the commons" involves public goods, including clean water and air,
to which everyone has free access without private mechanisms to control use, such as owner-
ship through property rights and allocation of costs through markets. HUNTER ET AL., supra
note 18, at 105-06.
39. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 333 (stating that all the treaties dealing
with pollution from ships were adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO)); Kristina Martin, Note, Conflicts in Marine Environmental Protection: The
Winter 20041
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In addition, precautionary and anticipatory approaches have become
necessary to ensure that states carry out their responsibility not to cause
transboundary environmental harm. In particular, marine environmental
protection requires precaution and prevention, as solutions to marine envi-
ronmental degradation are often complex due to the direct and cumulative
impacts of different substances discharged from multiple mobile and sta-
tioned sources.4° Thus, it is necessary to incorporate contemporary
international environmental norms, such as the precautionary principle and
states' duty to conduct environmental impact assessment, into regional and
international regimes of marine environmental protection.
In 1982, UNCLOS introduced an international framework for marine
environmental protection to facilitate these legal developments.4 '2 The
UNCLOS framework builds on the principle of state responsibility,4 and
Turkish Straits as a Case Study, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 681 (1999) (detailing
the history of the IMO and its initiatives in marine safety and environmental protection). For a
comprehensive list of the relevant IMO conventions, see IMO, Marine Environment Conven-
tions, at http://www.imo.org/Conventions (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
At the regional level, all the sources of marine pollution are addressed within a single
framework convention accompanied by protocols detailing parties' obligations concerning
specific sources of pollution. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 333-34. The United
Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP") has supported regional efforts to curve marine
pollution through its Regional Seas Programme. See id. at 334. For a comprehensive list of
regional agreements, see UNEP, Regional Seas Conventions and Protocols, at http://
www.unep.ch/seas/main/hconlist.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
40. Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex 2, 9M 17.18-.21, U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/4
(1992).
41. Id 1 17.21; see also ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, at 404 (stating that the duty to
assess potential environmental impact corresponds to the principle of state responsibility); CHUR-
CHILL & LowE, supra note 17, at 336 (explaining the incorporation of the precautionary principle,
as well as the concept of sustainable development and biodiversity, in regional seas agreements in
the 1990s); Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radio-
active Materials, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379, 379 (1996) (maintaining that the precautionary
principle has acquired "almost universal acceptance" as a fundamental nile concerning activities
affecting the marine environment). See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at 11, princ. 15
(codifying the precautionary principle that prevents states from using scientific uncertainty as a
justification to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent potentially significant environmental
harm); infra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining in detail states' duties to conduct environ-
mental impact assessments).
42. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 350 ("[P]art XII of the Convention represent[s] the first
attempt to set out a general framework for a legal regime that establishes on a global, conventional
basis the obligations, responsibilities and powers of states in all matters of marine environmental
protection'").
43. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 194(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or
control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdic-
tion or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in
accordance with this Convention.
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draws on emerging preventive and anticipatory environmental norms,"
while relying on international instruments to supplement detailed envi-
ronmental and safety standards.45
B. Competing Interests of States Concerned in
Marine Environmental Protection
The evolution of the law of the sea also reflects the conflict between
the interests of maritime states and coastal states. Maritime states have
interests in the freedom of navigation and wish to insulate their flagged
vessels from the control of coastal states. In contrast, coastal states want
to exercise as much control as possible over flagged vessels of other
states to manage fisheries, as well as to maintain peace, security, and
public order within their respective territories."
44. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 23, 21 I.L.M. at 1274 (requiring vessels loaded with
nuclear materials and other ultrahazardous substances to comply with "special precautionary meas-
ures" established by international agreements); id art. 206, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 (providing for states'
duty to assess environmental impacts); see also id. art. 119(l)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1291 (introducing the
concept of sustainability in fish stocks management).
45. See id art. 197, 21 I.L.M. at 1308 ("States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formu-
lating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment
.."); id. art. 201, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 ("States shall co-operate, directly or through competent
international organizations, in establishing appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation
and elaboration of rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the preven-
tion, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment."); id. art. 207(4), 21 I.L.M.
at 1310 ("States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic
conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and recom-
mended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from land-based sources..."); see also infra notes 65, 70, 76, 78 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that UNCLOS uses international standards in defining states' rights to
prescribe measures to protect the marine environment).
46. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 679-80; see also Mali v. Keeper of the Com-
mon Jail ("Wildenhus's Case"), 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (holding that "if crimes are committed on
board of a character to disturb the peace and tranquility of the country to which the vessel has
been brought," the offenders may be subject to the jurisdiction of the local laws, in sustaining
U.S. enforcement jurisdiction over a Belgian national on the Belgian vessel). The Permanent
Court of International Justice recognized this preposition in dealing with enforcement jurisdic-
tion regarding collision between French and Turkish vessels on the high seas. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9. General principles articulated in the S.S. Lotus case are
still valid under international law, although Article 11.1 of the Geneva Convention of 1958,
supra note 30, at 88, effectively overruled the Court's specific holding that authorized the
injured state's enforcement jurisdiction over a responsible officer of the culpable foreign ves-
sel in a collision case. See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS:
MATERIALS AND TEXT 858 (4th ed. 1994).
Enforcement jurisdiction, which is the authority to actually enforce laws, is distinct from
prescriptive jurisdiction, which refers to the authority to prescribe law. See CHURCHILL &
LOWE, supra note 17, at 11-12. Prescriptive jurisdiction does not always coexist with en-
forcement jurisdiction and, in some circumstances, coastal states may not directly enforce
validly prescribed and applicable local laws against foreign vessels within the territorial sea.
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This fundamental conflict of interest in the law of the sea is further
replicated in measures to protect the marine environment. Coastal states
may have legitimate interests in applying their own environmental and
safety standards to protect their unique local marine ecosystems and en-
vironmentally sensitive areas, such as habitats of endangered species,
spawning sites of fish stocks, and coral reefs. Although states have con-
cluded numerous international agreements to prevent marine
47environmental pollution, generalized international standards alone may
not adequately take into account geographical differences and ecological
vulnerabilities in local marine environments.
On the other hand, maritime states want to avoid imposition of do-
mestic environmental measures by coastal states, as this may create
inconsistencies in applicable environmental regulations across naviga-
tion routes.4 '8 A coastal state enjoys territorial sovereignty and holds the
right to prescribe environmental regulations pursuant to its own eco-
nomic policy goals and natural resources management plan.49 In
accordance with its own risk preferences, a coastal state may choose to
implement domestic environmental standards tougher than those pre-
scribed in applicable multilateral environmental agreements." If such
inconsistencies were tolerated across territorial seas, it could hinder
See id. at 12; Boyle, supra note 34, at 362-63. In discussing measures to prevent marine pollu-
tion, this Article focuses on prescriptive jurisdiction unless otherwise noted.
47. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May
12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, was adopted as the first international pollution
control standards. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 339. Subsequently, international
efforts to reduce marine pollution was expanded through the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, which sets detailed stan-
dards concerning oil (Annex I, mandatory), noxious liquid substances in bulk (Annex 1H,
mandatory), harmful substances carried by sea in packaged forms (Annex III, optional), sew-
age (Annex IV, optional), garbage (Annex V, optional), and air pollution (Annex VI, optional
and added in 1997). See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 339-40.
In addition, safety measures concerning the marine transport of dangerous goods are
codified in several international instruments. See, e.g., 1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANI-
ZATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS (IMDG) CODE pmbl. (2002),
available at http://www.imo.org/Safety/index.asp?topic-id=158 (last visited Aug. 1, 2003)
(including Amendment 31-02 of May 2002, which makes the IMDG Code mandatory except
for certain recommendatory provisions); International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 (amended May 2002) [hereinafter SOLAS
Convention] (incorporating the IMDG Code as mandatory). In addition, international agree-
ments concerning accidental release of marine pollutants, dumping, and liability regimes for
pollution damage supplement UNCLOS. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 353-69.
48. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 346; Boyle, supra note 34, at 358.
49. This environmental state sovereignty is codified in Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, along with environmental state responsibility. Stockholm Declaration, supra note
33, princ. 21; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at 8, princ. 2.
50. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 352 (stating that before UNCLOS entered into force,
international standards concerning marine pollution were merely permissible and states had
considerable discretion to determine whether and how to control pollution).
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freedom of navigation and impose substantial compliance costs on the
relevant industries.
In addition, a coastal state and its neighboring states may disagree
over measures to curtail land-based pollution. Although a coastal state
may unilaterally impose tough emissions standards on activities within
its territory, unilateral measures do not address land-based pollution
from neighboring states.-' As a result, the coastal state's unilateral meas-
ure may ineffectively protect the shared marine environment, while its
industries incur substantial compliance costs from stricter measures. To
avoid the race to the bottom, neighboring coastal states may want to
harmonize emissions standards and take collective action to curtail pol-
lution from land-based sources.
Thus, in marine environmental protection there is tension between
maritime states' interest in the freedom of navigation and preference for
international standards, and coastal states' interest in maritime safety and
local environments and preference for domestic standards. In addition, to
address marine pollution from land-based sources, neighboring coastal
states have an interest in cooperating and coordinating with one another,
while rejecting interferences with territorial sovereignty.
C. Marine Environmental Protection Measures
Under UNCLOS
To address these competing interests of concerned states, UNCLOS
adjusted customary jurisdictional arrangements and the associated rights
and obligations of states regarding marine environmental protection
measures." In particular, states' rights and obligations are elaborated in
Part XII of the Convention. Thus, under UNCLOS, "[a]ll parts of the
Convention must be viewed as equally important and the duty to protect
and preserve the marine environment is just as much an international
norm as the rights to innocent and transit passage."53
51. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 379; see also Boyle, supra note 34, at
352 (explaining that because the law of the sea before the adoption of UNCLOS failed to
cover marine pollution from land-based sources, preventing pollution from land-based sources
depended on unilateral measures of states concerned).
52. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 352-53.
53. NCI, supra note 6 (quoting a statement made by Professor Jon M. Van Dyke of
William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa); see also Main, supra
note 25, at 368 (stating that although the right of innocent passage is a primary concept in
UNCLOS, the Convention addresses the duty to protect the marine environment in much
depth).
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1. Substantive Environmental Measures for
Marine Pollution Prevention
Under Article II of UNCLOS, coastal states enjoy sovereignty over
the territorial sea,54 which is subject to the right of innocent passage by
flagged vessels of another state.55 Importantly, such passage must be "not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. 56 In
the context of marine environmental protection, passage of a foreign ship
conducting "any act of willful and serious pollution" is not innocent.57 To
prevent such passage, coastal states "may take the necessary steps" in-
cluding expulsion of non-innocent vessels from the territorial sea.
Without serious harm, however, a coastal state may not deprive the right
of innocent passage from a vessel merely carrying ultrahazardous sub-
stances, such as nuclear materials and highly toxic chemicals.5 9 The
coastal state may confine its passage to designated sea-lanes, 60 while the
vessel loaded with such substances must carry documents and comply
with "special precautionary measures" in applicable international in-
struments.6' In addition, coastal states may not hinder innocent passage
with impracticable requirements and discriminatory measures.62
In conformity with these general rights and obligations, a coastal
state may prescribe laws and regulations using its preferred standards to
preserve the marine environment and curtail pollution from foreign ves-
sels within the territorial sea.63 The foreign vessels must comply with
54. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 2(l), 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
55. Id. art. 2(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1272 ("The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised
subject to this Convention ..."); id. art. 17, 21 I.L.M. at 1273 ("Subject to this Convention,
ships of all States ... enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea").
56. Id. art. 19(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
57. Id. art. 19(l)(h), 21 I.L.M. at 1274; see also Raul A.F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nu-
clear Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 207, 223 (1997).
58. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 25(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1275. Although this provision
does not expressly spell out the coastal state's right to exclude vessels not engaged in innocent
passage, customary international law supports this right. See CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note
17, at 87.
59. Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 223-24.
60. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 22(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
61. Id. art. 23, 21 I.L.M. at 1274. For relevant international instruments concerning the
maritime transport of ultrahazardous materials, see supra note 47.
62. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 24(l)(a)-(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1275.
63. Id. art. 21(l)(f), 21 I.L.M. at 1274 ("The coastal State may adopt laws and regula-
tions, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law
... in respect of... the preservation of the environment of the coastal States and the preven-
tion, reduction and control of pollution thereof"); id. art. 211(4), 21 I.L.M. at 1310 (providing
that coastal states may, "in exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial sea," adopt laws
and regulations to curtail pollution from foreign vessels, while "[s]uch laws and regulations
shall ... not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels"); see also Boyle, supra note 34, at
359 (stating that UNCLOS, in general, maintains the basic preference for coastal states' do-
mestic rules and standards for pollution prevention within the territorial sea).
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properly prescribed laws and regulations of the coastal state during inno-
cent passagei" Nevertheless, coastal states may not apply domestic
regulations to affect the design, construction, manning, or equipment of
foreign vessels "unless they are giving effect to generally accepted inter-
national rules or standards."65 UNCLOS introduced this significant
exception to take into account maritime states' interests in navigation
while creating an incentive for them to adopt international safety stan-
dards established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
66
Within the EEZ, a coastal state has a sovereign right to explore and
manage natural resources.67 A healthy marine environment is necessary
to manage living natural resources on a sustainable basis. Nevertheless,
coastal states do not maintain full sovereignty within their respective
EEZs. Foreign vessels enjoy the freedom of navigation within the EEZ
of another state. 6 This arrangement creates tension between coastal
states and maritime states in exercising their rights and performing their
duties under UNCLOS. Part XII of the Convention purports to strike a
balance between the two sides.6 9 Under Article 211.5, coastal states may
prescribe rules to prevent pollution from vessels "conforming to and giv-
ing effect to generally accepted international rules and standards., 70 This
formulation gives coastal states no discretion in adopting their own stan-
dards, which must be neither higher nor lower than applicable
international standards.7' Nevertheless, a coastal state may apply "special
mandatory measures" to foreign vessels within an environmentally sensi-
tive area, provided that the coastal state obtains necessary authorizations
from the IMO acting as "the competent international organization. ' ' n
64. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 21(4), 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
65. Id. art. 21(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
66. See CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 17, at 94-95 (explaining that this provision
puts limitation on the legislative competence of coastal states to avoid differing standards in
design, construction, manning and equipment to which vessels cannot adjust during a voyage);
Boyle, supra note 34, at 360-61 (stating that the "international standards" provisions in
UNCLOS, in effect, limit the freedom of states to decline to ratify or apply relevant interna-
tional agreements). As a result, while maritime states may be compelled to apply international
standards that they have never ratified, they may exert influence over the development of in-
ternational safety standards through the IMO. Id. at 362.
67. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 56(1)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
68. Id. art. 58(l)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
69. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 358.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 211(5), 21 I.L.M. at 1311. When states adopted this
formulation in 1982, they seemed to have in mind the MARPOR Convention adopted in 1973
under the auspices of the IMO. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 361.
71. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 361.
72. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 211(6)(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1311. Within the designated
area, the coastal state may apply IMO standards specifically established for that area and,
additionally, its own domestic laws and regulations concerning discharges or navigation. Id.
art. 211(6)(a), (c).
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While coastal states obtain these quite novel jurisdictional bases for pol-
lution prevention within EEZs,73 their legislative competence in this
matter is narrowly tailored to minimize effects on maritime states' free-
dom of navigation.
On the high seas, flagged vessels are subject to exclusive control of
the flag states in exercising their right to the freedom of navigation.74 Ac-
cordingly, marine environmental protection on the high seas depends on
flag states' domestic measures. Part XII imposes individual and collec-
tive obligations on states to take measures to protect the marine
environment from pollution." In particular, domestic pollution preven-
tion measures "shall at least have the same effect as that of generally
accepted international rules and standards established through the com-
petent international organization or general diplomatic conference. 76
Unlike coastal states' laws and regulations, flag states' pollution preven-
tion measures are consistently applied to flagged vessels throughout a
voyage.7' Thus, to prevent pollution from flagged vessels, flag states are
encouraged to adopt stricter rules.
Regarding land-based sources, UNCLOS requires states to adopt
pollution prevention measures "taking into account internationally
agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures.78
According to this provision, such domestic standards can be lower than
international standards. 79 Because this matter squarely falls within the
territorial sovereignty of each state, the language is quite lenient com-
pared with the other provisions discussed above. To fill the gap,
UNCLOS requires that states endeavor to harmonize their pollution pre-
vention measures at the regional level, ° and encourages regional and
73. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 169 (explaining that coastal states'
prescriptive jurisdiction over marine environmental protection within EEZs was not generally
recognized prior to UNCLOS).
74. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 87, 21 I.L.M. at 1286 (the freedoms of the high seas);
id. art. 92(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1287 (flag states' exclusive jurisdiction).
75. Id. art. 194(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1308 ("States shall take, individually or jointly as ap-
propriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the marine environment from any source. ); id. art. 194(2), 21
I.L.M. at 1308 (providing for states' duty to prevent transboundary marine environmental
pollution resulting from activities under their jurisdiction or control); id. art. 195, 21 I.L.M. at
1308 (spelling out states' duty not to transfer damage or hazards or transform one type of
pollution into another).
76. Id. art. 211.2.
77. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 358 (arguing that the prescriptive jurisdiction of
coastal states in marine environmental protection plays a secondary role to supplement the
primary duty of flag states to regulate pollutants from their own vessels).
78. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 207(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1310.
79. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 354-55.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 207(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1310 (regional harmonization);
id. art. 207(4), 21 I.L.M. at 1310 (global and regional rules).
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
global cooperation in marine environmental protection.8' Indeed, these
provisions gave rise to regional regimes, including the OSPAR Conven-
tion 2 and other similar regional seas conventions."
2. Environmental Assessment as a Procedural Requirement
for Marine Environmental Protection
Thus far, this Article has examined the command-and-control aspect
of marine environmental pollution measures under UNCLOS. In addi-
tion, the Convention introduces measures to facilitate marine
environmental protection including, inter alia, assessment of potential
environmental impacts. An environmental impact assessment is a process
to examine, analyze, and evaluate planned activities in order to attain
sustainable development through environmentally informed decision-
making.H As contemporary environmental law shifts emphasis from
command-and-control measures to more holistic and preventive ap-
proaches, a state's duty to conduct environmental impact assessment has
emerged as a fundamental principle of international environmental law.85
81. Id. art. 197, 21 I.L.M. at 1308 (dealing with global and regional cooperation for
marine environmental protection); id. art. 200, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 (providing for facilitation of
studies, research programs, and exchange of information and data for marine environmental
protection); id. art. 201, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 (encouraging the development of scientific criteria
for regulations to protect the marine environment).
82. OSPAR Convention, supra note 11, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1072 ("Recalling the rele-
vant provisions of customary international law reflected in Part XII of the United Nations Law
of the Sea Convention and, in particular, Article 197 on global and regional cooperation for
the protection and preservation of the marine environment").
83. See UNEP, supra note 39 (listing regional seas conventions and protocols).
84. UNEP Governing Council, Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, Dec. 14/25, UN Doc. UNEP/GCIDEC/14/25 (1987), available at http://www-
penelope.drec.unilim.fr/penelope/library/Libs/Int nal/unep.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter UNEP Guidelines]; World Bank, Environmental Assessment, in THE WORLD
BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL: OPERATIONAL POLICIEs 4.01, 2 (1999), available at http://
wbln001 8.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/944eeaI d5fb3 1 d95852564a300
60b223/9367a2a9d9daeed38525672c007d0972?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 9, 2004);
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 366; Knox, supra note 33, at 291; Okowa, supra note 33, at
279.
85. See Kevin R. Gray, International Environmental Impact Assessment: Potential for a
Multilateral Environmental Agreement, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 83, 88 (2000);
see also Agenda 21, supra note 40, 8.5(b) (urging states to introduce "comprehensive ana-
lytical procedures" to assess economic, social and environmental impacts as well as costs,
benefits and risks in projects, policies, and programs to support more integrated decision-
making). Many commentaries regard the duty of states to conduct environmental impact as-
sessments as an emerging norm of customary international law. HUNTER ET AL., supra note
18, at 367; see also Erika L. Preiss, Student Article, The International Obligation to Conduct
an Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, 7 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308 & n.6 (1999); Gray, supra, at 127 (arguing that a
state's duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment "is arguably a customary principle
of international law at least where the environmental impact is expected to be grave"); Nicho-
las A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. ENVTL.
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Since 1969, when the United States initially instituted environmental
impact assessment through the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),86 more than a hundred countries have introduced similar domes-
tic procedures87 and numerous international legal instruments have
incorporated environmental impact assessment provisions." Principle 17
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 codi-
fies this basic duty as follows:
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall
be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a
significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to
a decision of a competent national authority. 9
Agenda 21, an action plan for the Rio Declaration, urges states to apply
environmental impact assessment in order to protect the marine envi-
ronment.90
A proposed activity may have domestic environmental impacts as
well as transboundary environmental impacts, which may extend beyond
the jurisdiction or control of the originating state. In the domestic con-
AFF. L. REV. 591, 602 (1992) ("It is becoming a norm of customary international law that
nations should engage in effective EIA [environmental impact assessment] before taking ac-
tion that could adversely affect either shared natural resources, another country's environment,
or the Earth's commons."). But see Okowa, supra note 33, at 279, 317, 335-36 (providing a
cautious assessment that the duty to conduct transboundary environmental impact assessment
has not yet attained the status of customary international law, although this duty has been
affirmed in a number of international legal instruments).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (2000).
87. See Knox, supra note 33, at 296-97; Gray, supra note 85, at 89.
88. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, opened for signature May 21, 1997, art. 12, 36 I.L.M. 700, 707
(1997) (providing for timely notification and information exchange including the results of
relevant environmental impact assessments); Agreement for the Implementation of the Provi-
sions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, arts. 5(c), 6(1), 6(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37
(1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1550-51 (1995) (requiring that coastal states and mari-
time states cooperate in assessing impacts of fishing, other activities, and environmental
factors on target stocks and related species); United Nations Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, June 5, 1992, art. 14, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 151, 31 I.L.M. 818, 827 (1992) (including
environmental impact assessment procedures with notification, information exchange, and
consultation processes); United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 3, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316-17
(1992) (requiring states to introduce legal, administrative, economic, financial, and technical
frameworks to implement environmental impact assessment); see also discussion infra Part IV
(examining in detail major international environmental impact assessment instruments). For a
comprehensive list of earlier international instruments dealing with environmental impact
assessments, see Robinson, supra note 85, app. 2, at 617-19.
89. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, princ. 17.
90. See Agenda 21, supra note 40, 17.21.
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text, an environmental impact assessment (1) promotes fully informed
decision-making that takes into account the potential environmental ef-
fects of the proposed activity and (2) offers an opportunity for affected
citizens to understand the proposed activities and provide input in deci-
sion-making.9' In the transboundary context, an environmental impact
assessment involves the interstate processes of notification, information
exchange, and consultation.92 Accordingly, transboundary environmental
impact assessment ensures: (1) that transboundary environmental effects
of a proposed activity are fully considered in the decision-making proc-
ess of the originating state, and (2) that affected states are given prior
notification and adequate information on the proposed activity and an
91. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 367; Knox, supra note 33, at 297; Preiss, supra
note 85, at 310; Robinson, supra note 85, at 594; Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 402.
92. See Okowa, supra note 33, at 279-80, 302. The Rio Declaration codifies the basic
norm of the interstate processes as follows: "States shall provide prior and timely notification
and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant
adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early
stage and in good faith." Rio Declaration, supra note 33, princ. 19. The originating state's
obligations to notify and consult stem from the customary international law principle of good
neighborliness. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 23-35 (July 25),
(holding that the parties are "under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith
for the equitable resolution of their differences concerning their respective fishery rights"
pursuant to existing international law); Lake Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
156, 167-69 (1959) (Ad hoc Arb. 1957) (opining that according to the rules of good faith, the
upstream state has the obligation to consider different interests of other riparian states and that
the parties concerned have the duty to negotiate in good faith during which they "must consent
to suspend the full exercise of their rights"); see also ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 4,
M 1-2 (explaining the duty to cooperate in good faith in the context of significant transbound-
ary harm); Boyle, Nuclear Energy, supra note 33, at 312 (concluding that it is "firmly
established" that states have "a customary law obligation to co-operate with neighbouring
States in the management of transboundary environmental risks," which entails notification
and negotiation to curtail risks of transboundary environmental hazards from planned activi-
ties); Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 401 (stating that the duty to consult derive from the duty to
consider the interests of other states as well as the duty to inform, which in turn flows from the
principle of good faith in international relations). ITLOS affirmed the originating state's obli-
gations to inform and consult with potentially affected states partly based on the duty to
cooperate under customary international law. See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
Some commentators regard the originating state's obligations to notify and consult also
as basic due diligence requirements concerning environmental state responsibility. See ILC
Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 3, 4, 7; art. 9, 6; art. 12, 2; Gunther Handl, State
Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 525, 557 (1980); John M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Danger-
ous Activity, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 197, 242-43 (1972); Okowa, supra note 33, at 280, 302. But
see Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1515 (questioning the wisdom of the duty to
assess environmental impact and the duty to inform as the procedural extension of environ-
mental state responsibility); Knox, supra note 33, at 291, 319 (questioning the majority view
that transboundary environmental impact assessment is corollary to environmental state re-
sponsibility and constitutes part of customary international law). For the fundamental
difference between the majority and minority views regarding environmental state responsibil-
ity, see supra note 33.
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opportunity to consult with the originating state regarding the potentially
significant transboundary impacts of the proposed activity.93 By taking
into account the results of the assessment and concerns expressed by the
affected states, the originating state may decide to deny authorization for
or may attach conditionality to the proposed activity including modifica-
tion of the project design, use of mitigation measures, or adoption of a
less environmentally harmful alternative.9 Thus, environmental impact
assessments, combined with command-and-control measures, enable
states to better address transboundary pollution.
In 1982, UNCLOS incorporated this basic international environ-
mental norm at the rudimentary stage of its development. Article 206,
entitled "Assessment of potential effects of activities," which reads as
follows:
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned
activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substan-
tial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine
environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment .... 9'
Unlike the pollution prevention measures discussed above, Article
206 is quite vague. This provision fails to identify which state should be
responsible for assessing the impacts of an activity that falls under con-
current jurisdiction of several states. The provision does not specify the
factors to be considered in evaluating the effects of proposed activities. It
is also silent as to the treatment of applicable international standards for
environmental impact assessments.
In addition, interstate processes are not well articulated under
UNCLOS. Although the Convention has provisions for information ex-
change, Article 200, which addresses the exchange of information and
data "for the purpose of promoting studies,, 96 does not deal with infor-
mation exchange regarding specific activities. Article 206 establishes
states' obligation to disseminate environmental assessment reports in
accordance with Article 205, which requires states to "provide such re-
ports at appropriate intervals to the competent international
organizations, which should make them available to all States."97 Under
this lenient provision, affected states might not obtain timely informa-
tion, or the competent international organizations might fail to provide
93. See UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, Preliminary Notes (Goals 1 & 3); see also
Handl, supra note 92, at 557; Okowa, supra note 33, at 277-78.
94. See Handl, supra note 92, at 557; Okowa, supra note 33, at 277.
95. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 206, 21 I.L.M. at 1309.
96. Id. art. 200, 21 I.L.M. at 1309.
97. Id. art. 205, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
vital information to the affected states. UNCLOS also lacks any explicit
reference to prior notification and consultation. Although Article 198
requires states to notify affected states and the competent international
organizations of "imminent or actual damage" of the marine environ-
ment, this provision does not cover prior notification of potential harm. 98
Unfortunately, these ambiguities have been replicated in regional
seas conventions. Most of the regional conventions have incorporated
similar environmental impact assessment provisions without detailed
procedures. 99 Although some regional conventions include provisions for
the interstate processes, these provisions again lack details to make them
operational. '°°
As a result, the rudimentary environmental impact assessment
provisions in UNCLOS and regional seas conventions offer little
guidance in resolving the MOX plant dispute, in which Ireland alleges
that the United Kingdom failed to conduct an adequate environmental
impact assessment and refused to engage in meaningful information
exchange and consultation with Ireland regarding the potential impacts
98. Id. art. 198, 21 I.L.M. at 1309 (emphasis added); see also Van Dyke, supra note 41,
at 382 (stating that the duty of prompt notification in the event of emergency is distinct from
the duty of prior notification and consultation to create a contingency plan in ultrahazardous
activities).
99. See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal
Region of the Mediterranean, as revised June 10, 1995, art. 4(c), available at http://
www.unep.ch/seas/main/med/medconvii.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Barce-
lona Convention]; Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment
of the Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, art. 12.2, T.I.A.S. 11085, at 9, 1506 U.N.T.S.
157, 161, available at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.html (last visited Nov.
12, 2003) [hereinafter Caribbean Sea Convention]; Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-
Based Sources and Activities, Oct. 6, 1999, art. 7(2), to the Caribbean Sea Convention
supra, available at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/lbsmp/final%20protocollbsmp-
protocol eng.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003); Convention for the Protection, Management
and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, June
21, 1985, art. 13(1), reprinted in 1986 O.J. (C 253) 10, 12, available at http://www.unep.ch/
seas/main/eaf/eafconv.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Eastern African Conven-
tion]; Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Apr. 21, 1992, art.
15(2), (5), 32 I.L.M. 110, 115-16, available at http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/backsea/
bsconv.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and
Sustainable Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific,
Feb. 18, 2002, arts. 5(6)(c), 6(2)(b), available at http://www.unep.chl/seas/main/nep/
nepconve.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); Convention on the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment of the Baltic Sea Area, Jan. 17, 2000, art. 7(l), available at http://
www.helcom.fi//helcom/convention.html#Article7 [hereinafter Helsinki Convention]. Al-
though the OSPAR Convention provides for "Assessment for the Quality of the Marine
Environment" with detailed procedures, it deals with general assessment through regular
monitoring and does not codify environmental impact assessments for proposed activities.
OSPAR Convention, supra note 11, art. 6, 32 I.L.M. at 1077.
100. See Barcelona Convention, supra note 99, art. 4(d); Eastern African Convention,
supra note 99, art. 13(3), 1986 O.J. (C 253) at 12; Helsinki Convention, supra note 99, art.
7(2), 1507 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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of the proposed MOX project on the marine environment of the Irish
Sea. The following section will examine the details of this dispute.
II. THE MOX PLANT CASE
(IR. v. U.K.)
A. The Dispute
1. Radioactive Discharges from the Sellafield MOX Plant
The dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom involves po-
tential transboundary environmental risks to the Irish Sea from the
operation of the proposed MOX plant, related activities at Sellafield, and
marine transports of radioactive materials.'0 ' BNFL, a government-
owned company, is responsible for most of the activities at Sellafield,
which include the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, the manufacturing
of MOX fuel, and the management of radioactive waste.' 2 Currently,
BNFL and COGEMA, its French counterpart, conduct reprocessing in a
large scale at a commercial basis to "recycle" plutonium and uranium for
nuclear power generation. '°3 Conventional commercial light water reac-
tors use low-enriched uranium fuel to generate electricity. Spent low-
enriched uranium fuel contains unused fissile uranium and fissile pluto-
nium created through nuclear fission, as well as highly radioactive waste
products.' ° Through reprocessing, fissile uranium and plutonium are
101. Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland, MOX Plant (ir.
v. U.K.), at 4, 5 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 2001), available at http://
www.itlos.org/case-documents/2001/document-en_191.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [here-
inafter ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case].
102. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 17-18, 1.44; Counter-Memorial of the
United Kingdom, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), at 17, 2.2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/PDFJUK%20Counter%20-Memorial.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) [here-
inafter Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial]; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101,
at 4, 15.
103. See World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy Made Simple: Nuclear Fuel Cycle,
at http://www.world-nuclear.org/education/nfc.htm (last updated Jan. 2002). Japanese utility
companies have engaged reprocessing contracts with BNFL and COGEMA, which have
Europe's two largest reprocessing facilities at Sellafield and at La Hague respectively.
See Greenpeace, Plutonium--Questions and Answers 2, 4, at http://www.greenpeace.org/
-nuclear/bnfl/docs/plutoniumq&afinal.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
104. Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 28, 2.11 (explaining that spent fuel still
contains 96 percent of the original uranium as well as one percent plutonium and three percent
waste products); see also Helton, supra note 6, at 180 (outlining the process of nuclear fission,
which creates plutonium and other fission products "dangerously radioactive for tens of
thousands of years") (quoting Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, Issue Brief for
Congress, 92-059 at 35 (July 30, 2001), at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreportsWaste/
waste-2.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004)).
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separated from the waste.' °5 Recovered uranium is reused to manufacture
low-enrichment uranium fuel. Recovered plutonium is mixed with ura-
nium and converted into MOX fuel.'06 In theory, MOX fuel would be
used in fast breeder reactors that could reproduce more fissile plutonium
than they had consumed while generating electricity.' 7 In practice, tech-
nical difficulties have prevented realizing viable commercial fast breeder
reactor technology.' 8 To avoid accumulating plutonium inventory, in-
stead, MOX fuel is directed to light water reactors as an alternative to
low-enriched uranium fuel.' °9
BNFL recovers plutonium and uranium at Sellafield's two reprocess-
ing plants."0 The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) treats
most foreign customers' spent fuel, except for a fraction of Japanese fuel
that is reprocessed at the Magnox Reprocessing Plant."' BNFL has
105. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 29, V 2.15-.16; see also Helton, supra
note 6, at 181; Larry R. Foulke & Ruth F. Weiner, Plutonium Transportation-Risks and Bene-
fits, AM. NUCLEAR Soc'y, June 17-21, 2002, at 6 (prepared for presentation at the Latin
American Symposium on Power Supply and Its Problems: The Nuclear Proposal), available at
http://www.ans.orglpi/sptopicslpdfs/pluttrans.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
106. World Nuclear Association, supra note 103, 7.
107. See Bayan Rahman, Ruling Hits Japan's Nuclear Power Sector: Electricity Genera-
tion Court Rules That Controversial Reactor Must Not be Restarted, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2003, at 7.
108. Greenpeace, supra note 103, at 4 (stating that France, Germany, the United King-
dom, and the United States have abandoned their fast breeder reactor programs because of
technical and economic problems). Japan has closed its prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju,
since a fire caused by a major leak of liquid sodium coolant on December 8, 1995. Citizen's
Nuclear Information Center, Major Victory to Brow Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy: The Ground
Breaking Ruling on the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor, NUKE INFO TOKYO, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at
1-2, available at http:/lcnic.jplenglish/nitlfiles/nit93.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). Although
the Japanese government hopes to resume the operation of Monju by 2005, the plan was effec-
tively blocked by Nagoya High Court's judgment on January 27, 2003 that recognized flaws in
the Monju pre-construction safety review and ultimately nullified the Japanese authority's
construction permission of 1983. Id; Rahman, supra note 108, at 7.
109. See supra note 6.
110. Request for Provisional Measures: Written Response of the United Kingdom, MOX
Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), at 16, 29 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 2001), at
http:l/www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/document-en-192.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004)
[hereinafter ITLOS U.K.'s Response]; see also Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 31-
33, 2.27-35 (detailing the process of manufacturing MOX fuel).
111. See U.K. Dep't for Env't, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Re BNFL's MOX Plant
at Its Site in Sellafield, Cumbria: Justification for the Manufacture of MOX Fuel: Decision of
the Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and the Secretary of State for
Health 22, 78 (2001), at http:llwww.defra.gov.uk/environment/radioactivitylmox/pdflmox-
decision.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter DEFRA Decision]. Currently, BNFL's
reprocessing business at THORP depends substantially on foreign customers. See Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 30, 2.22 (noting that between 1994 and 2004, about two
thirds of the THORP reprocessing contracts are from overseas customers including Japan,
Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands). THORP is designed to reprocess ura-
nium-dioxide fuel encased in stainless steel cladding, while the Magnox Reprocessing Plant
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manufactured MOX fuel assemblies for foreign utility companies from
fissile materials obtained at THORP by using the existing MOX Demon-
stration Facility (although its operation is presently suspended due to the
falsification incident). ' 2 The proposed full-scale commercial plant will
increase BNFL's MOX production capacity from 8 tons to 120 tons a
year.' 3 To reduce a stockpile of plutonium recovered under existing
THORP reprocessing contracts,"' BNFL has already entered into sepa-
rate contracts with utility companies in Germany, Japan, Sweden, and
Switzerland to manufacture MOX fuel assemblies at the new MOX
plant."' BNFL has sought the substantial expansion of MOX production
capacity to attract further reprocessing contracts with foreign customers
in competition with COGEMA, which already operates a large-scale
commercial MOX plant.'16
deals with Magnox fuel, which consists of natural uranium metal covered by cladding made
from magnesium oxide. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 17, 30, 1.42, 2.19.
112. See Bellona Foundation, supra note 2, at 20, 3.1; see also Her Majesty's Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate (Nil), Summary Report on the Progress of BNFL in Responding to
HSE's MDF and Team Inspection Recommendations 4 (2000) (stating that when the Nil
authorizes BNFL to restart the MOX Demonstration Facility, BNFL will use the demonstra-
tion facility to support the development of the Sellafield MOX Plant and will not operate it for
MOX production), at http://www.hse.gov.uk/nsd/bnflprog.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2003).
113. See BNFL, supra note 8, at 6, 2.7, 2.9. MOX production capacity is measured by
heavy metal ton per year (HMt/y).
114. No new reprocessing contracts at THORP have been concluded since 1997. Annex
VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 66, 3.22(5).
115. Arthur D. Little Ltd., Assessment of BNFL's Business Case for the Sellafield MOX
Plant: Public Domain Version of the Report Submitted to DEFRA/DH on 15 June 2001, app.
A9, at 25 (2001), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/consult/mox/adl/
pdf/ADL-public.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); see also Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial,
supra note 102, at 12, 65-66, 11.35, 3.22.
116. See Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115, app. A8, at 21; MacPherson, supra note 3;
see also Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 31, 2.23 ("Without MOX it is unlikely
that THORP would obtain any new contracts."); Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115, at 30
(confirming that "there would be little point" for the foreign customers to sign further reproc-
essing contracts with BNFL without the MOX plant); BNFL, supra note 8, at 6, 2.6
(explaining that overseas customers, who are obliged to take the return shipments of pluto-
nium under reprocessing contracts with BNFL, increasingly prefer to receive plutonium in the
form of MOX fuel).
Despite the above expectation, on August 26, 2003, BNFL made public its intention to
cease the operation of THORP by 2010 after it has fulfilled existing contracts. See Paul
Brown, Sellafield Shutdown Ends the Nuclear Dream: Pounds 1.8bn Thorp Plant that Prom-
ised Limitless Electricity to Close by 2010, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 26, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uknews/story/0,3604,1029333,00.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2003). The Magnox Reprocessing Plant is also to be phased out by 2012. See Annex VII
U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 43, T 2.73. Thereafter, BNFL plans to convert
itself into a nuclear waste disposal company. BNFL's withdrawal from reprocessing business
is apparently not because of the MOX plant dispute but because of operational problems in the
reprocessing plants as well as its exposure to British Energy's financial crisis. See Brown,
supra, at I (reporting that THORP's output has been reduced to about a half of its capacity
because of its inability to treat radioactive liquid waste generated through reprocessing speed-
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The United Kingdom has developed the Sellafield nuclear industrial
complex in Cumbria on the northeast English coast of the Irish Sea, a
semi-closed sea lying between the United Kingdom and Ireland."' The
distance between the British nuclear industrial site and the Irish coast at
its closest point is about 112 miles.' 8 In 1977, both states claimed a 200-
mile EEZ over the Irish Sea, and the relevant EC legislation presently
authorizes Irish vessels to fish within 6 miles of the Sellafield site." 9
The Sellafield site has concerned the Irish people since the 1950s,
due to routine radioactive discharges, as well as the accumulation of ra-
dioactive waste' 20 and a history of accidents including a major fire at a
nuclear reactor in 1957.121 The Irish Sea is presently known as one of
"the most radioactively polluted seas in the world,"' although dis-
charges from the Sellafield site have declined since the 1970s.'23 Ireland
is concerned not only about direct discharges from the new MOX plant,
which the United Kingdom claims as de minimus,24 but also about the
intensification of reprocessing business at THORP, which has routinely
ily enough to comply with government regulations); Paul Brown, Meacher Applauds Thorp
Closure: Reprocessing was Pointless, Says Former Environmental Minister, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 27, 2003, at 6 (stating that BNFL had to renegotiate reprocessing contract with British
Energy to save the struggling nuclear energy company from recent financial crisis), available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,1029877,00.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2003).
117. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 4, 5; Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 176-91, In 8.165-237.
118. Annex VII In's Memorial, supra note 5, at 16, 1.39; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of
Case, supra note 101, at 4, 5.
119. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 4, 5. Although the median line
across the Irish Sea is established as the formal boundary between the two sides for fishery
control purposes, Irish vessels do fish within six miles of Sellafield. Id.
120. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 22, '11.59 (noting that currently,
BNFL is estimated to have 1,600 cubic meters of liquid high-level waste in the storage facility
at Sellafield). Sellafield's high-level evaporation and storage facility is known as "the largest
single nuclear inventory in Europe." Paul Brown, Inside Sellafield: Decaying and Dangerous,
the Legacy of a Flawed Nuclear Vision: Sellafield's Building 277 Is One of the UK's Most
Hazardous Radioactive Sites, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 26, 2003, at 4, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk news/story/0,3604,1029273,00.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
121. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 9, 15; Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 23, 1.64; see also Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 16, 1.41 (not-
ing that the 1957 fire at Windscale (renamed Sellafield) is one of the world's worst nuclear
power accidents along with Chernobyl and Three Mile Island).
122. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 6, 10; Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 3, 9-10, In 1.2, 1.19, 1.20 & n.22.
123. ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 40, 99; Memorial of Ireland, Dispute
Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), at
4, 9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/Ireland%20-%20Memorial.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial].
124. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 52-55, 3.7-.13; ITLOS U.K.'s Re-
sponse, supra note 110, at 11, 14 (maintaining that discharges from the MOX plant will be
"infinitesimally small").
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discharged radioactive substances into the Irish Sea at a much higher
level.2 2 Low concentrations of artificially made radionuclides are already
detected in seaweeds, shellfish, and wildlife in sea areas affected by dis-
charges from Sellafield.2 6 Although it is officially regarded that heavy
consumption of affected seafood does not pose significant radiological
health risks, 27 great uncertainty exists regarding the potential ecological
impacts of radionuclides in the marine environment. 2
125. OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 123, at 4, 9; see also Annex VII Ir's Memorial,
supra note 5, at 3, 19-20, 1.2, 1.51. As to gaseous discharges, the dose impact of THORP is
5,000 times larger than that of the MOX plant; as to liquid discharges, the dose impact of
THORP is 666,667 times larger than that of the MOX plant. See Annex VII U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 60, 71, 3.9, 3.33. The dose impacts here refer to the
estimated radiation doses to the most exposed group in the United Kingdom. Id.
Ireland's concern about cumulative impacts was by no means speculative when the dis-
pute had arisen. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also BNFL, supra note 8, at
9, $ 3.6-.9 (stating that BNFL has chosen the Sellafield site for the new MOX plant because
of the advantages of "integrated access with THORP," "management and operations ... com-
bined with THORP," and shared facilities with THORP). While BNFL's recent decision to
withdraw completely from reprocessing business may not affect Ireland's case in the pending
proceedings, it could have ramifications for the embattled MOX plant. See Brown, supra note
120, at 4 (interviewing Michael Meacher, the former U.K. environment minister, who said,
"[tihis decision to close Thorp must be the death knell for the MOX plant too, because one is
dependent on the other.").
126. See Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 11, 13, U 1.26, 1.32 (quoting the
OSPAR Quarterly Status Report 2000). In addition, it is estimated that 200 kilograms of plu-
tonium contaminates the Irish Sea as sediments, which resulted mostly from routine and
accidental releases from Sellafield. Id. at 9, 10, 13, 1.19, 1.27, 1.31. Environmental degra-
dation in the Irish Sea is "irreversible in the human scale" given that some of released
radioactive isotopes have extreme radiotoxicity or overwhelmingly long half-lives. Id. at 63,
199, (N 3.51, 8.285. See generally Foulke & Weiner, supra note 105, at 1 (explaining that
plutonium has 15 isotopes with half-lives ranging from 20 minutes to 76 million years). For
more information about radiological effects of plutonium and other radionuclides, see infra
notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
127. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 64, 3.59; see also Annex VII U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 75-77, 78, 3.44-46, 3.49; ITLOS U.K.'s Response,
supra note 110, at 40, 99 (quoting the words of the Deputy Chief Executive of the Radio-
logical Protection Institute of Ireland).
128. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 11, 13, 1 1.29 (pointing out that "no
internationally accepted radiological criteria for the protection of marine flora and fauna" is
available because radiological effects on the marine ecosystems are little studied). According to
several studies, there are no currently identifiable impacts of radioactive discharges on popula-
tions of marine biota of the northeast Irish Sea. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note
102, at 83-85, l 3.59-.63; Rejoinder of the U.K., MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), at 33-34, $ 2.41-.43
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/UK%20Rejoinder%2Part%201.pdf,
http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/UK%20Rejoinder%2OPart%201.pdf (last visited July 31, 2003)
[hereinafter Annex VII U.K.'s Rejoinder]. Nevertheless, these studies are not designed to capture
radiological impacts on the complex ecosystems of the marine environment, which entail di-
verse habitats and an intricate balance between species. Reply of It., MOX Plant (It. v. U.K.),
at 24-25, 1 2.73-.76 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/
Ireland%2OReply.pdf (last visited July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Annex VII Ir.'s Reply]; see also
de Fontaubert, supra note 18, at 761.
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
Given the evidence that marine currents have carried radioactivity
from the Irish Sea into some of the most valuable fishing ground for
Scandinavian vessels, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
have also expressed concern about radioactive releases from Sellafield
29
In July 1998, the parties to the OSPAR Convention, including the
Scandinavian countries as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland,
adopted the OSPAR Strategy "with the ultimate aim of concentrations in
the environment ... close to zero for artificial radioactive substances" by
2020.30 In October 2001, the five Scandinavian states demanded that the
United Kingdom halt all radioactive discharges from Sellafield and stop
the reprocessing business at THORP. 3' In particular, Norway formally
conveyed its strong regret to the United Kingdom when the U.K. gov-
ernment determined that the new MOX plant was economically
justified.
1 3 2
129. David McKittrick, Irish Flotilla to Confront Sellafield Ships, INDEPENDENT, Sept.
13, 2002, at 12, available at 2002 WL 26239159. The 2000 OSPAR Report found the rapid
spread of technetium-99 from the Irish Sea into the North Sea. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 11, 1.26; see also Perera, supra note 14 (reporting that the Institute of Ma-
rine Research in Bergen found a tenfold increase in levels of technetium-99 carried from
Sellafield into the sea around northern Norway). Technetium-99 is an artificially made ra-
dionuclide with a half-life of 212,000 years. See United States Envtl. Prot. Agency
(U.S. EPA), Radiation Information: Technetium-99, at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/
radionuclides/technetium.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2002). Not only Sellafield's reprocessing
plants but also those of La Hague, France contribute to the contamination of northern Euro-
pean seas with artificially made radionuclides, although radioactive discharges from Sellafield
are much higher than those of the French counterpart. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5,
at 10, 111.23-.24.
130. Sintra Statement, Jul. 23, 1998, OSPAR Comm'n, Ministerial Mtg. 13, available
at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/md/sintra.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2003). The Sintra State-
ment also notes a unanimous decision of the OSPAR Commission terminating the possible
future exemptions for France and the United Kingdom from the prohibition on the dumping of
low-level and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. Id. 12. At the Sintra Ministerial meet-
ing, the U.K. authorities further indicated that they would address the Scandinavian countries'
concern about technetium-99 through the discharge authorization process for Sellafield. Id.
17.
131. Annex VI Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 24, 1.68; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of
Case, supra note 101, at 8, 13. In March 2002, the Parties to the North Sea Conference,
except France, also supported the ministerial declaration that called for the evaluation of "the
options for spent fuel management after current reprocessing contracts have come to an end."
Ariane Sains, North Sea States Propose Future 'Evaluation' of Reprocessing, NUCLEONICS
WEEK, Mar. 28, 2002, at 15, available at 2002 WL 10528791. This formulation accommo-
dates Sweden's contradictory position where it condemns radioactive discharges from
Sellafield while its utility company has already contracted with BNFL for reprocessing of
spent fuel. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
132. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 24, 1.68; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of
Case, supra note 101, at 8, 13. Although Norway ultimately decided not to join Ireland in
legal actions against the United Kingdom, Norway is ready to take future action if the United
Kingdom fails to reduce discharges of technetium-99 from Sellafield. Perera, supra note 14, at
7. To appease the concerns of Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom
decided to require BNFL adopt two types of abatement technology to curtail technetium-99
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2. Marine Transports of Nuclear Materials
Associated with MOX Production
In addition to reprocessing and fuel manufacturing, BNFL transports
MOX fuel as a separate business through its subsidiary, Pacific Nuclear
Transport, Ltd. (PNTL).'3 3 Although MOX fuel can be transported by rail
or road in Europe, delivery of MOX fuel to Japan almost inevitably in-
volves marine transport.3 Customarily, Japanese electric utilities sign
separate sea transport contracts with BNFL, which establish the required
MOX transport routes to Japan.' 35 BNFL has already accumulated an
inventory of 45 tons of plutonium dioxide reprocessed from previously
contracted Japanese spent fuel.'36 To appease the international commu-
nity's concern about grave threats of terrorism to plutonium shipments,
BNFL mixes the plutonium inventory with uranium and sends it back to
Japan in the form of MOX fuel.'37 MOX fuel contains three to ten percent
plutonium dioxide, depending on the type of the reactor. 38 Assuming
each fuel assembly contains five percent plutonium, the 45-ton pluto-
nium inventory will be converted into 900 tons of MOX fuel. Ireland
estimates that this will require at least 60 shipments if PNTL vessels are
fully loaded.
39
The United Kingdom maintains that MOX will be shipped in com-
pliance with all applicable international standards developed and
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
almost exclusively released from the reprocessing of Magnox spent fuel. See DEFRA, Radio-
active Discharges: Sellafield/Technetium-99 (Dec. 11, 2002), at http://www.defra.gov.uk/
environment/radioactivity/discharge/sellafield/index.htm (last modified July 8, 2003).
133. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 51, 2.88 & n.88 (noting
that BNFL owns 62.5 percent of PNTL shares with the remaining shares held by COGEMA of
France and three Japanese utilities and three Japanese trading companies).
134. See NCI, Plutonium Air Shipments, at http://www.nci.org/airtrans.htm (last visited
June 25, 2003) (reporting that in 1987, when plutonium air shipments were about to begin
between Europe and Japan over Alaska, the U.S. Congress introduced legislation preventing
such shipments, which compelled Japan to shift to maritime transportation of plutonium).
Given a delay in building a domestic reprocessing plant, Japanese utilities continue depending
on the European reprocessing industry to reduce a stockpile of spent fuel. See Arthur D. Little
Ltd., supra note 115, app. A3, at 6; Greenpeace, supra note 103, at 4.
135. Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115, at 22, 1.6.1.
136. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 17, 33.
137. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 92, 3.83 & n.120;
ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 31, 170; Underhill, supra note 6, at 44; see also
NCI, supra note 6, 3 (stating that the marine transport of pure plutonium is politically unac-
ceptable after the controversial plutonium dioxide shipments).
138. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 31, 2.27; Foulke & Weiner, supra note
105, at 6.
139. Annex VH Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 34-35, T 2.41; ITLOS Ir's Statement of
Case, supra note 101, at 18, 33.
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the IMO.' 40 IAEA instruments cover the security of nuclear cargoes and
the safety of packages containing nuclear materials.14' The Convention
on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1979 imposes the duty to
safeguard radioactive materials loaded on British vessels on the United
Kingdom. 42 In addition, the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material 43 provide for performance requirements and test
standards for the transportation package of radioactive materials.
Through domestic legislation, the United Kingdom applies the IAEA
Regulations to BNFL's nuclear shipments to overseas customers.
144
The IMO deals with the safety of vessels carrying highly radioactive
cargoes. The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG
Code),'4 5 which governs the maritime transport of various ultrahazardous
materials, incorporates the IAEA Regulations and the Code for the Safe
Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioac-
tive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (INF Code). 46 To transport MOX
140. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 27-32, 47-54, 90-96,
2.33-45, 2.79-.96, 3.79-.92. See generally Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 214-18 (arguing
that even if a cask that complies with IAEA standards is lost at sea, serious radioactive release
in the marine environment is highly unlikely).
141. See generally Boyle, Nuclear Energy, supra note 33, at 261-66 (discussing IAEA's
function to ensure health and safety in every aspect of the use of nuclear energy).
142. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, art.
3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, at 7, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, 126 [hereinafter Physical Protection Conven-
tion]; Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 28, 2.37 (noting that the
Convention took effect for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Euratom in 1991); see also Code
of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, 3, IAEA
Res. GC(XXX1V)/RES/530 (Nov. 13, 1990), available at http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf386.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
IAEA Code of Practice] ("Every State should take the appropriate steps necessary to ensure
that radioactive waste within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control is safely managed
... to ensure the protection of human health and the environment"); Joint Convention on
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Sept.
5, 1997, available at http://www.iaea.orglPublicaions/Documents/Conventions/jointconv.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Joint Safety Convention] (requiring each party involved
in transboundary movement of spent fuel and radioactive waste "take the appropriate steps to
ensure that each movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this
convention and relevant binding international instruments"). The Joint Convention entered
into force for Ireland and the U.K. on June 18, 2001. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial,
supra note 102, at 28, 2.38.
143. IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1 (ST-
1, Revised 1996); see also Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 30, 48-49,
I 2.40, 2.80-.81.
144. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 47, [ 2.80 (noting that the
IAEA Regulations are implemented through the domestic legislation of 130 countries includ-
ing the parties to this dispute).
145. IMDG Code, supra note 47.
146. Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level
Radioactive Waste in Flasks on Board Ships, IMO Assembly Resolution A.748(18) (Nov. 4,
1993) [hereinafter INF Code]; see also Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102,
at 50, 1 2.86. In May 2002, the IMO made these codes almost universally binding through the
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fuel, spent fuel, and high-level waste between Europe and Japan, PNTL
has five U.K. registered vessels classified as INF Class 3, which are cer-
tified to carry materials covered by the INF Code without restrictions on
the maximum aggregate radioactivity. "' The United Kingdom claims that
the PNTL fleet has always complied with the 1993 INF Code standards,
although all five vessels were built between 1979 and 1987.148
Ireland accepts these international standards, recognizing that they
"reflect majority views as to the proper balance between safety and other
factors" at the time when they were adopted. 49 However, Ireland is
strongly concerned that recent frequent MOX shipments will increase
the likelihood of accidents or terrorist attacks, which could involve seri-
ous radioactive contamination of the Irish Sea and impose significant
health effects on the Irish public.50 An amount of plutonium dioxide
revision of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974. See SOLAS
Convention, supra note 47; see also Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at
30-31, 2.42 (pointing out that 146 states have ratified the SOLAS Convention, which makes
the Convention applicable to 98.5 percent of the world merchant gross tonnage).
147. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 50, 2.86; Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 37, 2.50 (citing Tim Deere-Jones, A Review of Aspects of the
Marine Transport of Radioactive Materials: A Report to Greenpeace International 9, at
http://archive.greenpeace.org/-nuclear/bnfl/docs/TDJmarinetransports.pdf (last visited June
25, 2003)).
148. See Deere-Jones, supra note 147, at 9-10, 25; see also Paul Cullen, Voyage to the
Heart of a Deadly Nuclear Cargo Ship, IRISH T1MES, July 23, 2002, at 3, available at 2002
WL 24080466 (discussing additional equipments in PNTL vessels).
149. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 197, 8.276.
150. Id. at 38, 2.56. Although MOX fuel does not contain weapons-grade plutonium,
the possibility of terrorist attacks to the MOX plant and the associated shipments of highly
radioactive materials remains a matter of global concern and has been fiercely debated be-
tween the parties involved. United Kingdom contends that it took appropriate measures to
assure nuclear safety and security and cooperated with Ireland in providing relevant nuclear
security information. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 174-78,
In 6.117-.129. Ireland, however, argues that the United Kingdom breached its duty to cooper-
ate over nuclear safety and security at Sellafield and associated nuclear shipments. Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 176-91, 1 8.165-237. In response, the U.K. rejects Ireland's
contention concerning potential terrorist attacks against Sellafield and nuclear shipments.
ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 116-19, W 67-71. Ireland maintains that there is
urgency to grant the provisional measures due to terrorist threats, especially in light of Sep-
tember 1 th. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 51-55, 118-213; see also
Greenpeace, supra note 1, at 3 (asserting that the maritime transport of "weapons usable,
highly radiotoxic plutonium material" for two months would be vulnerable to terrorist at-
tacks); Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (CNFC) & Inst. for Energy Economics Japan (IEEJ),
Can Reactor Grade Plutonium Produce Nuclear Fission Weapons? (May 2001), at
http://www.cnfc.or.jp/e/proposal/reports/repOl05e.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (conclud-
ing that "it is theoretically possible to use reactor grade plutonium for the weapons purposes,
but there is no positive evidence that a meaningful arsenal can be realized through such proc-
esses"); Ingrid Bazinet, Sellafield: Britain's Nuclear Plant Steps up Security, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 5, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23617391 (stating that BNFL insists that
it has tightened security measures at Sellafield in response to September I lth, while environ-
mentalists are concerned about the security of Sellafield's waste tanks filled with highly
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powder the size of a tiny pollen grain can cause cancer if inhaled.' As
typical MOX shipping packages were originally developed for land
transports, they might not necessarily be calculated to withstand accident
conditions peculiar to ocean shipments."2 If a ship loaded with MOX
fuel were to catch fire, a large quantity of respirable nuclear particles
could be released into the atmosphere and the marine environment.'53 If
the ship sank into the sea, unrecovered fuel rods could ultimately cor-
rode and release highly radioactive substances into the marine
environment, which could have devastating impacts on fisheries (espe-
cially in the context of the semi-closed seas).'-
In addition, the operation of the MOX plant would increase the fre-
quency and volume of shipments of INF Code materials between Europe
and Japan. Since 1969, BNFL, COGEMA, and the Overseas Research
Council (a consortium of Japanese utility companies) have routinely
radioactive materials); Cullen, supra note 148, at 3 (detailing BNFL's explanations on security
measures adopted in major PNTL vessels).
151. NCI, supra note 6, 8. More precisely, the inhalation of less than 100 micrograms
of plutonium dioxide can cause lung cancer, and the ingestion of only a few milligrams may
likely result in liver or bone cancer. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 31, 2.27.
152. Edwin S. Lyman, The Sea Shipment of Radioactive Materials: Safety and Environ-
mental Concerns, Nuclear Control Inst. (1999), at http:l/www.nci.orglelel-malaysia.htm (last
visited Apr. 9, 2004) (presented to the Conference on Carriage of Ultrahazardous Radioactive
Cargo by Sea: Implications and Responses).
153. See ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 18, 1 34; Jon M. Van Dyke &
Eldon V.C. Greenberg, International Law Permits Panama to Prohibit Shipments of Ultrahaz-
ardous Radioactive Materials Through the Panama Canal, Nuclear Control Inst. (2000), at
http://www.nci.org/v-w-x/vd-eg-canal.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2003). Type B casks used for
INF shipments are typically designed to withstand a half-hour engulfing fire at 800 degrees
Celsius to meet IAEA standards. Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 212-13; Foulke & Weiner, supra
note 105, at 3. However, Type B casks might not escape damage from a ship fire involving
irradiated nuclear materials that can burn for a day or more at 1000 to 2000 degrees Celsius.
Marin, supra note 25, at 372; Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 404; see also Annex VII Ir.'s Memo-
rial, supra note 5, at 191-92, 8.242.
154. See ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 18, 34; see also Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 38, 2.56. MOX shipping casks in compliance with the IAEA
Regulations are required to survive immersion to a depth of 200 meters and typically calcu-
lated to withstand immersion in deep water between 2,000 and 3,000 meters. Annex VII
U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 94, 3.87; Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 212-13;
Foulke & Weiner, supra note 105, at 3. Nonetheless, Type B casks might not survive corrosive
effects of salt water during prolonged immersion in the sea. Marin, supra note 25, at 372; Van
Dyke, supra note 41, at 381-82. The United Kingdom refutes Ireland's concern by citing an
IAEA study conducted between 1995 and 1999 that concludes neither the loss of a flask into
the sea nor the release of radioactive substances into the air as the result of a severe fire "are
likely to subject exposed individuals to radiation doses that are significant by comparison to
normal background doses." Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 94, 3.87
(emphasis added). In 1999, however, the IAEA recognized that "there is a growing need to
examine methods to explicitly address the protection of the environment from radiation" in
order to put environmental protection and human protection on an equal footing in accordance
with the concept of sustainable development. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 12,
1.30 (emphasis added).
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transported spent fuel from Japan for reprocessing in Europe.' 5 The first
known return shipment of plutonium took place in 1984, when a
Japanese vessel sailed from France to Japan through the Panama Canal
with 250 kilograms (638 pounds) of pure plutonium dioxide.56 After
U.S. opposition killed a Japanese plan to transport nuclear cargoes via
air, "'57 a Japanese ship carried the second plutonium return shipment in
1992.58 Thereafter, PNTL has transported MOX fuel and vitrified waste
containing highly radioactive residues from reprocessing of spent fuel
from Europe to Japan.'59 These ships have carried more than 8,000 tons
of nuclear materials on more than 160 roundtrip voyages covering 4.5
million miles across the oceans.' 60 Thus far, no accidental releases have
been recorded during sea transport of INF Code materials carried by
Class 3 vessels.'
61
Nevertheless, given the extreme radiotoxicity of the cargoes
involved, a number of coastal states have opposed nuclear shipments
between Europe and Japan. There are three possible nuclear transport
routes: (1) through the southwest Pacific around the Cape of Good Hope;
(2) around Cape Horn; and (3) through the Caribbean Sea via the
Panama Canal. 62 In addition to the environmental impacts of nuclear
shipments on coastal communities, transports of highly radioactive
materials via Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope, in particular,
involve potentially harmful effects on the fragile ecosystems of the
155. Deere-Jones, supra note 147, at 9; Foulke & Weiner, supra note 105, at 5.
156. See David Marsh, Plutonium Cargo Sets Sail from Cherbourg, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1984, at 2; James Tyson, Deadly Plutonium Shipment Arrives in Japan, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Nov. 15, 1984, LexisNexis Academic Universe.
157. See supra note 134; see also David Marsh, French Plutonium to be Flown to Japan,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1985, at 2.
158. See Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 399.
159. See generally NC., Nuclear Sea Shipment Chronology, at http://www.nci.org/
s/seatrans-chron.htm (last visited June 25, 2003). The liquid high-level nuclear waste gener-
ated from reprocessing of spent fuel is immobilized through "vitrification," in which the dried
radioactive residues are incorporated in the solid and stable crystalline structure of borosilicate
glass, which is in turn contained in stainless steel canisters. Annex VII fr.'s Memorial, supra
note 5, at 29, 2.12; Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 212. Even under normal conditions, glass
blocks containing high-level waste remain extremely hot. Van Dyke, supra note 41, at 380.
160. Foulke & Weiner, supra note 105, at 5.
161. Id.; ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 18-19, i[n 33-34. Nevertheless, it is
reported that some maritime accidents involved INF Class 1 or 2 vessels. See, e.g., Deere-
Jones, supra note 147, at 23 (reporting that in 1999, a vessel carrying fissile uranium refined
at a BNFL plant had an engine room fire, drifted for a while, and was ultimately tugged to a
port in Pembrokeshire without cargo damages). In addition, in the mid 1980s, consignment of
radioactive Californium 252, which is non-INF material, was lost in the Irish Sea while head-
ing from Liverpool to Dublin. Id. The U.K. Department of Transport was not sure whether the
cargoes would float or sink and what would be the ultimate fate of the lost consignment. Id.
162. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 34, 2.41.
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Antarctica and its marine environment.'63 Thus far, en-route countries
including New Zealand, South Africa, the Rio Group (led by Chile), and
the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community have officially
protested nuclear shipments.'64 In 1995, Chile mobilized aircraft and
ships to expel from its EEZ a PNTL vessel carrying vitrified waste
between France and Japan via Cape Horn.' 65 Because the parties involved
in nuclear business transactions refuse to disclose in advance the
itinerary of ships loaded with INF Code materials, en-route countries are
unprepared in the event of an accident or emergency. '66 Indeed, in 1998,
163. See id. at 36, 2.48; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 20, 38.
164. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 35-37, It 2.43-.49; Van Dyke, supra
note 34, at 399; NCI, supra note 6, 1 14.
165. See Marin, supra note 25, at 362; Van Dyke, supra note 41, at 386-87; Jon M. Van
Dyke, The Legitimacy of Unilateral Actions to Protest the Ocean Shipment of Ultrahazardous
Radioactive Materials, Nuclear Control Inst. (1996), at http://www.nci.org/i/
ib121396.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). Similarly, in Argentina, the Administrative Law
Division of the Federal Appeal Court ordered that the government prohibit the Pacific Swan
(loaded with vitrified waste) from entering its EEZs. Government Ignores Court Ruling on
UK-Registered Nuclear Waste Ship, LA NACION (Arg.), Jan. 11, 2001, translated in BBC
Sua. OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 16, 2001, LexisNexis Academic Universe [hereinafter
Government Ignores]. Although the Argentine Government did not take forcible measures
against the British vessel, the Navy's missile-armed escort ship followed it until the ship left
Argentine waters. Id.
166. See Roisin Ingle, BNFL Refuses to Give Location of Nuclear Ship, IRISH TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 25943165 (reporting that BNFL's spokesperson
said, "[flor security reasons we never release details of location or when a ship will arrive at
its destination"); Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 399 (noting that Japan declined to disclose the
planned route of plutonium shipments in detail, citing security reasons). Many coastal states
have requested prior notification and consultation regarding INF shipments. See Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 191, 8.238, 8.241 (contending that the United Kingdom has
a duty to enter into prior consultation with Ireland regarding nuclear shipments so that the
Irish Coast Guard can "develop a preparedness, response and co-operation framework, in
order to respond if incident should take place"); see also Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 220 (ex-
plaining that the Solomon Islands and its supporters advocated for prior notification and
consultation with en-route states to make appropriate preparations in the event of emergency
in vessels carrying radioactive materials); NCI, supra note 6, 14 (reporting that in 1996,
New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade called for transparency on the routing of
vessels loaded with nuclear cargoes). Similarly, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay issued
a joint declaration in 1997 demanding "prior notification of routes, consultation on emergency
plans, commitment to salvage and other measures" in the marine transport of nuclear materi-
als. NCI, supra note 6, 14. Although recently shippers are prepared to offer public notice of
a shipment two days before it leaves and to disclose the route a day after departure, there is
still no advance consultation with en-route countries. Van Dyke, supra note 165.
Their refusal of prior notification is based on a narrow interpretation of the applicable
IAEA instruments providing for prior notification to the "state of transit." Physical Protection
Convention, supra note 142, art. 4(5), T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, at 8, 1456 U.N.T.S. at 126-27
(providing for advance notification to "[s]tates which the nuclear material is expected to tran-
sit by land or internal waterways, or whose airports or seaports is expected to enter"); Annex
VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 152-53, 6.50 (contending that the relevant
IAEA instruments do not require prior notification of INF shipments specifically to en-route
states); see also Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 221 (supporting this view through concern that
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when Greenpeace activists exposed the vulnerability of nuclear
shipments by venturously boarding a PNTL freighter carrying vitrified
waste through the Panama Canal, Canal authorities failed to act promptly
due to "dysfunctional communication, command and control" between
the responsible agencies."'
3. Environmental Impact Assessments Regarding the
MOX Plant and Associated Nuclear Shipments
Although Ireland and other states have legitimate substantive concerns
about BNFL's MOX-related activities, their claims are anticipatory.
Without materialized harm, they may have difficulty establishing the
United Kingdom's breach of substantive obligations concerning marine
environmental protection.6 As a result, the crux of this dispute lies in
procedural claims regarding the adequacy of environmental impact
information disclosure may attract terrorists and other criminals as well as radical anti-nuclear
activists to impede the safe shipments of INF Code materials). The Joint Safety Convention
and the IAEA Code of Practice also include the requirements for notification to transit states.
Joint Safety Convention, supra note 142, art. 27 (stating that the transboundary shipments of
spent fuel and radioactive waste through a transit state is subject to international obligations
applicable to the specific modes of transport used); IAEA Code of Practice, supra note 142,
para. 3 (requiring prior notification and consent of transit state in the international transports
of radioactive waste). The Joint Safety Convention merely defines "State of transit" as "any
State, other than a State of origin or a State of destination, through whose territory a trans-
boundary movement is planned or takes place." Joint Safety Convention, supra note 142, art.
2(s). Coastal states argue that the term "territory" should include the "territorial sea." See An-
nex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 187, 8.225. The IAEA Code of Practice leaves this
question unanswered without offering a definition of "the state of transit" while "[t]aking into
account the provisions of the Basel Convention ... and other relevant international instru-
ments" and at the same time, nothing that "[n]othing in this Code prejudices or affects in any
way" the navigation rights of flagged vessels under customary international law as reflected in
UNCLOS. See IAEA Code of Practice, supra note 142, 1 n.2.
167. NCI, supra note 6, 6. In addition, in January 2001, when the Pacific Swan carried
vitrified waste through Cape Horn, Argentina needed three days of aerial searching to find the
British vessel "190 nautical miles from the coast in an area in which there is a high concentra-
tion of fishing boats," which "made it more difficult to identify this particular ship."
Government Ignores, supra note 165 (quoting the statement of the commander of the Argen-
tine Southern Naval Area, Rear-Adm Alegandro Kenny).
168. See Boyle, supra note 34, at 365-66 (stating that although UNCLOS emphasizes
the prevention and control of marine pollutants, the customary norm of state responsibility for
loss or damage remains instrumental in defining states' obligations to make reparation for
marine environmental pollution); see also State Responsibility, supra note 33, at 17 (regarding
the holding of the Trail Smelter arbitration "as a case of responsibility for breach of an obliga-
tion not to cause harm, in which proof of material damage is a precondition of
responsibility"). This is because environmental state responsibility attaches to the act of fail-
ing to prevent transboundary harm, while international law does not directly prohibit the
activity that may cause transboundary harm, such as operating a smelter. See Nuclear Energy,
supra note 33, at 312; see also State Responsibility, supra note 33, at 14 (noting that the Trail
Smelter arbitration prescribed a fume control regime without prohibiting the operation of the
smelter).
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assessments for the proposed MOX plant and the associated transports of
radioactive materials. 69
a. The 1993 Environmental Statement for
the Proposed MOX Plant
The domestic authorization process for the new MOX plant began in
October 1992, when BNFL filed a formal application to the Copeland
Borough Council, the local planning authority, for permission to con-
struct the plant. 70 The Town and County Planning (Assessment of
Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988 (1988 Regulations), which
implement Directive 85/337EEC of 1985, require an environmental im-
pact assessment for the construction of a nuclear fuel manufacturing
plant if it is "likely to have significant effects on the environment."'' Ini-
tially, BNFL did not submit an environmental assessment on the basis
that the MOX plant likely would not involve significant environmental
effects. 72 In July 1993, Ireland sent the United Kingdom a letter stating
that the European Community (EC) Directive and the U.K. legislation
required an environmental impact assessment for the proposed MOX
plant. 73 Subsequently, BNFL "voluntarily" prepared the Environmental
Statement of 1993.74
Generally reflecting the criteria in the 1988 Regulations, 175 the
Statement consists of a non-technical summary statement and the
169. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 69, IN4.1, 4.5 (remarking that
"[t]he dispute ... concerns serious procedural violations of UNCLOS by the United King-
dom," and "the 1993 MOX environmental statement is at the heart of this dispute");
Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Szrkely, Provisional Measures of Dec. 3, MOX Plant
(Ir. v. U.K.), 12 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 2001), at http://www.itlos.org/
casedocuments/2001/document en_205.doc (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Szrkely Opinion] (discussing Article 206, which provides for the environmental impact
assessment requirement of UNCLOS, as "crucial for determining the viability of the ...
provisional measures" requested by Ireland); ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at
38, 94(2) ("The complaint that Ireland has brought before the Annex VII tribunal is essen-
tially procedural in nature.").
170. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 126, 5.47; BNFL,
supra note 8, 1 1, 5.
171. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 124, 126-27, H 5.42,
5.47.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 127 5.47.
174. Id. at 22, 127-28, 112.17, 5.48.
175. See id. at 22, 129, 12.17, 5.51. The 1988 Regulations require the developer to
include the following information:
* a description of the project comprising information on the site, design and
size of the project,
* a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if
possible, remedy significant adverse effects,
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following five chapters: (1) "Introduction," which briefly describes
BNFL's business and applicable procedural requirements; (2) "The Need
for the Development," which discusses the benefits of MOX fuel and its
supply and demand; (3) "Site Selection," which identifies the selection
criteria and the alternative sites considered; (4) "The Proposed
Development" which offers details of the construction, operation, and
decommissioning of the MOX plant; and (5) "Assessment of
Environmental Effects," which describes the present situation and
considers the potential impacts of the MOX plant and measures to mitigate
such impacts during construction, operation, and decommissioning.1
76
The Environmental Statement, however, contains no section (or even
a paragraph) explaining the potential impacts of the proposed MOX
plant on the marine environment of the Irish Sea. According to Chapter
4, liquid and gaseous effluents from the MOX plant will be discharged
via the THORP facilities.' 7 BNFL fails to complete the process descrip-
tion of the MOX plant, and neglects to describe how liquid and gaseous
effluents are treated at the THORP facilities and ultimately discharged
into the Irish Sea. It is also unclear whether BNFL has explored any al-
ternative methods of treating radioactive discharges or measures to
mitigate the radiological impacts on the marine environment. In the sec-
tion on: water, the Environmental Statement focuses on the effects of the
diversion of water for the operation of the plant and the treatment of
non-active effluents.' 8 Regarding active effluents, it simply states, "The
treatment and quantity of active liquid effluent from the operation of
SMP [the Sellafield MOX Plant] will be as described earlier in the as-
sessment of Health and Safety."'79 However, the "Health and Safety"
section does not deal with issues concerning the marine environment and
merely concludes that radiation doses to a "critical group" of the United
Kingdom's population will be insignificant."0 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Environmental Statement fails to disclose the scientific
methodology and the data used in constructing this hypothetical group. 8 '
the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the project is
likely to have on the environment,
a non-technical summary of the information mentioned in indents I to 3.
Id. at 123, 1 5.38.
176. BNFL, supra note 8, at iii.
177. Id. 4.37, 4.41.
178. See id. 5.75-.83.
179. Id. 5.81.
180. See id. 1$ 5.49, 5.50, 5.52.
181. Id. 1 5.36. The Statement merely offers the following general (or vague) description
of the critical group: "The critical group represents a small group of people with extreme
habits such as the consumption of specific foods at a high rate and/or occupancy of certain
area." Id.
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Although the section on flora and fauna cursorily references radiation
monitoring programs and sampling of "locally caught fish," it fails to
identify which areas will be monitored and what species of fish will be
subject to monitoring.' Ireland is particularly disturbed by BNFL's
omission of any discussion about expected radioactive discharges from
the reprocessing at THORP to reclaim plutonium for MOX fuel manu-
facturing at the new plant.' 3
The Environmental Statement notably falls to discuss the transport
of nuclear materials, even though this will be an essential part of BNFL's
business at the proposed MOX plant. The sections on the site selection
and process description of the MOX plant are completely silent about
how the ingredients of MOX fuel are obtained, or about how MOX fuel
assemblies are shipped to the customers. Although Chapter 5 references
transports, the description focuses on domestic transportation. For ex-
ample, the chapter emphasizes the history of safe transport of MOX fuel
within the United Kingdom' 84 and the expected "marginal increase of rail
and road movements per year from Sellafield."'85 It also stresses that be-
cause containers must meet the IAEA standards, accidents in MOX fuel
transport "would not pose an unacceptable threat to the public"'86 and
"doses to transport workers [would be] extremely low."'8 7 The Statement
is completely silent on the transport of MOX fuel across the Irish Sea
and other seas between Europe and Japan.'8
In addition, this environmental assessment process lacked proce-
dures for interstate consultation and information exchange. Under the
182. Id. [5.92.
183. See Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 124-25, I 7.43-.47; Annex VII Ir.'s
Reply, supra note 128, at 76-77, 6.49-54 (emphasizing the linkage between THORP and
the MOX plant in rebutting the United Kingdom's arguments regarding the adequacy of the
1993 Environmental Statement). In this context, notably, THORP was not subject to any envi-
ronmental assessment during its planning stages in the 1970s without domestic environmental
impact assessment requirements. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 18, 1.48. In
1992, the European Commission examined under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty whether
radioactive waste discharges from THORP was likely to cause significant contamination of the
territory of another member state. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 19,
2.7. However, the assessment did not specifically deal with the marine environment and
Ireland did not have access to the data the United Kingdom submitted to the European Com-
mission. Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 18, 1.48. Cf discussion infra Part III.A.3
(discussing the inappropriateness of the European Commission's Article 37 Opinion for the
purpose of marine environmental impact assessment of the MOX plant).
184. See BNFL, supra note 8, 5.54.
185. Id. '[ 5.21.
186. Id. 15.55.
187. Id. 5.56.
188. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 123, 7.40; see generally id. at 46,
2.91 ("As far as Ireland is aware, these shipments have never been subject to any environ-
mental impact assessment requirement, and their impacts on the environment have never been
assessed.").
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1988 Regulations, the local planning authority is required to consult with
authorities in neighboring municipalities and relevant domestic statutory
bodies. Although the local authority may consult with other domestic
institutions and individuals, the Act does not require interstate consulta-
tion or public participation.' In 1994, Ireland initiated communication
with the Copeland Borough Council by sending a letter summarizing its
concerns about the quality and adequacy of BNFL's Environmental
Statement.'9 In reply, the Council solicited supplementary information
from BNFL and conveyed it to Ireland.' 9' Nevertheless, Ireland received
no satisfactory response from the local authority about the foreseeable
additional impacts of THORP or the impacts of the MOX plant on the
Irish Sea's marine environment. 92
BNFL was also required to obtain an authorization from Her Maj-
esty's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Nil), which consulted with Her
Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food. 93 Again, no interstate consultation was required at
this stage. Although the Environmental Statement "does not form part of
the formal applications which BNFL will make to the NiT,"' 94 the United
Kingdom authorities agreed to permit the construction of the MOX
plant, apparently based on this Statement. 95 Accordingly, BNFL com-
pleted the construction of the MOX plant in August 1995.196
b. The 1997 Opinion of the European Commission
Concerning the MOX Plant
In 1996, BNFL applied for variations to existing discharge authori-
zations for Sellafield with reference to the proposed MOX plant. 97 Under
Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, the United Kingdom is required to ob-
tain an opinion from the Commission of the European Communities
189. See BNFL, supra note 8, 1.5.
190. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 70, 166, 4.8, 8.114.
191. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 127-28,1 5.48.
192. See Annex VII Ir.'s Reply, supra note 128, at 76-77, 6.55-58.
193. See BNFL, supra note 8, 1.6. NII deals with the operation of nuclear facilities
including the storage of radioactive wastes and is responsible for the administration of the
United Kingdom's civil nuclear site licensing system. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial,
supra note 102, at 35, 2.52(2).
194. BNFL, supra note 8, 1.9.
195. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 123, 166, 167, It 7.37, 8.114, 8.119;
ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 11, 20.
196. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 23, 2.19.
197. See DEFRA, Variations to the BNFL Sellafield Radioactive Waste Discharge Au-
thorizations: Decisions of the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (The Ministers) 8 (Nov. 19,
1999), at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environmentlradioactivity/sellawaste/index.htm (last visited
July 14, 2003) [hereinafter DEFRA Variations Authorization].
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(European Commission) regarding whether "any plan for the disposal of
radioactive waste in whatever forms" will likely result in significant ra-
dioactive contamination in another member state.'98 Accordingly, the
United Kingdom submitted relevant documents regarding the MOX plant
to the European Commission.'" The Commission's Opinion found that
both under normal operating condition of the MOX plant and in the
event of "an accident on the scale considered in the general data," the
radiation doses to the Irish public would not be significant "from the
health point of view."2°° Ultimately, the Commission concluded that rou-
tine and accidental discharges from the MOX plant are "not liable to
result in radioactive contamination ... of the water, soil, or airspace" of
Ireland.20'
Nonetheless, the opinion does not fully address Ireland's concern, as
it failed to provide a holistic account of the radiological impacts on the
marine environment of the Irish Sea. It also failed to assess the cumula-
tive effects of the MOX project, including the sea transportation of
nuclear materials and the expected increase of radioactive discharges
from THORP.22 In addition, Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty does not
provide for interstate processes. Although the Commission adopted the
Opinion based on a report by an expert panel, which included two Irish
nationals nominated by Ireland,20' the Irish government itself did not
have access to the information the United Kingdom submitted to the
Commission.' The Irish government and the affected members of the
public had little grasp of the reasons for the Commission's Opinion,
which is formulated in standardized and conclusory language.03
198. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
37, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
199. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 23, 2.19.
200. Comm'n Op. of Feb. 1997 Concerning the Plan for the Disposal of Radioactive
Waste Arising from the Operation of the BNFL Sellafield Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant Located in
the U.K., in Accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, 1997 O.J. (C 68) 4 [hereinafter
1997 Comm'n Op. Concerning the MOX Plant].
201. Id.
202. See Annex VII Ir.'s Reply, supra note 128, at 39, 3.45-.46; Annex VII Ir.'s Me-
morial, supra note 5, at 18, 128, 1.48, 7.58.
203. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 163, 6.87.
204. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 128, 1 7.58.
205. Compare 1997 Comm'n Op. Concerning the MOX Plant, supra note 200, with
Comm'n Op. of 26 Nov. 2002 Concerning the Plan for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Arising from the Operation of the MOX Demonstration Facility at Sellafield Located in the
U.K., in Accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, 2002 O.J. (C 292) 7 [hereinafter
2002 Comm'n Op. Concerning the MOX Demonstration Facility]. The 1997 Opinion reads as
follows:
(a) the distance between the plant and the nearest point on the territory of another
Member State, in this case Ireland, is 184 km;
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c. The 1998 Discharge Authorizations for the Sellafield Site
At the domestic level, the Environment Agency is responsible for gase-
ous and liquid discharge authorizations under the Radioactive Substances
Act 1993.206 Although BNFL's application for variations primarily con-
cerned changes in THORP and other facilities, BNFL's submission
included information on the proposed MOX plant.2 °7 The Environment
Agency decided to process discharge variations for the entire Sellafield site
independently from authorizations for uranium and plutonium commission-
ing of the MOX plant. °8
BNFL already estimated in the 1993 Environmental Statement that
"The liquid and gaseous radioactive discharges from the new MOX plant
will not require changes to the activity levels permitted in either the exist-
ing or the proposed Discharge Authorization for Sellafield."2°9 At that time,
the U.K. authorities notably promulgated the discharge authorizations for
(b) under normal operating conditions, the discharges of liquid and gaseous efflu-
ents will be small fractions of present authorized limits and will produce an
exposure of the population in other Member States that is negligible from the
health point of view;
(c) low-level solid radioactive waste is to be disposed to the authorized Drigg site
operated by BNF plc. Intermediate level wastes are to be stored at the Sella-
field site, pending disposal to an appropriate authorized facility;
(d) in the event of unplanned discharges of radioactive waste which may follow an
accident on the scale considered in the general data, the doses likely to be re-
ceived by the population in other Member States would not be significant from
the health point of view.
In conclusion, the Commission is of the opinion that the implementation of the plan
for the disposal of radioactive wastes arising from the operation of the BNFL Sella-
field mixed oxide fuel plant, both in normal operation and in the event of an
accident of the magnitude considered in the general data, is not liable to result in
radioactive contamination significant from the point of view of health, of the water,
soil or airspace of another Member State.
1997 Comm'n Op. Concerning the MOX Plant, supra note 200, at 4. The 2002 Opinion,
which deals with the MOX Demonstration Facility suspended after the falsification incident, is
almost identical except that paragraph (b) identifies the harm that is "not significant" and
paragraph (c) discusses the temporal storage of plutonium-contaminated materials before off-
site transport for disposal. See 2002 Comm'n Op. Concerning the MOX Demonstration Facil-
ity, supra, at 7. From these opinions, it is difficult to learn that the proposed commercial MOX
plant is "a different plant in a different building" with production capacity fifteen times larger
than that of the MOX Demonstration Facility. See ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at
42, T 103(2).
206. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 35, 2.52(1).
207. See id. 2.23, at 24; DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 2, 2.
208. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 2, 2; Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions (DETR), Ministers' Decision on the Justification for the Uranium
Commissioning of BNFL's Mixed Oxide Plant 3 (June 25, 1999), at http://
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/consult/mox/3.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
209. BNFL, supra note 8, 3.5.
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
the entire Sellafield site under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993, which
took effect in 1994 to permit BNFL to operate THORP
210
In October 1998, the Environment Agency issued three separate pro-
posed decisions regarding discharge variations and the uranium and
plutonium commissioning of the MOX plant.2 ' In the proposed decision on
variations for the Sellafield site, the Agency substantially reduced the dis-
charge limit for technetium-99, an artificial radionuclide, highlighting the
United Kingdom's commitment to the OSPAR Strategy of June 1998.212
However, the reduction would have no practical effects on the operation of
THORP and the MOX plant that generate little or no discharge of techne-
tium-99.213 While the proposed decision also attached an information
condition requiring that BNFL conduct scientific research concerning the
biological effects of radioactivity in the vicinity of Sellafield, 14 the Envi-
ronment Agency added another condition obligating BNFL to use the best
available technology to control the timing of discharges to the Irish Sea so
as to limit the radiological impact on the critical group.25 Although the En-
vironment Agency conducted its own assessment regarding Sellafield's
radioactive discharges, the Agency restricted its consideration to only five
210. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 19-20, U 2.8-.9. Later, the
new discharge authorizations survived a challenge in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment
and Others, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd and Another, 4 All E.R. 352 (1994), where the High Court
concluded that an environmental impact assessment was not required in the new discharge authori-
zations because the construction and operation of THORP constitute a single operation, which
predated the first EC Directive (85/337 EEC). See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note
102, at 20, 1 2.10; Case Comment, Radioactive Substances, (1994) PLAN. & ENVTL. L. BuL. 74-75.
211. DEFRA Variations Authorization, supra note 197; DETR, supra note 208; Env't Agency,
Document Containing the Agency's Proposed Decision on the Justification for the Plutonium Com-
missioning and Full Operation of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant, British Nuclear Fuel plc Sellafield
(Oct. 1998), at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/radioactivity/mox/pdf/mox-annex2.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2004) (Annex H to Decision of the Secretary of State for DEFRA and the Secretary
of State for Health, Oct. 2001).
212. DEFRA Variations Authorization, supra note 197, 13 (quoting the paragraph 3.8 of the
Environment Agency's proposed decision on variations that would reduce the liquid discharge limit
for technetium-99 from 200 to 90 terabecqerels a year); see also id. 20, 32.
213. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 78, 3.50 n.67. ("[T]he
MOX plant generates no discharges of technetium-99 whatsever [sic]:' Because technetium-99 is
created almost exclusively through the reprocessing of spent Magnox fuel, the substantial reduction
in the discharge limit of technetium-99 does not affect the reprocessing of spent uranium-dioxide
fuel at THORP to produce the ingredient of the proposed MOX plant. See Annex VII U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 78, 3.50 n.67 (noting that currently, THORP contributes up
to 0.05 percent of technetium-99 discharges from the entire Sellafield site); DEFRA, supra note
132; supra note 111 and accompanying text. The Environment Agency's proposed decisions of
October 1998 and the subsequent economic justification for the MOX plant deal with plutonium
reclaimed at THORP, and further authorizations would be required for BNFL to use Magnox de-
rived plutonium at the new MOX plant. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 23-24, q 82-83;
Env't Agency, supra note 211, at 6, T 3.4.
214. DEFRA Variations Authorization, supra note 197, 13 (quoting the paragraph 3.15 of
the Agency's proposed decision).
215. Id. (quoting the paragraph 3.13 of the Agency's proposed decision).
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of the numerous radioactive substances discharged from the nuclear
industrial complex.26 Overall, the proposed decision added little to the ex-
isting scheme to control discharges from THORP into the marine
environment.
Separately, the Environment Agency considered radioactive discharges
from the MOX plant in the proposed decision on plutonium commission-
ing. The Agency agreed with BNFL that gaseous and liquid radioactive
releases from the new MOX plant would be within the discharge limits for
the entire Sellafield site, and concluded that BNFL was not required to ob-
tain further discharge authorizations for the new MOX plant."8 This
determination effectively permitted BNFL and the United Kingdom au-
thorities to continue relying on the 1993 Environment Statement. Aside
from additional technical information made available through the authori-
zation processes, "the Environment Statement has never been updated or
revisited, despite longstanding and regularly repeated requests from Ire-
land," especially regarding the relationship between the MOX plant and
THORP as well as the direct and cumulative impacts of the MOX plant on
the marine environment of the Irish Sea.2 9 This remains so, even though in
the intervening time, UNCLOS, the OSPAR Convention, and the new EC
Directive 220 entered into force for the United Kingdom to impose an obliga-
216. Id (H 9, 26-29.
217. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 111.
218. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 12, 23. In the Proposed Decision, the
Environment Agency reached the following conclusion:
The Agency is satisfied that the gaseous, liquid and solid wastes arising from the opera-
tion of the MOX plant can be disposed of within the constraints of the existing Sellafield
authorizations under [the] R[adioactive] S[ubstances] A[ct 1993] ... It is satisfied that
the MOX plant can be operated in accordance with those more restrictive limits [for the
substances identified in the variations].
Env't Agency, supra note 211, at 6, 3.1.
219. ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 11, 20; see also supra notes 191-92
and the accompanying text. The proposed decision of 1998 includes some details pertaining to air
shipments of MOX fuel. Env't Agency, supra note 211, app. 4, at A4.128 ("BNFL has stated that
12 to 24 movements in total involving 'non-military radioactive material, excluding irradiated fuel'
from Sellafield will be made using Carlisle Airport per year."). In contrast, the proposed decision
offers no specifics concerning sea shipments of MOX fuel and only includes generalized references
to the relevant international standards. See id. app. 4, at It A4.126-.140. Without giving any factual
references or scientific assumptions, the Environment Agency makes a conclusory statement regard-
ing the radiological impacts on marine life from the operation of the MOX plant and associated
nuclear shipments. See id app. 4, at IM A4.156-.157. Because the Agency's proposed decision is
"based on a recognition that THORP has already been justified," it does not include any additional
assessment on THORP in relation to the plutonium commissioning of the MOX plant. Id. app. 4, at
A4.10.
220. Council Directive 97/1 1/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 73) 5 [hereinafter 1997 EC Directive] (amend-
ing Directive 85/337/EEC of 1985).
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
tion on it to conduct adequate environmental impact assessments before the
authorization of the proposed activity.
2 '
d. The 2001 Economic Justification of the MOX Plant
Lastly, an economic justification for the MOX plant is required under
222relevant Euratom Directives. To authorize the operation of the MOX
plant, the United Kingdom must ensure that the MOX plant is economi-
cally justified and that the economic, social, or other benefits of the plant
are shown to outweigh the health detriments it may cause.2 23 The Environ-
ment Agency issued the proposed decision of 1998 on the plutonium
commissioning of the MOX plant as part of this justification exercise.224 In
addition, the United Kingdom authorities held five rounds of public consul-
tations between April 1997 and August 2001.22 Ireland was invited to this
public consultation process as one of the consultees 6 The Irish govern-
ment, as well as the Irish public, was also given an opportunity to make
submissions. 7 Indeed, Ireland participated in four of the five consultation
sessions, during which Ireland made submissions and received data con-
cerning radioactive discharges from the MOX plant.
228
However, Ireland was not satisfied with this process because material
business information and quantitative data were substantially removed
from the publicly circulated version of the independent consultees' re-
ports29 due to commercial confidentiality.23° For example, an appendix in
221. See ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 39, 87.
222. Council Directive 80/836/EURATOM, 1980 O.J. (L 246) 1, repealed by Council Direc-
tive 96/29/EURATOM, art. 6, 1996 O.J. (L 159) 1.
223. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 5-8, TI 13-28; Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 45-46, 2.90; see also Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM, supra note 222, art. 6
("Member States shall ensure that all new classes or types of practice resulting in exposure to ioniz-
ing radiation are justified in advance of being first adopted or first approved by their economic,
social or other benefits in relation to the health detriment they may cause.").
224. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 11, at 10, 9IN1 37-38.
225. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 72, 4.11; ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case,
supra note 101, at 12-13,1 24.
226. ITLOS U.K's Response, supra note 110, at 44, 1106.
227. Id.; DEFRA, Sellafield MOX Plant Consultation 2001 12 (Apr. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk.environment/consult/mox/sellafield/03.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003)
(inviting "comments from anyone in the U.K. or abroad").
228. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 25, 2.26.
229. See Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115; PA Consulting Group, Final Report-
Assessment of BNFL's Economic Case for the Sellafield MOX Plant (Dec. 1997), available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/consult/mox/pacindex.htm (last visited July 24, 2003). After
the PA Consulting Group prepared the report, the data falsification incident emerged at BNFL's
MOX Demonstration Facility, which required some adjustments regarding the economic case of
BNFL's MOX manufacturing business. See DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 3-4, 8. Subse-
quently, the U.K. authority engaged Arthur D. Little Ltd. to prepare the revised report taking into
account the effects of the falsification incident. See id at 4, 9.
230. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 71-73, i 4.10, 4.12-. 17; ITLOS Ir.'s
Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 12-13, 24.
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the report prepared by Arthur D. Little (ADL) includes tables that summa-
rize contract information on "parties involved," "dates of contract,"
"required volume," "due date," "price" "payment schedule," "other
[information]," and "status" for each customer. In the publicly available
version, almost all information has been deleted from the tables except for
the parties involved in the Swedish contract and the date of their contract.23'
During the public consultation process, Ireland raised the issue of in-
adequate information and requested the United Kingdom to supply
deleted information including: (1) details of secured and forecast sales
volumes; (2) details of required annual production capacity; (3) figures
for the sales volumes and sales prices assumed for MOX fuel; (4) details
of plant capacity and commissioning start dates for plutonium commis-
sioning; and (5) the number of annual voyages relating to the MOX plant
operation.232 Although the above information did not directly pertain to
the marine environment, it would help Ireland assess the pattern and in-
tensity of the MOX plant operation, which would likely affect the
environmental quality of the Irish Sea. In reply, however, the United
Kingdom rejected Ireland's information request, again based on com-
mercial confidentiality.
233
e. Ireland's Legal Actions Against the United Kingdom
Because the economic justification is a critical part of authorizing
the operation of the MOX plant, Ireland requested the constitution of an
arbitral tribunal under Article 32 of the OSPAR Convention (OSPAR
tribunal) on June 15, 2001. Ireland alleged that the United Kingdom vio-
lated Article 9 of the Convention in authorizing the proposed MOX plant
without offering adequate information to Ireland.3  Despite Ireland's
attempt to suspend the authorization process, the United Kingdom took a
decisive step on October 3, 2001. 21 Based on the ADL Report and the
Environment Agency's proposed decision on plutonium commissioning,
the United Kingdom determined that the MOX plant was economically
231. See Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115, app. A9.
232. OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 123, at 34-35, 1 114.
233. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 77-78, 4.31-32, 4.34, 4.37;
Counter-Memorial of the U.K., Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9
of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), at 1, [ 1.2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002), at http://
pca-cpa.org/PDF/UK%20-%20CM%20prelims.pdf, http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/UK%20-
%20Counter%20Memorial.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter OSPAR U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial].
234. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 18,1 38.
235. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 79, 4.41-42 (noting that the
United Kingdom rejected Ireland's request not to authorize the MOX plant pending the result
of the OSPAR arbitration).
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justified and the social, economic, and other benefits exceeded the det-
riment to public health.236
Shortly thereafter, on October 25, 2001, Ireland instituted arbitral
proceedings against the United Kingdom under Article 287 of UNCLOS,
alleging that the United Kingdom violated basic obligations in Part XII
of the Convention including, inter alia, assessment of environmental
impacts under Article 206.237 On November 15, 2001, pending the consti-
tution of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of the Convention (Annex
VII tribunal), Ireland requested provisional measures from ITLOS to
prevent the operation of the new MOX plant and to freeze the transport
of radioactive materials associated with the MOX plant." By that time,
the United Kingdom had substantially raised the stakes of the MOX pro-
ject. The suspension of the MOX plant would wipe out 480 potential
jobs on the depressed northwest coast of England,239 as well as BNFL's
MOX business of at least £10 million. Additionally, while the MOX
plant had already absorbed the capital investment of £470 million, main-
taining it in the condition of operational readiness would cost £385,000
per week.14 It was only about a month before the plutonium commis-
sioning of the MOX plant, which was planned on December 20, 2001 .24
As a result of Ireland's desperate attempts, the three tribunals under
the UNCLOS and the OSPAR Convention have dealt with essentially
identical disputes concerning the adequacy of transboundary environ-
mental impact assessments regarding the proposed MOX project.242
236. DEFRA Decision, supra note 111, at 2, 4, 24, 3, 9, 11, 89-91. Ireland questions
the adequacy of economic analysis that failed to take into account capital costs as well as costs
associated with safety and security. Annex VII Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 73-74, IT 4.16,
4.18, 4.23; see also Underhill, supra note 6, at 44 (reporting that even the most optimistic
observers think that the MOX plant will be far from recouping its £470-million start-up costs,
considering the competitiveness of energy markets and the expensiveness of MOX fuel). But
see Case Comment, Proposed Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at Sellafield, 2002 J. PLANNING &
ENVTL. L. 1113-22 (involving a case that upheld DEFRA's decision to justify the operation of
the MOX plant). The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on December 7, 2001. Annex VII
U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 26, 1 2.30.
237. See ITLOS Ir.'s Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 37, 82.
238. Id. at 63, T 150.
239. ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 14, 86, in 23, 232; Underhill, supra
note 6, at 44; see also Arthur D. Little Ltd., supra note 115, at 29 (estimating that in addition
to 400 direct jobs, 80 related jobs in the local business community would be lost if the opera-
tion of the MOX plant would not be authorized).
240. ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 13, 86, In 20, 232.
241. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 81-82, q 4.54-.55.
242. In addition to the ITLOS, the Annex VII tribunal, and the OSPAR tribunal, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) may have power to adjudicate the MOX plant dispute under
Article 226 of the European Community Treaty. See Annex VII Further Provisional Measures,
supra note 16, at 7, 21. Ireland has repeatedly manifested its intention to bring action against
the United Kingdom before the ECJ, although such a lawsuit has not yet materialized. See
Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 25, 2.26. In the interim, the
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B. Proliferation of Tribunals
1. ITLOS Judgment on Provisional Measures
On December 3, 2001, ITLOS issued an order regarding the provi-
sional measures in this dispute. Under Article 290(5), ITLOS may grant
provisional measures to preserve the rights of the parties or to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment pending the constitution of an
Annex VII tribunal, if ITLOS determines that (1) the Annex VII tribunal
would have prima facie jurisdiction over the disputed matters, and (2)
the urgency of the situation requires such measures.243 In this proceeding,
ITLOS must determine whether these conditions are satisfied based on
information from parties' submissions and, if it determines so, what pro-
visional measures are appropriate in the given circumstances. A decision
on the merits must be left for the Annex VII tribunal.
Regarding jurisdictional bases, Ireland argued that the Annex VII
tribunal would have prima facie jurisdiction because the dispute involved
the issue of whether the United Kingdom fulfilled its duties: (1) to pre-
vent, reduce, and control pollution of the Irish Sea under Articles 192,
194, 207, 211, 212, and 213 of UNCLOS; (2) to cooperate with Ireland
in marine environmental protection of the Irish Sea under Articles 123
and 197; and (3) to assess the potential impacts of the MOX plant and
related activities on the marine environment of the Irish Sea under Arti-
cle 206.24 According to Ireland, there was urgency because, without
provisional measures, Ireland's "right to insist the United Kingdom ful-
fill those duties" would be irrevocably violated by the irreversible effects
of radioactive discharges from the MOX plant.1
5
In response, the United Kingdom contended that the Annex VII tribu-
nal would lack prima facie jurisdiction over this dispute under Article
287(5),246 because Ireland's claims turned on the interpretation and appli-
cation of relevant provisions in regional agreements. In particular, both
parties agreed to submit the dispute concerning the information disclosure
provision of the OSPAR Convention to the OSPAR tribunal, pursuant to
the dispute settlement provision of the regional sea convention.247 The
European Commission has commenced the proceedings against Ireland regarding its attempt
to settle the dispute through means other than adjudication before the ECJ. See infra note 316
and accompanying text.
243. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 290(5), 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
244. ITLOS Ir's Statement of Case, supra note 101, at 51, 1126.
245. Id. at 57,91 144; see also id. at 56-58, i 141-48.
246. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 287(5), 21 I.L.M at 1323 ("If the parties to a dispute
have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of dispute, it may be submitted only
to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.") (emphasis
added).
247. ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 6-7, 2-4.
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United Kingdom further contended that there was no urgency because
the MOX plant would have only de minimus environmental effects.248 To
support its position, the United Kingdom gave assurance that there
would be no export of MOX fuel from the disputed plant and no import
to THORP of spent fuel in accordance with contracts for conversion to
the MOX plant by October 2002.249
ITLOS agreed with Ireland that the Annex VII tribunal would have
prima facie jurisdiction over the present dispute.20 However, ITLOS
found for the United Kingdom on the issue of urgency and rejected the
provisional measures requested by Ireland.25' Instead, the Tribunal pre-
scribed alternative provisional measures to require the parties to work
together in information exchange, monitoring, and pollution prevention
measures concerning the operation of the MOX plant.252 The provisional
measures were based on the duty to cooperate as a fundamental principle
for marine environmental protection under Part XII of UNCLOS as well
as general international law.253 In particular, the Tribunal believed that
"prudence and caution require that Ireland and the United Kingdom co-
operate in exchanging information concerning risks or effects of the
operation of the MOX plant,"z 4 and ordered both parties to submit the
initial report concerning the provisional measures by December 17,
2001, only three days before the plutonium commissioning of the dis-
puted plant.
2 5
As Judge Ad Hoc Szrkely pointed out, the ITLOS order was contra-
dictory. On one hand, the Tribunal rejected Ireland's contention that its
right to have an adequate environmental impact assessment under Article
206 would be irrevocably nullified with the plutonium commissioning of
the MOX plant. On the other hand, the Tribunal did require the United
Kingdom to exchange information with Ireland concerning environ-
mental impacts of the MOX plant before its plutonium commissioning. 6
248. Id. at 10, 111.
249. Id. at 10, 12; ITLOS Provisional Measures, supra note 12, at 17-18, 78-80.
Ireland considers the MOX return shipments from Japan on October 2002 in contravention to
this assurance. See supra note 5. Apparently, however, the United Kingdom carefully and
deliberately formulated the wording of its assurance precisely to exclude the particular ship-
ments because the return of the falsified MOX fuel technically constitutes neither "the export
of MOX fuel" nor "the import of spent fuel." See ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at
75, 201
250. ITLOS Provisional Measures, supra note 12, at 40, 50-51.
251. Id. at 17-18, I 72-80.
252. Id. at 19-20, 89(1).
253. Id. at 18-19, 182.
254. Id. at 19, 84.
255. Id. at 20, 1 89.2.
256. Sz6kely Opinion, supra note 169, at 1, 2-5.
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Apparently, this contradiction resulted from a compromise between
the United Kingdom's sovereign rights over economic activities within
its own territory and Ireland's rights to adequate information and
meaningful consultation as part of transboundary environmental impact
assessment procedures.2 ' The Tribunal possibly wanted to avoid
unnecessary intrusion in the United Kingdom's sovereignty by ordering
the suspension of the governmental authorizations for a MOX facility
located within its territory.25s However, the Tribunal appeared to be equally
concerned that considerations of the transboundary environmental effects
of the MOX project were almost completely left out in domestic
authorization processes without meaningful consultation and information
exchange with Ireland.2 9 As a result, effectively, if not on its face, the
ITLOS decision affirmed the originating state's duty to assess
transboundary environmental impacts and associated obligations of
consultation and information exchange with affected states.
Nevertheless, given the generality of the relevant UNCLOS provi-
sions, ITLOS was unable to define the standard of adequate information
and what steps are required to result in meaningful information exchange
and consultation. Therefore, the ITLOS judgment offered little guidance
to evaluate whether the parties have indeed complied with the provi-
sional measures. 26 As discussed below, the OSPAR tribunal was also far
257. See generally John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 137 (1998) (commenting that "judicial balancing of several factors
is the essence of any decision to prescribe provisional measures").
258. Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson, Provisional Measures of Dec. 3, MOX Plant
(Ir. v. U.K.), at 4, 3 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 2001), at http://www.itlos.org/
casedocuments/2001/document-en201.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) ("It is common
ground that the plant is situated on the territory of the United Kingdom and thus under the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom.").
259. Joint Declaration of Judges Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, AkI, Marsit, Eiriksson and
Jesus, Provisional Measures of Dec. 3, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), at 1, T 1, 4 (Int'l Trib. for the
Law of the Sea 2001), at http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/document en
198.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (highlighting "almost total lack of agreement on the scien-
tific evidence with respect to the possible consequences of the operation of the MOX plant on
the marine environment of the Irish Sea" and "the almost complete lack of cooperation be-
tween the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom with respect to the environmental
impact of the planned operations").
260. During Annex VII proceedings, the parties actually expressed disagreements in the
adequacy of the information exchanged pursuant to the ITLOS provisional measures. On De-
cember 5, 2001, Ireland sent the United Kingdom a list of fifty-five questions that mostly
reiterate Ireland's concerns previously communicated to the United Kingdom. Ireland felt that
the United Kingdom's response was vague and procrastinated. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 5, at 83-84, V 4.64-66, 4.69-.72. The United Kingdom contends that it provided
the requested information fully except for confidential one especially concerning national
security. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 6-7, 162-63, 1.20,
6.83-.84. The United Kingdom made a counteroffer to review the existing mechanisms for
coordination and monitoring regarding Sellafield, which Ireland has not yet accepted. Id.
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from resolving a similar problem in interstate information exchange un-
der the relevant provisions of the OSPAR Convention.
2. OSPAR Tribunal's Final Award Concerning
Access to Information
On July 2, 2003, the OSPAR tribunal issued its final award on the
MOX plant dispute. 6 ' Ireland's case was "narrow" and only concerned
Article 9 of the Convention.2 Article 9(2) provides for access to infor-
mation "on the state of the maritime area, on activities or measures
adversely affecting or likely to affect it and on activities or measures in-
troduced in accordance with the Convention. 263 Article 9(1) requires the
parties to the Convention to make such information available "to any
natural or legal person, in response to any reasonable request.., as soon
as possible and at the latest within two months."264 This requirement is
subject to the exceptions recognized under Article 9(3) including "com-
mercial and industrial confidentiality.
' 265
Apparently, Article 9(1) is designed to ensure public access to in-
formation in the domestic context without expressly providing for
interstate information exchange.2 6 Ireland, nonetheless, relied on this
provision in the MOX dispute because a state may correctly be classified
as "any legal person.' 267 Ireland contended that the United Kingdom vio-
lated its obligation to provide Ireland with access to information relevant
to the effects of the MOX plant on the marine environment of the Irish
Sea.26 Ireland's allegations focused on the adequacy of information in
the publicly circulated version of the two reports, in which the independ-
269ent experts assessed the economic viability of the MOX project.
Ireland maintained that the expert reports as a whole should constitute
"environmental information" because the entire reports dealt with the
evaluation of the functioning of the MOX plant, an activity that would
potentially adversely affect the maritime area with radioactive discharges
261. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15.
262. Id. at 4,' 12.
263. OSPAR Convention, supra note 11, art. 9(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1078.
264. Id. art. 9.1
265. Id. art. 9.3(d).
266. See OSPAR U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 233, at 1, 19, 1.4, 3.2 (assert-
ing that Article 9 does not directly confer Ireland the right to receive information).
267. See Reply of Ir., Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the
OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K.), at 3, 7 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002), at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/PDF/Ireland%20-%2OReply.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter OSPAR Ir.'s
Reply].
268. See OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 123, at 4-5, In 2-3.
269. See id. at 24, 75-77.
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into the Irish Sea. 270 Thus, the omitted commercial information, as part of
the expert reports, should constitute information within the purview of
Article 9(2).7 Ireland further asserted that the United Kingdom, by
categorically rejecting Ireland's requests, failed to demonstrate that the
withheld information qualified for the commercial confidentiality excep-
tion under Article 9(3).272
The United Kingdom questioned the tribunal's jurisdiction over the
dispute and the admissibility of Ireland's claims under Article 9(1) with-
out express provisions for interstate information exchange.273 The United
Kingdom contended that it fulfilled its obligation under Article 9(1) by
270. OSPAR Ir.'s Reply, supra note 267, at 5, 13; see also OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial,
supra note 123, at 30-31, U 98-103.
271. OSPAR Ir.'s Reply, supra note 267, at 5, 13 ("The reports were created as a whole
and cannot be sliced into individual pieces of data."). Ireland specifically references the fol-
lowing fourteen categories of information.
(A) Estimated annual production capacity of the MOX facility;
(B) Time taken to reach this capacity;
(C) Sales volumes;
(D) Probability of obtaining higher sales volumes;
(E) Probability of being able to win contracts for recycling fuel in
significant quantities;
(F) Estimated Sales demand;
(G) Percentage of plutonium already on site;
(H) Maximum throughput figures;
(I) Life span of the MOX facility;
(J) Number of employees;
(K) Price of MOX fuel;
(L) Whether and to what extent, there are firm contracts to purchase MOX
from Sellafield;
(M) Arrangements for transport of plutonium to, and MOX from, Sellafield;
(N) Likely number of such transports.
OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 123, at 2, 754.
272. OSPAR Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 123, at 33-34, 108-10.
273. See OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 39, T 118; see also Rejoinder of the
U.K., Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention
(Ir. v. U.K.), at 5-7, 11-14 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2002), at http://pca-cpa.org/PDFJUK%20-
%20Rej.%20cover.pdf, http://pca-cpa.orgIPDF/UK%20-%20Rejoinder.pdf (last visited Nov.
11, 2003) [hereinafter OSPAR U.K.'s Rejoinder]. The United Kingdom asserted, "The only
possible cause of action for breach of Article 9 would be in respect of a failure to provide for a
domestic regulatory framework dealing with the disclosure of information." OSPAR U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial, supra note 233, at 19, 3.4. According to the United Kingdom's interpre-
tation, Ireland should have no cause of action concerning the right to receive specific
information under Article 9(1). OSPAR U.K.'s Rejoinder, supra, at 5, 11. This interpretation
would further require Ireland to exhaust domestic remedy before resorting to international
arbitration under the OSPAR Convention. Id. at 5, 10.
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274simply putting in place a domestic information disclosure system. As
to the merits, the United Kingdom argued that Article 9(2) did not cover
the specific categories of commercial information requested by Ireland,
which was not "directly and proximately related to the state of the mari-
time area or to activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to
affect the maritime area., 275 The United Kingdom also pointed to the
commercial confidentiality exception of Article 9(3) to justify its rejec-
tion of Ireland's information disclosure requests, as well as its
elimination of the requested information from the publicly available ver-
sion of the independent experts' reports.276
In its final award, the OSPAR tribunal rejected the United King-
dom's arguments regarding jurisdiction and admissibility.277 According to
the majority of the tribunal, Article 9 entails more than "aspirational ob-
jectives" for the domestic implementation legislation because (1) the first
subparagraph is written in the strongest expression to achieve the objec-
tives of regional marine environmental protection and pollution
prevention, 27 and (2) the dispute settlement clause in Article 32 covers
271Article 9 as an enforceable obligation in this particular subject matter.
In light of these findings, the information disclosure provisions must be
construed as having "an intended bite" to ensure the specific perform-
ance of information disclosure in reply to a valid information request,
28°
and the failure to do so would constitute a breach of international obliga-
tions.'
The arbitral tribunal, however, denied Ireland's information requests
by narrowly interpreting Article 9(2).282 According to the majority opin-
ion, the information sought under this provision must satisfy all of the
following three conditions: (1) "on the state of the maritime area,"
(2) "on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it,"
and (3) "on activities or measures introduced in accordance with the
Convention." '283 In delineating the scope of Article 9(2), the majority
274. OSPAR U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 233, at 1, 1.4 (maintaining that
Article 9 merely requires member states "to establish a domestic framework for the disclosure
of information").
275. Id. at 26, IM 4.8-.9.
276. Id. at 2, 11.6.
277. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 27, 58, 78(i)-(ii), 185(i)-(ii).
278. Id. at 40-41, i 128-34; OSPAR Convention, supra note 11, art. 9(1), 32 I.L.M. at
1078 ("The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their competent authorities are required to
make available the information ... to any natural or legal person, in response to any reason-
able request... ) (emphasis added).
279. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 40,1127.
280. Id. at 40, 42, 43, [ 127, 132, 136.
281. Id. at 27, 45-46, 58, I 78(iii), 145-46, 185(iii).
282. Id. at 27, 58, 1N 78(iv), 185(iv).
283. Id. at 53-5,11 167-684; see also supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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considered the second condition crucial, and found that Ireland failed to
establish that each category of the redacted commercial information per-
tained to an activity or measure involving "an adverse effect" on the
maritime area presently or prospectively. Having resolved the dispute,
the tribunal declined to consider the issue of the commercial confidenti-
ality exception under Article 9(3)2 s
Like ITLOS, the OSPAR tribunal apparently intended to strike a bal-
ance between Ireland's rights to information in the transboundary
context and the United Kingdom's sovereignty over a domestic commer-
cial activity. On one side, the arbitral tribunal broadly construed Article
9(1) to open the door to interstate information exchange between the
neighboring coastal states to realize the goals of the regional sea conven-
tion. By contrast, the tribunal manipulated the scope of information
under Article 9(2) seemingly to avoid upsetting the U.K. authorities by
scrutinizing their determinations concerning the issue of commercial
confidentiality in MOX production.
The tribunal's narrow reading of Article 9(2), however, created un-
due hurdles to meaningful information exchange. As Dr. Griffith argued
in his dissenting opinion, Article 9(2) should not entail the showing of
"an adverse effect" involved in the proposed activity.2 6 The plain text of
the provision deals with "activities or measures adversely affecting or
likely to affect the state of the maritime area." '287 Thus, the showing of "a
potential effect" should suffice for the activity that had not yet com-
menced.288 In addition, the majority's approach would encourage the
originating state to segment a complex activity so as to decline informa-
tion disclosure for each segment of the proposed activity. Segmentation
could prevent a holistic account of the potential environmental impacts
of the planned activity. Furthermore, the majority put the onus of proof
on the affected state, which had no control over the potentially hazardous
activity and thus was not in the position to collect evidence sufficient to
demonstrate "an adverse effect" in every segment of the activity.289 The
284. OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 56, 57, IN 175, 179-80.
285. Id. at 27, 58, IN 78(v), 185(v).
286. Id. at 88, 1 79 (Dr. Gavan Griffith QC, dissenting).
287. OSPAR Convention, supra note 11, art. 9.2, 32 I.L.M. at 1078 (emphasis added);
see also supra note 263 and accompanying text.
288. See OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 89, U 81-82 (Dr. Gavan Griffith QC,
dissenting).
289. Id. at 87, 76 (Dr. Gavan Griffith QC, dissenting) (criticizing the majority's "wrong
approach to the burden of proof' in finding that "Ireland has failed to 'demonstrate adverse
effect'" in its information requests). Dr. Griffith contends that Article 2(2)(a) of the OSPAR
Convention, which provides for the precautionary principle, justifies the imposition of preven-
tive measures "even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the
import and the effects" and further shifts the responsibility for offering scientific evidence to
the originating state. Id. at 87, T 73.
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majority's holding would ultimately defeat the very purpose of the inter-
state process, designed to fill a gap in information and knowledge
regarding the transboundary environmental impacts of the proposed ac-
tivity.
The perplexity of the OSPAR tribunal's final award fundamentally
resulted from the structural inadequacy of the Convention itself. Article
9(1) is primarily designed to deal with information access in the domes-
tic context. The arbitral tribunal's elastic construction of the information
disclosure provision cannot address the root of the MOX plant dispute,
namely the lack of an adequate procedure for transboundary environ-
mental impact assessment including interstate consultation and
information exchange. As discussed below, the Annex VII tribunal has
also exhibited difficulty confronting this issue under UNCLOS.
3. Annex VII Tribunal's Order on
Further Provisional Measures
On July 26, 2002, just four days after its rebuttal submission in the
OSPAR proceeding, Ireland made its first written submission to the
Annex VII tribunal. Ireland's case under UNCLOS is essentially
procedural. Ireland argues that the United Kingdom failed to fulfill its
obligation to conduct a proper impact assessment under Article 206
without fully considering the environmental effects of the entire process
of MOX production, and in particular radioactive discharges from
reprocessing at THORP, accumulation of radioactive waste at Sellafield,
and the international shipments of radioactive materials.290 In addition,
by engaging in inadequate information exchange and improper
consultation with Ireland, the United Kingdom breached its duty to
cooperate under Article 123 (regarding semi-closed seas) and Article 197
(concerning the marine environment in general). 29' As a result of these
procedural violations, the United Kingdom authorized MOX production
to increase radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea, which is
inconsistent with its substantive obligations under Articles 192, 193,
194, 207, 211, 212, 213, 217 and 222 regarding marine environmental
protection and pollution prevention.292 Ireland seeks relief from the
tribunal through an order that the United Kingdom suspend the
authorization of MOX production and the associated international
transports of radioactive materials until the United Kingdom conduct a
290. See Annex VlIr.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 3, 111, IT 1.3(1), 7.1.
291. Id. at 3-4, 140, 111.3(2), 8.6.
292. Id. at 4, 201-02, In 1.3(3), 9.1-2.
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thorough transboundary environmental impact assessment of the MOX
293plant using appropriate interstate processes.
The United Kingdom maintains that it complied with Article 206.
Even though that provision applies to the 1993 Environmental State-
ment, 294 it "certainly does not require that the potential effects of planned
activities be assessed by reference to any set of formula. 2 95 As such, Ar-
ticle 206 requires that impact assessments be "simply part of an ongoing
process of information gathering and sharing. 296 According to this inter-
pretation, after the proposed activity is commenced, the proper remedy
for inadequate environmental impact assessments, if any, would be to
monitor the actual effect of the activity under Article 204.297 The United
Kingdom also asserts that it fulfilled its obligations of cooperation under
Articles 123 and 197, as well as prior notification and consultation under
customary international law, if applicable. 29 The United Kingdom con-
tends that it performed its obligations through international and regional
institutions and bilateral arrangements, which include, inter alia, the
processes for the European Commission's Opinion and the economic
justification for the MOX plant.299 Because planned radioactive dis-
charges from the MOX plant are infinitely small and generate no
appreciable risks, the United Kingdom's authorization of MOX produc-
300tion does not breach the substantive provisions.
The first hearing by the Annex VII tribunal on the merits was to be
held on June 10, 2003.30' Despite the ITLOS ruling on prima facie juris-
diction, the tribunal was concerned about jurisdictional problems in
relation to EC law.3 °0 The European Community has deposited a formal
293. Id. at 253-55, T 10.15(5).
294. Although the United Kingdom and Ireland were signatories to UNCLOS, the Con-
vention took effect between the parties on August 24, 1997. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-
Memorial, supra note 102, at 109, 5.7.
295. Id. at 109, 5.6(3).
296. Id. at 114, 5.18.
297. See id. at 108-09, 243, IN 5.4, 8.14.
298. The United Kingdom insists that under Article 288, the Annex VII tribunal's com-
petence is confined to the interpretation or application of UNCLOS without the consent of the
parties to enlarge the tribunal's jurisdiction over rights and obligations under other interna-
tional agreements and customary international law. See id. at 98-107, U 4.7-.32. On the other
hand, Ireland argues that under Article 293, the tribunal must "apply '[UNCLOS] and other
rules of international law not incompatible with [the] Convention,'" which include the OSPAR
Convention, relevant EC Directives, and principles of customary international law. Annex VII
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 99-109, if 6.1-.35.
299. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 151-66, 6.46-95.
300. See id. at 181-88, i 7.1-.23.
301. See Annex VII Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16, at 7, 21; Perm. Ct.
Arb., Recent and Pending Cases, at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/ (last visited Nov.
10,2003).
302. See Annex VII Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16, at 7, 20.
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declaration to assert its "exclusive competence" over pollution preven-
tion provisions in Part XII of UNCLOS, to the extent that such
provisions affect the Community's common rules. °3 Article 292 of the
Treaty on the European Union prohibits member states from employing
alternative methods of dispute settlement for issues concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the EC instruments.?° On June 5, only five
days before the beginning of the hearings, the tribunal was notified that
the European Commission was considering whether to initiate infringe-
ment proceedings against Ireland for failure to comply with Article
292.03 Given this sudden development, on June 13 the Annex VII tribu-
nal decided to suspend further proceedings through December 1, 2003.'06
In the interim, Ireland sought further provisional measures requiring
the United Kingdom to (1) freeze radioactive discharges from the MOX
plant and THORP at 2002 levels; (2) cooperate with Ireland on a confi-
dential basis in preparing an emergency plan and in providing the
requested information and radiological data collected from monitoring
and further research; and (3) take no steps or decisions which might pre-
vent the full effect of any environmental assessment the tribunal might
order under Article 206, should the tribunal proceed on the merits.3 7
On June 24, 2003, about a week before the OSPAR final award, the
Annex VII tribunal issued an order to deny the further provisional meas-
ures requested by Ireland.3 °8 Apparently due to this timing, the Annex VII
tribunal avoided giving effect to Ireland's request concerning the disclo-
sure of the withheld information. 3°9 As to the radioactive discharges, the
tribunal found that there was no urgent and serious risk of irreparable
harm before the resumption of the proceedings, although it noted that
some of the radionuclides discharged from the MOX plant have ex-
tremely long half-lives."0 It also considered that Ireland's request
303. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 101, 14.19.
304. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1; Treaty on
European Union, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 253; see also Annex VII U.K.'s
Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 102, 4.21.
305. See Annex VII Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16, at 7, 21.
306. Statement by the President, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/STATEMENT%20BY%20THE%20PRESIDENT.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2003); see also Annex VIU Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16,
at 20 (formalizing the decision in the president's statement).
307. See Request for Further Provisional Measures, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2003), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/Request%20for%20Provisional%20
Measures.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
308. Annex VII Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16, at 20.
309. See id. at 19, 166 ("The Tribunal does not need at this stage to resolve the factual
issues in dispute between the Parties as to the adequacy and timeliness of the disclosure of
certain information and as to the character and extent of co-operation.").
310. See id. at 16-18, 153-62.
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regarding environmental assessment under Article 206 failed to "give
any clear guidance to the United Kingdom of what conduct is required of
it pending a final decision.' '3 '
Instead, the Annex VII tribunal affirmed the ITLOS provisional
measures and promulgated further provisional measures of its own to
supplement the ITLOS measures.312 The arbitral tribunal was particularly
concerned about untimely and ineffective cooperation and consultation
between the parties under the ITLOS measures.3 3 To address its concern,
the tribunal recommended that the parties establish an effective intergov-
ernmental mechanism for notification and coordination, and ordered
them to submit reports on their compliance twice, by September 12 and
November 17, 2003.3ta
By enhancing the ITLOS provisional measures, the Annex VII tribu-
nal endorsed the interstate processes for notification and consultation as
part of the procedural obligations under Part XII of UNCLOS. The tri-
bunal, however, exhibited difficulty articulating the parties' rights and
obligations under the vague provisions of Article 206. Without knowing
precisely what information should have been included in the environ-
mental impact assessment of the MOX plant, Ireland and the United
Kingdom continued discordant communication under the ITLOS provi-
sional measures.3 - Thus, despite the Annex VII tribunal's intention, the
further provisional measures added little to improve the situation.
On October 21, 2003, the College of Commissioners of the Euro-
pean Community authorized the institution of infringement proceedings
against Ireland before the European Court of Justice.3 6 In response, on
November 14, 2003 the Annex VII tribunal decided to extend the sus-
pension of further proceedings on jurisdiction and merits under
UNCLOS until the European Court of Justice has reached a decision
311. Id. at 18,163.
312. Id. at 20.
313. See id. at 19, 66.
314. See id. at 19-20, U 66-67.
315. See supra note 260.
316. Further Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, Order No. 4 of Nov.
14, MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), at 2 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/
ENGLISH/RPC/MOX%200rder%2ONo4.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Annex VII
Further Suspension of Proceedings]; see also Answer Given by Mr. Prodi on Behalf of
the Commission, E-1964/03EN (July 16, 2003), at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/
omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=WQA&L=EN&PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+WQA+E-2003-1964-
N+0+DOC+WORD+VO//EN&LEVEL=4&NAV=S&SAMELEVEL=I (last visited Feb. 10,
2004) (reply to Written Question E-1964/03 by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the Commission,
June 3, 2003); Answer Given by Mr. Prodi on Behalf of the Commission, E-1491/03EN
(June 16, 2003), at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=-FORMS&L=
EN&PUBREF=-/IEP//TEXT+WQ+S-EXPERT+0+FORM+HTML4+VO//EN&LEGID=5 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2003) (reply to Written Question E-1491/03 by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the
Commission,Apr. 22, 2003).
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
regarding Community law issues (or the tribunal otherwise deter-
mines).3 7 When the Annex VII tribunal issued this decision, nearly two
years have lapsed since the plutonium commissioning of the MOX plant,
and there could be further twists and turns before a complete resolution
of the entangled dispute.
C. Lessons to Learn
As demonstrated by the MOX plant dispute, the existing legal
framework is poorly designed to guide states in the conduct of marine
environmental impact assessments for proposed activities involving both
domestic and transboundary effects. As discussed earlier, environmental
impact assessments in this context should (1) facilitate fully informed
decision-making that takes into account the potential transboundary and
domestic effects of proposed activities and (2) offer an opportunity for
affected states and citizens to comprehend the proposed activities and
have their concerns considered in decision-making."' However,
UNCLOS, as well as the regional seas conventions, fails to provide a
detailed procedure for initial screening, environmental impact assess-
ment documentation, public participation, and the interstate processes of
notification, information exchange, and consultation. In addition, exist-
ing dispute settlement mechanisms have failed to bring about the
efficient resolution of procedural environmental disputes.
Article 206 of UNCLOS does not provide specific criteria or meth-
ods to determine the threshold question of whether the proposed MOX
project may involve "substantial pollution of or significant and harmful
changes to the marine environment." Without agreed-upon criteria, the
parties to the dispute disagree with each other about whether the pro-
posed activity triggers the environmental impact assessment requirement
of Article 206. The United Kingdom emphasizes the "infinitesimally
small" amount of radioactive discharges from the MOX plant and re-
gards the 1993 Environmental Statement as "voluntarily" prepared by
BNFL.3 9 In contrast, Ireland focuses on the inherently hazardous nature
of nuclear activities and accuses the United Kingdom of failing to fill
remaining gaps in the 1993 Environmental Statement.320 Likewise, the
parties maintain dissimilar views about the required contents of assess-
ment under the indeterminate provision of Article 206. The United
317. Annex VII Further Suspension of Proceedings, supra note 119, at 2, 1 (a). At the
same time, the Annex VII tribunal extended its further provisional measures and required the
parties to submit a compliance report by May 31, 2004 and every six months thereafter until
the resumption of Annex VII proceedings. Id. at 3, 1 (d).
318. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
319. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 28, 186-87, M 2.17, 7.19.
320. Annex VH Ir's Reply, supra note 128, at 65, 6.22.
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Kingdom has consistently excluded from the 1993 Environmental
Statement and the subsequent authorization processes information on the
cumulative impacts of plutonium reclamation at THORP and interna-
tional transports of nuclear materials associated with MOX production.
Ireland considers this information essential for a proper environmental
impact assessment of the MOX plant.
Although the differences between the opposite sides of the Irish Sea
might ultimately be resolved in consultation with EC and other relevant
regional instruments with more specific criteria,"' such a solution might
not be possible in a similar dispute in a different region without
instruments establishing common standards for environmental impact
assessments. For example, only an inchoate regional sea program
without binding instruments exists in Northeast Asia,322  where
commercial nuclear reactors have rapidly proliferated along the coasts of
Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan.3 A reprocessing
plant is also currently under construction in a coastal village in Japan.324
321. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 293, 21 I.L.M at 1324 (requiring Annex VII tribunals
to apply "other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention."); Annex VII
Ir's Memorial, supra note 5, at 104, 6.19 (contending that the Espoo Convention and rele-
vant EC Directives constitute "other rules of international law" and "show how general
obligations in UNCLOS are to be interpreted and applied"); see also OSPAR Final Award,
supra note 15, at 34, 103, 105 (holding that to prevent anachronistic results in interpreting a
treaty concluded in an earlier period, the tribunal may take into account subsequent develop-
ments in law and apply "other extant international agreements" so long as such instruments
are admissible for the purpose of interpretation in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
322. See United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Status of Regional Agree-
ments Negotiated in the Framework of the Regional Seas Programme (Rev. 5), at
http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/hstatus.html# (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (stating that an action
plan was adopted in 1994 for the North West Pacific Region as the newest among the regional
seas regimes administered by UNEP). No regional sea convention has yet been concluded
among the participants including China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. Id.
323. See Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, DATA: Nuclear Maps of East Asia, Nuke
Info Tokyo, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 8-9, available at http://cnic.jp/english/nit/files/nit87.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004). As of December 2001, the status of nuclear plants in East Asia is as
follows:
* China: 3 under operation, 8 under construction, and 2 planned;
* Japan: 52 under operation, 4 under construction, and 2 under pre-construction
safety review;
* South Korea: 16 under operation, 4 under construction, and 4 planned;
* North Korea: 2 under construction; and
* Taiwan: 6 under operation and 2 under construction.
See id.
324. See Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Commercial and Research Nuclear Fa-
cilities in Japan, Nuke Info Tokyo, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 9 (indicating that a reprocessing plant is
under construction in the Rokkasho Village nuclear complex along the Pacific Ocean), avail-
able at http://cnic.jp/englishlnit/files/nit93.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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In addition, Russia is exploring the possibility of importing spent fuel
from Taiwan for future reprocessing, which would involve the frequent
shipments of INF Code materials across the semi-closed sea between the
Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago.3:2
UNCLOS, the OSPAR Convention, and Article 37 of the Euratom
Treaty all lack express provisions concerning public participation and
the interstate processes of prior notification, information exchange, and
consultation concerning potentially significant transboundary harm. In
accordance with the applicable domestic statute, BNFL prepared the
1993 Environmental Statement without participation by the Irish authori-
ties or affected members of the public. The European Commission's
Opinion was inadequate to fill this gap, because Article 37 offers no op-
portunities for concerned citizens and the affected member states to be
informed and have input in the Commission's determination. As dis-
cussed, the OSPAR tribunal used interpretative techniques to facilitate
interstate information exchange but was unable to overcome the struc-
tural shortcomings of the Convention, which primarily deals with
information disclosure in the domestic context. Although ITLOS and the
Annex VII tribunal infused customary good faith obligations into Part
XII of UNCLOS to facilitate the interstate processes,326 customary norms
are expressed at a high level of generality and thus are not helpful to de-
termine the precise timing of notification and consultation or the specific
contents of information to be exchanged between the parties.327 Without
clear guidance, the parties have engaged in untimely and unfruitful dia-
logue during the interim period under the ITLOS provisional measures,
as well as during the preparatory phase of the proposed activity. This is
only reinforced distrust between one another.
In addition, existing legal dispute settlement mechanisms may not be
suitable for a dispute between the originating state and a non-notified
state in determining whether a transboundary environmental impact
assessment is required for the proposed activity. In accordance
with general international law concerning state responsibility for
internationally wrongful conduct, 321 the non-notified party may resort to
325. See Hideyuki Ban, Conference in Taiwan to Stop International Waste Shipments,
Nuke Info Tokyo, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 6-7, available at http://cnic.jp/english/nit/files/nit87.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
326. See supra notes 92, 253-55, 312-14 and accompanying text.
327. Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1515. Cf Boyle, supra note 34, at 366
(pointing out the high level of generality in the customary principle of state responsibility not
to cause transboundary environmental harm).
328. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (providing that an action or
omission that "(a) [ius attributable to the State under international law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a
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dispute settlements under UNCLOS and allege that the originating state
has committed a breach of procedural obligations concerning
transboundary environmental impact assessment.3 29 To proceed on the
merits, however, competent tribunals must make a substantive
determination as to whether the proposed activity involves "substantial
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine
environment" under Article 206. This determination requires a factual
inquiry as to the effects of the proposed activity, under which tribunals
must inevitably confront highly technical and complex scientific
evidence. Renowned judges and arbitrators sitting on the bench of
international tribunals may not necessarily have sufficient scientific
expertise. For example, in prescribing the further provisional measures,
the Annex VII tribunal determined that there would be no serious
potential harm from the operation of the MOX plant, pending its
judgment on the merits.3 The arbitral tribunal supported its conclusion
with the finding that radioactive discharges from the MOX plant
contained a small quantity of radionuclides including plutonium-241 and
cesium-137, which have "an extremely long half-life. ' 3 ' However, these
isotopes have half-lives of 14 years and 30 years, respectively, which are
quite short compared with a half-life of 24,000 years for plutonium-239,
a key fissile ingredient of MOX fuel.332 As a shorter half-life indicates
more intense radioactivity, discharges of plutonium-241 and cesium-137
could have serious hazardous effects in a short term, while releases of
plutonium-239 would involve relatively low level but extremely long
term effects.333 A small quantity of extremely radiotoxic substances could
breach of an international obligation of the State" as the requisite elements of an internation-
ally wrongful act of a state).
329. Cf OSPAR Final Award, supra note 15, at 45-46, 144-46 (indicating that a
state's failure to respond to another state's request for information is admissible under Article
9(1) of the OSPAR Convention in accordance with the principle of state responsibility).
330. Annex VII Further Provisional Measures, supra note 16, at 16, 55.
331. Id. at 16, 54.
332. See Argonne Nat'l Lab. Envtl. Assessment Div. & U.S. Dep't of Energy Richland
Operations Office, Summary Fact Sheets for Selected Environmental Contaminants to Support
Health Risk Analyses (July 2002), available at http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/doc/Cover-Intro-
Linked.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003) (section on Plutonium); U.S. EPA, Radiation Informa-
tion: Cesium, at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/cesium.htm (last updated Dec. 3,
2002). MOX fuel contains plutonium-239 as well as other non-fissile plutonium isotopes as
by-products. CNFC & IEEJ, supra note 150 (noting that plutonium-239 accounts for 40.4
percent of MOX-grade plutonium).
333. See U.S. EPA, Understanding Radiation: Why Are Some Atoms Radioactive?, at
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/radiation.htm (last updated Dec. 3, 2002) (explaining
that the rate of radioactive decay, during which the nucleus of the radionuclide emits radiation,
is measured by the half-life); see also Foulke & Weiner, supra note 105, at 2. In addition,
these isotopes have different radiological effects due to different types of radiation they emit
through radioactive decay. For example, gamma rays can penetrate human tissues entirely;
alpha and beta particles cannot, although exposure to the strong emission of beta particles can
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produce serious harm to biota in the foreseeable future. As a result, the
tribunal's conclusion makes little sense. Without technical and complex
scientific knowledge, future tribunals will have similar difficulty
evaluating the potential effects of planned industrial activities on the
marine environment.
In addition, the structural delay makes a fundamental resolution of
the dispute more difficult. Having failed to settle the crucial factual
dispute at the threshold of the transboundary environmental impact
assessment process, the parties have continued unfruitful dialogue for
about a decade. When Ireland resorted to legal dispute settlements,
BNFL had already completed the construction of the MOX plant and
was about to commence its plutonium commissioning. By that time, the
United Kingdom had considerably higher economic stakes in the
project.3 4 Now, the United Kingdom wants to avoid the suspension of
the authorization and is reluctant to make costly changes to take
Ireland's environmental concerns into account. 335 To some extent, the
originating state may address the affected state's concerns through
rigorous post-hoc monitoring under Article 204. Still, post-hoc
monitoring may not substitute for prior assessment of environmental
impacts under Article 206. Allowing substitution would effectively
redden or burn human skin. See U.S. EPA, Understanding Radiation, at http://www.epa.gov/
radiation/understand/ (last updated Dec. 3, 2002). Thus, cesium-137, which emits gamma rays
as well as beta particles, could pose hazard to a person merely walking through contaminated
land. U.S. EPA, Understanding Radiation: Cesium, supra note 332; U.S. EPA, Understanding
Radiation, supra. On the other hand, plutonium-241, which principally emits beta particles, is
hazardous when inhaled or ingested, although the same isotope outside the human body is of
less serious concern. See Argonne Nat'l Lab. Envtl. Assessment Div. & U.S. Dep't of Energy
Richland Operations Office, supra note 332; U.S. EPA, Understanding Radiation, supra. The
situation looks more complex when the decay chains of radionuclides are considered. Ameri-
cium-241, a decay product of plutonium-241, has a longer half-life of 432.7 years to transform
into another radionuclide, neptunium-237. U.S. EPA, Radiation Information: Americium, at
http://www.epa.gov/radiationradiaonuclides/americium.htm (last updated Dec. 3, 2002).
Unlike plutonium-241, americium-241 could pose serious hazard to humans without ingestion
or inhalation because it emits gamma rays as well as alpha particles. Id.; see also Inst. for
Energy & Envtl. Res., Science for the Critical Masses: How Plutonium Changes with Time, 3
ENERGY & SECURITY, at http://www.ieer.org/ensec/no-3/puchange.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2003). Plutonium-241, americium-241, and neptunium-237 are among "the most biologically
hazardous of materials." Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 199, 8.285. Although
these radioactive substances have been routinely discharged into the Irish Sea and contami-
nated seafood is deemed to pose no hazard to human health, there is scientific uncertainty as
to the effects of their additional discharges on biota. See id.; see also supra notes 126-28 and
accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
335. See Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 242, 8.12. But see
ITLOS U.K.'s Response, supra note 110, at 86, 231-32 (refuting the provisional measures
on the ground that such measures involved "not an abstract entitlement to authorise the con-
duct of an industrial activity on a State's territory, but the exercise of rights with important
economic consequences" to BNFL, its employees, and the local community).
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nullify the affected state's procedural rights to ensure that the originating
state is fully informed about the potential environmental consequences
of the proposed activity in making a critical decision.336 An efficient
mechanism to settle the factual dispute is necessary to avoid unnecessary
costs to the originating state, and to safeguard the non-notified state's
procedural rights.
In order to address these structural problems, the following Section
conducts a comparative analysis of major regional and international en-
vironmental impact assessment schemes and proposes a marine
environmental impact assessment protocol to Article 206 of UNCLOS.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT MECHANISMS
AND THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO UNCLOS
A. The Framework of Comparative Study
To facilitate efficient administration of marine environmental impact
assessment, there should be a greater degree of coordination between
UNCLOS and other relevant international and regional instruments. In
designing an environmental impact assessment protocol to UNCLOS, it
is necessary to take into account the procedures available in existing in-
struments on environmental impact assessment, as well as jurisdictional
arrangements and states' rights and obligations in protecting the marine
environment. Currently, several international instruments provide for
transboundary impact assessment procedures. In 1987, five years after
the adoption of UNCLOS, the United Nations Environmental Program
adopted the Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment
(UNEP Guidelines) to provide a set of non-binding guidelines to
adequately assess environmental impacts at national, regional, and inter-
national levels.337 In 1991, the basic framework in the UNEP Guidelines
336. See Okowa, supra note 33, at 285 (arguing that if the originating state were allowed
to proceed with an activity having potentially significant transboundary environmental impacts
without full consultations with the affected states, this "would render nugatory the very aims
of environmental impact assessment procedures."). But see supra notes 244-45 and accompa-
nying text (explaining Ireland's contention in the ITLOS proceedings that Ireland's procedural
rights would be irrevocably nullified without suspension of the authorization of plutonium
commissioning at the MOX plant). See generally supra note 84 and accompanying text.
337. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84 (Preliminary Note). The UNEP Guidelines are
regarded as an authoritative document codifying a basic framework for an environmental im-
pact assessment. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 368; see also Knox, supra note 33, at 297
(referencing the UNEP Guidelines as one of international instruments that have helped domes-
tic environmental impact assessment procedures spread among nations). In the MOX plant
case, Ireland cites the UNEP Guidelines as a relevant international instrument in support of its
arguments concerning the duty to conduct environmental impact assessments. See Annex VII
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was elaborated on in the Convention on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) adopted at the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.33 The Espoo Con-
vention is "a useful model for interstate cooperation" in dealing with
transboundary environmental impacts,'" and its procedures were essen-
tially replicated in the 1997 EC Directive.' ° In the same year, the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) also
created a Draft North American Agreement on Transboundary Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (Draft North American Agreement). 4 ' In
2001, interstate environmental impact assessment procedures were fur-
ther codified in the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities adopted by the International Law Commission
(ILC Draft Articles).32 In addition, the World Bank and regional banks
Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 116, 7.17-19. But see Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial,
supra note 102, at 119, 5.29 (noting that "the tribunal may wish to look at the 1987 UNEP
Goals and Principles but these do not contain rules of international law.") (emphasis added).
338. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb.
25, 1991, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Espoo Convention] (referencing the UNEP
Guidelines as one of international instruments on which the Convention relied). On May 21,
2003, 35 parties to the Espoo Convention including Ireland and the United Kingdom, as well
as the European Community, signed the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to
the Espoo Convention. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context, at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/protocolenglish.pdf (last
updated July 30, 2003). While basic environmental impact assessments under the Espoo Con-
vention deal with proposed activities, strategic environmental impact assessments under the
new Protocol cover proposed plans and programs that are required by legislative, regulatory,
or administrative measures and to be adopted by governmental authorities or legislative bod-
ies. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, opened for signature May 21, 2003, art. 2(5),
MP.EIA/2003/1, available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/protocolenglish.pdf.
This Article confines the scope of analysis to basic environmental impact assessment under
the Espoo Convention.
In the Annex VII proceedings, Ireland references the Espoo Convention to elucidate the
United Kingdom's obligation to carry out transboundary environmental impact assessments
and associated interstate processes. See Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 117-18,
154, It 7.22-.23, 8.59. But see Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, 5.29
(pointing out that the Espoo Convention is not applicable to the present dispute because the
Convention came into force between the parties only in October 2002, three months after
Ireland ratified it). The United Kingdom ratified the Espoo Convention in 1997. See Annex
VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 104, 1 6.19 & n.28.
339. Robinson, supra note 85, at 608; see also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 367;
Preiss, supra note 85, at 320 (noting that the Espoo Convention is regarded as an authoritative
codification of the basic requirements in transboundary environmental impact assessment).
340. 1997 EC Directive, supra note 220.
341. North American Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation (NACEC), Draft North American
Agreement on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (June 21, 1997), at http:/
www.cec.org/pubs info-resources/lawtreat-agree/pbl.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Nov.
11,2003).
342. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Hann from Hazardous Activities, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N.
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have applied environmental assessment processes in lending decision-
making 43 The Antarctic Treaty regime also provides for detailed impact
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 370-77, U.N. Doc. A156/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft
Articles]. The ILC Draft Articles are outgrowths of the Commission's codification of the gen-
eral rules concerning state responsibility pursuant to Article 13 of the Charter of the United
Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 13, l(a), 59 Stat. 1031 (mandating the General Assembly to
conduct studies and to make recommendations in order to "encourag[e] the progressive devel-
opment of international law and its codification"); see also ILC Draft Articles, supra, pmbl.;
Boyle, State Responsibility, supra note 33, at 2. The ILC has decided to draft the rules con-
cerning international liability separately from the rules governing state responsibility because
the Commission feels it necessary to distinguish states' obligations concerning internationally
lawful activities involving potential transboundary harm from their obligations concerning
internationally wrongful conduct involving a breach of international law. See ILC Draft Arti-
cles, supra, art. 1; ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 1, 1 1, (confining the scope of the
Draft Articles "to activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing
significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences"); Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 328, art. 1; Commentaries
to Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, 4, at 62, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/
law/ilc/texts/State -responsibility/responsibility-commentaries(e).pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2004) (stating that "for the purpose of these articles, international responsibility results exclu-
sively from a wrongful act contrary to international law."); see also Boyle, State
Responsibility, supra note 33, at 2.
ILC's work concerning transboundary harm has sparked heated scholarly debates. See,
e.g., Knox, supra note 33, at 301 (contending that the ILC Draft Articles attempt to codify
"the mythic conception of transboundary E[nvironmental] I[mpact] A[ssessment] as a corol-
lary to Principle 21 and highlight the absence of similar provisions in the regional
agreement."); Boyle, State Responsibility, supra note 33, at 13, 17, 22 (arguing that the ILC's
attempt to codify general propositions of international liability without harm or injury may be
"unhelpful or misleading" and recommending the Commission to direct its efforts to "more
practical and less theoretically questionable standpoint of codifying and developing a set of
basic environmental obligations for states"); Developments in the Law, supra note 33, at 1507
(questioning whether the ILC's study indeed reflects the interests of states by extensively
attributing private conduct to states and thereby holding states internationally liable for trans-
boundary harm from almost all private activities). In the MOX plant dispute, Ireland and the
United Kingdom disagree about the precise legal effects of the Draft Articles although both
parties attach importance to the Commission's work. Compare Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-
Memorial, supra note 102, at 193, 7.37 (using the ILC Draft Articles "as a guide" in inter-
preting its obligations under UNCLOS although "The Draft Articles are not binding or in any
way dispositive of interpretation of UNCLOS."), with Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5,
at 114, T 7.9 (regarding the Draft Articles as a confirmation that the duty to conduct environ-
mental impact assessments under Article 206 of UNCLOS reflects customary international
law).
343. World Bank, supra note 84; European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
(EBRD), Environmental Procedures (July 28, 2003), at http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/
enviro/procedur/procedur.pdf [hereinafter Procedures]; EBRD, Environmental Policy (Apr
2003), at http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/enviro/policy/policy.pdf [hereinafter Policy];
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Operational Procedures, 6, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONSID-
ERATIONS IN ADB OPERATIONS (Feb. 28, 2003), at http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Manuals/Operations/om2O.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
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assessment requirements in its Protocol on Environmental Protection
(Antarctic Protocol).344
Although the environmental impact assessment procedures in the
above instruments exhibit some similarity, their scopes and designs vary
depending on the institutional context and the purpose of the instru-
ments. To address the problems identified in the previous section, the
following section examines: (1) methods and criteria to determine
whether proposed activities are subject to the impact assessment re-
quirements; (2) notification and information exchange; (3) public
participation; (4) the required contents of the environmental impact as-
sessment documentation; (5) interstate consultations; (6) dispute
settlement systems, and (7) the role of international and regional institu-
tions in marine environmental impact assessment processes.
B. Comparative Analysis of Environmental Impact
Assessment Mechanisms and
Its Application to UNCLOS
1. Methods and Criteria to Determine Whether Proposed
Activities Are Subject to the Environmental
Impact Assessment Requirements
In general, environmental impact assessment provisions are
applicable only when the proposed activity is likely to have significant
environmental impacts."5 Thus, each instrument discussed above
344. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455 (1991) [hereinafter Antarctic Protocol].
345. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 1 (providing for a comprehensive
environmental impact assessment when a proposed activity "is likely to significantly affect the
environment."); see also Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 2, 30 I.L.M. at 803-04
(requiring transboundary environmental impact assessments in planned activities that cause a
significant adverse transboundary impact); ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 1 (covering
"activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing significant
transboundary harm through their physical consequences"); NACEC, supra note 341, art. 10.1
(making the transboundary environmental impact assessment procedure applicable when the
proposed project "is likely to cause significant adverse transboundary environmental impacts
on the environment of another Party"); World Bank, supra note 84, 8(a) (mandating an
environmental impact assessment only when the proposed project "is likely to have significant
adverse environmental impacts."); ADB, supra note 343, 1 6 (including a provision similar to
that of World Bank); EBD, Procedures, supra note 343, at 7, 9, 2.3.1, 2.3.3 (stating that an
environmental impact assessment is conducted when the proposed project involves
"potentially significant adverse future environmental impacts which, at the time of screening,
cannot be readily identified or assessed."); see also ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 2,
6 & nn. 919-20; Okowa, supra note 33, at 283-84. Reflecting the fragile ecosystems of the
Antarctica, the Antarctic Protocol uses a lower threshold. See Antarctic Protocol, supra note
344, Annex I, art. 3.1 (obligating the parties to the Protocol to conduct a comprehensive
environmental evaluation for a proposed activity that is likely to involve "more than a minor or
transitory impact.").
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includes methods and criteria for determining whether a proposed
activity has such significant impacts that it is subject to environmental
impact assessment procedures. Under these instruments, the originating
state makes the initial decision regarding the likelihood of significant
transboundary impacts of the proposed activity and the final decision• • • • 146
regarding the authorization. By comparison, multilateral development
banks' instruments give banks more decisional authority in these
matters 7
In addition, there are two major approaches in the existing instru-
ments. One is to identify criteria by which the proposed activities are
screened initially to determine the applicability of the impact assessment
requirements. For example, the UNEP Guidelines identify "the nature
and location of the proposed activity" as screening criteria for determin-
ing whether a proposed activity is likely to have significant
environmental impacts.48 The World Bank endorses this approach. The
Bank staff examines the "type, location, sensitivity, and scale of the pro-
ject, and the nature and magnitude of its potential impacts" in
determining under which category the proposed project belongs.4 9 Cate-
gory A includes projects with potential to have "significant adverse
environmental impacts."35 For this category, an environmental impact
assessment is mandatory."' Category B includes projects judged to have
some adverse environmental impacts but of lesser degree of significance
than those for category A projects."2 For this category, an initial envi-
ronmental examination is required to determine whether the potential
impacts of the proposed activities are so significant that a full environ-
346. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 2, 30 I.L.M. at 803 (assigning responsibili-
ties for the transboundary environmental impact assessment processes to the originating state);
NACEC, supra note 341, art. 10.1 ("The determination whether a proposed project is likely to
cause significant adverse transboundary environmental impacts on the environment of another
Party shall be made by the Party of Origin ...."); ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 1,
6 (giving the originating state the responsibility to manage risks in the proposed activity
while conferring to the affected states the right of engagement with the originating state
through the interstate processes); see also Antarctic Protocol supra note 344, art. 8.2 (requir-
ing the parties to ensure the application of the assessment procedures in the preparatory
processes before the authorization of proposed activities).
347. World Bank, supra note 84, 8 ("The Bank undertakes environmental screening of
each proposed project to determine the appropriate extent and type of E[nvironmental]
A[ssessment]."); ADB supra note 343, 7 (allocate the responsibility for the final classifica-
tion of the proposed activity to ADB's chief compliance officer); EBD, Procedures, supra note
343, at 4, 2.1 (mandating EBRD staff to prepare terms of reference for environmental impact
assessments).
348. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 1.
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mental impact assessment is required.353 No environmental impact as-
sessment or initial environmental examination is necessary for Category
C projects without significant impacts.354 The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) closely follows the World Bank's procedure" The Antarctic Pro-
tocol also adopts a similar two-step approach with an initial
environmental examination for screening and a comprehensive environ-
mental evaluation for activities more than "a minor or transitory
impact.
' '356
The other approach is to comprise a list of activities that are, pre-
sumably, likely to cause significant adverse environmental impacts. The
Espoo Convention includes such a list in Annex 1.357 In addition, Annex
III of the Convention also provides for general criteria to determine
whether a non-listed activity may have significant adverse impacts. 58
The criteria are very similar to those used by the World Bank. If the con-
cerned parties identify an activity to be likely to have a significant
impact, the activity must be treated as though it were listed in Annex 1.359
The interstate process is triggered if Annex I activities are likely to have
significant transboundary effects. 360 This determination is left primarily
to the originating party. The Draft North American Agreement also uses
a combination of a list of activities and a set of criteria for non-listed
activities.6  In addition, the Draft Agreement includes a geographical
limit. The proposed projects must be located within 100 kilometers of
the borders between the two of the three NACEC member states.362 The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also uses
an approach similar to the Espoo Convention in its Environmental Pro-
cedures.363 Unlike procedures under the Espoo Convention and the Draft
Agreement, the EBRD staff determines the terms of reference for envi-
ronmental impact assessments under its Environmental Procedure.36
353. Id.
354. Id. I 8(c) (Category C: a project whose impacts are de minimus). If a financial in-
termediary ("FI") is involved in a Bank-financed project, the World Bank requires the FI to
screen proposed subprojects and to ensure that subborrowers prepare an appropriate environ-
mental assessment for each subproject. Id. I 11.
355. ADB, supra note 343, 6.
356. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 344, Annex I, art. 2.
357. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 2(3), app. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 804, 812-13.
358. Id. app. III, 30 I.L.M. at 814.
359. See id. art. 2(5), 30 I.L.M. at 804.
360. Id. arts. 2(4), 3(1), 30 I.L.M. at 804.
361. NACEC, supra note 341, art. 2.1 (a)(b). The Draft Agreement has not yet developed
a definitive set of factors and puts Annex Im in blankets. Id.
362. Id. art. 2.1(a).
363. See EBD Procedures, supra note 343, at 8, 2.3.1; EBD, Policy, supra note 343, at
5, 15-17, 15, Annex 1 (including an indicative list of activities to be classified as Category A
projects).
364. See EBD, Procedures, supra note 343, at 4, 2.1.
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The ILC Draft Articles are quite vague about methods to determine
whether proposed activities are subject to environmental impact assess-
ment procedures. The Draft Articles cover proposed activities that are
"not prohibited by international law" and "involve a risk of causing sig-
nificant transboundary harm through their physical consequences., 365 "A
risk of causing significant transboundary harm" encompasses risks in the
form of "a high probability of causing significant transboundary harm"
and "a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm."3 66 To
identify such an activity, the ILC's Commentaries reference some gen-
eral characteristics, including the types and sources of energy used in the
manufacturing project, the location of the proposed activity, its prox-
imity to the border area, the use of hazardous substances listed in
multilateral environmental agreements, and activities listed as having
significant impacts in international instruments, including Annex I of the
Espoo Convention.367 Although this broad formulation may encompass
criteria and lists used in all the existing environmental impact assessment
procedures,368 the Commentaries fail to specify whether initial screening
is required.
Article 206 of UNCLOS provides for impact assessments "[w]hen
States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities un-
der their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or
significant and harmful changes of the marine environment. ' '369 This pro-
vision seemingly put responsibility and decisional authority on the
originating state. However, an activity can be under concurrent jurisdic-
tion of several states. For example, a Russian vessel carried MOX fuel
from Russia to Canada within one mile of the U.S. border as part of the
Parallex project, a joint U.S.-Russian-Canadian experiment to reduce
global stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium. 370 The United States pro-
vided the full value of the cost of MOX transportation.37' In that case,
Russia was the flag state that exercised jurisdiction and control over the
flagged vessel. Regarding environmental regulations, the United States
had prescriptive jurisdiction over the vessel passing through the territo-
365. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 1.
366. Id. art. 2(a).
367. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 7, 9 & n. 954, at 405.
368. The ILC feels that including a generic list of activities is "not without problems and
functionally not essential" because such list might likely be underinclusive and could be out-
dated. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 1, 4. The Commission is also concerned that
such a generic list might not capture the particular application of a proposed activity, its spe-
cific context, and the manner of its operation, a combination of which accounts for the risk of
the activity. Id.
369. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 206, 21 I.L.M at 1309.
370. Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 843 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
371. ld. at 843.
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
rial sea. Like multilateral development banks, the United States, as the
funding body, might also require environmental impact assessments of
the federally funded activity.
372
In a draft protocol to UNCLOS, the originating state should imple-
ment and administer the environmental impact assessment process as in
the Espoo Convention and similar instruments. Although UNCLOS al-
lows coastal states to prescribe pollution prevention measures applicable
within the territorial sea and the EEZ,373 the Convention confers on them
only limited enforcement jurisdiction.374 In addition, Article 206 provides
that states conduct impact assessments "as far as practicable." '375 It is not
practicable that coastal states apply their own impact assessment proce-
dures to foreign vessels and facilities due to issues of evidence and
regulatory competence. Before the proposed activity is commenced, the
owner or operator of the facility retains most of critical evidence con-
cerning the likelihood of significant environmental harm. The host state,
in the case of land-based sources, or the flag state, in the case of vessels,
controls the proposed activity and related information and is in a better
position to administer environmental impact assessment procedures. In
the MOX plant case, neither Ireland nor other coastal states had control
over BNFL to directly obtain information on controversial activities.
Thus, the draft protocol should follow the general model of transboundary
environmental impact assessment and, depending on the subject matter,
give either the host state or the flag state decisional authority regarding
whether the proposed activity could potentially cause significant harm to
the marine environment within the territorial sea and the EEZ of another
coastal state.376 Extensive interstate processes should complement the
372. Id. at 845 (holding that NEPA was applicable to major federal actions, including
federal funding, in a foreign jurisdiction that had effect on the U.S. environment); see also
Recommendation on Measures to Facilitate the Environmental Assessment of Development
Assistance Projects and Programs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(86)26 (Oct. 2, 1986); Recommendation on Environmental Assessment
of Development Assistance Projects and Programs, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(85)104 (June 20, 1985).
373. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
374. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 27-28, 21 I.L.M at 1275 (prohibiting coastal
states from stopping, diverting, and boarding a foreign ship exercising the right of innocent
passage except for certain enumerated circumstances); see also supra note 46 (explaining
difference between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction).
375. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 206.
376. This arrangement is consistent with the U.S. appellate court decision in Mayaguez-
anos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d 297 (1 st Cir. 1999). Without major
federal actions in the transport of vitrified waste between France and Japan, the First Circuit
declined to entertain plaintiffs' claim that NEPA be applicable to the nuclear waste shipments,
even though the shipments passed through a U.S. EEZ in the Mona Passage. Id. at 304-05; see
also ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 1, 8 (stating that in cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tions over a proposed activity, the territorial jurisdiction prevails over other types of
jurisdictional bases except that the flag state jurisdiction preempts the territorial jurisdiction of
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rights and duties of the potentially affected coastal states in protecting
the marine environment. On the other hand, the draft protocol should not
prejudice the funding body's right to require an environmental impact
assessment as a condition of funding because such an assessment may
extend to issues beyond the scope of UNCLOS. To avoid unnecessary
duplications, the originating state and the funding body should cooperate
and coordinate in preparing an environmental impact assessment of the
funded activity.
A draft environmental impact assessment protocol to UNCLOS
should also adopt a method of initial determination similar to the Espoo
Convention's approach. The two-step approach works in the World Bank
and the Antarctic Treaty regime because the covered project is limited by
their specific mandates. Such an approach would not be practicable un-
der UNCLOS, which implicates a vast number of land-based sources and
commercial vessels regarding marine environmental protection. Accord-
ingly, the proposed environmental impact assessment procedure should
include a list of activities similar to the Espoo Convention. If a proposed
activity falls in the categories of activities listed in the protocol, the
originating state should presumptively "have reasonable grounds for be-
lieving" that the proposed activity may substantially pollute or
significantly harm the environment. For example, taking into account the
lists of the existing instruments, the MOX plant should fall in a category
of "installations for the production of nuclear fuel '37 7 or "nuclear related
projects., 37" As in the Draft North American Agreement, the draft proto-
col should include a geographical limit measured from a baseline 79 to
coastal states). The proposed jurisdictional arrangement is also in line with the general princi-
ple of state responsibility to control transboundary harm as well as the principle concerning
the allocation of international liability. See Handl, supra note 92, at 530 (highlighting the
"pivotal nature of the linkage" between state control and state liability regarding the harm
caused by private activities). When a private activity falls under concurrent jurisdiction, inter-
national liability is assigned to "the state whose control bore most directly on the occurrence
of the accident." Kelson, supra note 92, at 229, 235 (stating that under the principle of original
state responsibility, if a private activity involves the substantial risks of transboundary harm,
the originating state is responsible and directly liable for the harm); supra note 33 and accom-
panying text. Handl, supra, at 535.
In the case of states with federal systems, a competent sub-national authority may admin-
ister the transboundary environmental impact assessment procedures. See Knox, supra note
33, at 315 (explaining that due to concern about the scope of federal jurisdiction, the United
States has not yet ratified the Espoo Convention, while Canada ratified the Convention with a
reservation to exempt its application from projects that are under provincial jurisdiction).
377. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, app. I, 3, 30 I.L.M. at 812; 1997 EC Directive,
supra note 220, Annex I, 3(b).
378. NACEC, supra note 341, app. I, F
379. The baseline refers to "the line from which the outer limits of the territorial sea and
other coastal State zones ... are measured." CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 17, at 31. The
normal baseline is "the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts offi-
cially recognized by the coastal State." UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 5, 21 I.L.M at 1272.
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ensure a nexus between the proposed activity and the marine environ-
ment.
As in the Espoo Convention, the draft protocol should also include
general criteria for non-listed activities or land-based activities located
outside the geographical limit. For example, ships carrying radioactive
materials are not listed in the existing instruments concerning environ-
mental impact assessments. Applying the generally recognized criteria,
however, such ships should be deemed to have potentially significant
effects on the marine environment due to the inherently dangerous na-
ture and the location of the activities. Requiring prior environmental
impact assessment does not hinder the actual exercise of the freedom of
navigation by vessels within EEZs and the high seas,38 ° and is consistent
with the provisions of UNCLOS requiring that the flag state have due
regard for coastal states' rights and duties."' Although UNCLOS prohib-
its coastal states from discriminating vessels exercising the right of
innocent passage based on their cargoes,382 prior environmental impact
assessments administered by the originating state have nothing to do
with hampering vessels' innocent passage.
The United Kingdom, nevertheless, have argued that procedural
environmental obligations are already included in Article 23 of
UNCLOS to require ships loaded with ultrahazardous cargoes to carry
documentation and comply with special precautionary measures
pursuant to international agreements."' Indeed, the United Kingdom has
complied with the applicable regulations prescribed by the IMO and the
IAEA regarding marine transportation of INF Code materials. Because
this provision reflects a consensus among the parties to the Convention
regarding the international movements of radioactive materials, nothing
more should be required.4
However, when UNCLOS was concluded in December 1982, coastal
states might not have been aware of the possibility of international mari-
time transport of plutonium for commercial purposes. It was in October
Normal baselines must be used except for the enumerated special geographical conditions. See
id. art. 6 (reefs); art. 7 (straight baselines for deeply indented or unstable coasts); art. 9 (river
mouths); art. 10 (bays); arts. 11, 12 (port facilities); art. 13 (low-tide elevations).
380. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 23, 21 I.L.M at 1274-75.
381. Id. arts. 58.3, 87.2. Article 87.2 is more broadly formulated than Article 58.3 to
require a flag state to take into account the rights and duties of any other states. Id.
382. Id. arts. 24, 26, 21 I.L.M at 1275.
383. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 133, 5.56 ("Maritime
transports of radioactive materials are subject to ... detailed and stringent regulations ...
which are implemented in the United Kingdom to a standard that represents international good
practice.").
384. See Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 223-24 (noting that "the carriage of nuclear cargoes
was considered during UNCLOS III and resolved to the satisfaction of both coastal and mari-
time interests.").
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1984 that Japan commenced the first plutonium return shipments from
Europe. Since then, repeated and persistent official protests by coastal
states against the sea shipments of weapons grade plutonium, MOX fuel,
and vitrified waste have cast doubt on the existence of such consensus on
these matters. Moreover, in 1999, a U.S. district court held that environ-
mental impact assessment provisions under NEPA were applicable to the
federally funded marine transport of MOX fuel because of "the logical
possibility that an accident involving the Russian MOX shipment might
also have transboundary effects on American populations. 386 In light of
these developments, the proposed protocol to UNCLOS should at least
be applicable to the international maritime transports of the above con-
tested radioactive materials.
2. Notification and Information Exchange
Between the Concerned States
In the transboundary context, environmental impact assessments in-
volve a sequence of interstate processes. Under the UNEP Guidelines,
when information obtained through environmental impact assessment
indicates that a proposed activity is likely to have significant trans-
boundary environmental impacts, the originating state should notify the
potentially affected state of the proposed activity.387 The originating state
should transmit any relevant information from the environmental impact
assessment documentation to the affected state, subject to domestic in-
formation protection rules. 3" Apparently, the Guidelines require
notification and information exchange only after the preparation of envi-
ronmental impact assessments. The Guidelines are silent as to the
contents of the notification.
The Espoo Convention provides more elaborate interstate proce-
dures. The originating party must notify affected parties of a proposed
Annex I activity that is likely to have significant transboundary impacts
"as early as possible and no later than when informing its own public
about that proposed activity."389 This notification must includes "(a) in-
formation on proposed activity, including any available information on
its possible transboundary impacts, (b) the nature of the possible deci-
sion;" and (c) an identification of a reasonable time within which the
385. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
386. Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 843 (W.D. Mich. 1999). The court, how-
ever, denied the plaintiffs' request of injunction invoking the political question doctrine due to
potential damage to the U.S.-Russian relationship and chilling effect on nuclear non-
proliferation. Id. at 848.
387. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 12(a).
388. Id. princ. 12(b).
389. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, arts. 2(4), 3(1), 30 I.L.M. at 804.
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
notified party must respond with acknowledgement and an indication of
whether it intends to participate in the environmental impact assessment
process. 9 If the affected parties do not intend to participate in the as-
sessment process, the originating party conducts an environmental
impact assessment pursuant to its domestic law.39'
If the affected party, in reply to notification, indicates its desire to
participate in the assessment process, the originating party must supply
relevant procedural and substantive information that has not yet been
provided at the time of notification. Upon the request of the originating
party, the affected party must supply reasonably obtainable information
concerning the potentially affected environment under the affected
party's jurisdiction.3 92 The Espoo Convention further requires the origi-
nating party to provide the environmental assessment documentation
itself to the affected party.3 93 Relevant information may be classified pur-
suant to the requirements of applicable domestic rules, including
commercial confidentiality exceptions. 9
The Draft North American Agreement also adopts a similar notifica-
tion procedure. Under the Draft Agreement, the notification document is
to include more details of procedural and substantive information, 95
while the information exchange provision is limited to the affected
state's request for additional information.3 96 Unlike the Espoo Conven-
tion, the Draft North American Agreement ignores reciprocity in
information exchange, as it lacks a provision dealing with the originating
390. Id. art. 3(2)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 805.
391. Id. art. 3(4), 30 I.L.M. at 805.
392. Id. arts. 3(5), 3(6) , 30 I.L.M. at 805.
393. Id. art. 4(2), 30 I.L.M. at 806.
394. Id. art. 2(8), 30 I.L.M. at 804.
395. NACEC, supra note 341, arts. 7, 10.1(b), 10.2, app. H. Under the Draft North
American Agreement, prior notification is required for listed activities located within the geo-
graphical limit even when the potential effects of such activities may be confined to the
domestic environment. Id. art. 7(1). If the proposed activity is not likely to involve trans-
boundary impacts, notification should include; (A) basic information including (1) the nature
and location of the project, (2) the description and location of the potentially affected envi-
ronment, (3) identification of proponent/developer; (B) points of contact; and (C) reasonable
time frames for the notified party to respond and make comments, if any. Id. art. 7.2, Annex 1I,
pt. I. If the proposed activity is deemed to have potentially significant transboundary impacts,
the originating state must provide the general notification as well as the notification of intent
to conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment. Id. arts. 7.3, 10.1 (b). The notifi-
cation of transboundary environmental impact assessment must include (A) more details on
the proposed project; (B) information on the public participation process in the originating
party; and (C) opportunities for the potentially affected party to participate. Id. app. II, pt. II.
The originatinj state must specify reasonable time frames within which the affected party
responds and comments on notification, if any, and indicates whether it intends to participate
in the transboundary environmental impact assessment process. Id. art. 10.2, app. II, pt. I.C.
396. Id. art. 8.2. If the affected party wishes to obtain additional information, it may
make an information request with justifications for the necessity of such information. Id.
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state's request for information on the affected state's local environment.
Currently, it is unclear whether information exchange should occur di-
rectly between the concerned parties or be made through the NACEC.397
As in the Espoo Convention, the Draft Agreement provides for the af-
fected party's right to receive completed environmental impact
assessment documentation.398
According to the ILC Draft Articles, the notification must be timely
with the available supporting technical and other information. 399 The
originating state must not make any decision to authorize the proposed
activity until the receipt of the affected state's response, which must be
made within six months. 4°° The Draft Articles require reciprocal informa-
tion exchange only after the proposed project has been commenced. °' As
in the Espoo Convention, the ILC Draft Articles allow the originating
party to withhold information based on national security and commercial
confidentiality.'*'
While the Espoo Convention and the Draft North American Agree-
ment provide for notification prior to the environmental impact
assessment process, the Draft Articles, as well as UNEP Guidelines, re-
quire notification only after the completion of an environmental impact
assessment. This is because the Espoo Convention and Draft Agreement
give the affected states the right to participate fully in the assessment
process and in the interstate process,43 while the Draft Articles and
UNEP Guidelines provide only the right to participate in the interstate
process to the affected states.
UNCLOS omits explicit references to prior notification and informa-
tion from Part XII, which deals with marine pollution prevention. 40 This
omission, however, does not mean that interstate processes are irrelevant
to the protection of the marine environment. On the contrary, as ITLOS
indicated in the provisional measures, information exchange between
concerned states is vital to facilitate cooperation in marine environ-
mental protection pursuant to Part XII. The importance of the interstate
397. See id. arts. 8.1,9.
398. See id. art. 13.1(a).
399. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 8.1.
400. Id. art. 8.2.
401. Id. art. 12.
402. Id. art. 14.
403. In particular, the Draft North American Agreement explicitly provides that "the
notification should be given early enough to provide the Potentially Affected Party and its
public a meaningful opportunity to have their comments considered and, in cases where a
transboundary environmental assessment is conducted, to participate in that assessment proc-
ess'" NACEC, supra note 341, art. 3.
404. See discussion supra Parts II.C.2, I.B.4. Article 206 merely encourages the circu-
lation of the assessment documentation through the competent international organizations. See
UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 206, 21 I.L.M at 1306.
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process was further highlighted by the Annex VII tribunal, which reiter-
ated the ITLOS ruling in prescribing the further provisional measures.
Similarly, the OSPAR tribunal attempted to encourage interstate infor-
mation exchange through the creative interpretation of the information
disclosure provision, although the regional sea regime's attempt turned
out to be inefficacious. Therefore, a proposed protocol to UNCLOS
should include provisions for interstate processes.
In the draft protocol, the notification process should follow the basic
model of the Espoo Convention and the Draft North American Agree-
ment, not the ILC Draft Articles and the UNEP Guidelines. As discussed
above, the affected coastal state has no control over activities within the
originating state's territory. The affected coastal state also abrogates
prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction regarding envi-
ronmental impact assessments of foreign vessels within its territorial sea
and EEZ.4°5 To compensate these limitations and curtailments, the af-
fected state should have the right to participate fully in the environmental
impact assessment process of the originating state. In particular, notifica-
tion followed by information exchange at the pre-decision stage would
help the originating state take into account the local marine environment
of the affected coastal states in conducting an environmental impact as-
sessment. Thus, a draft protocol to UNCLOS should adopt the basic
notification provision and the reciprocal information exchange provision
in the Espoo Convention. In addition, as in the Espoo Convention and
the Draft North American Agreement, the originating state should also
provide the assessment documentation itself to the affected coastal state.
These procedural requirements should effectuate what ITLOS envi-
sioned in prescribing the provisional measures.
On the other hand, the draft protocol should allow the originating
state to classify the relevant information pursuant to applicable domestic
rules concerning national security and commercial confidentiality. This
exception is in conformity with the Espoo Convention and the ILC Draft
Articles, as well as the tacit recognition of commercial confidentiality in
the OSPAR final award. To prevent the abuse of the confidentiality pro-
vision, there should be a strict condition of non-discrimination, in which
the affected state, as a legal person, enjoys the right of information equal
to those of the public of the originating state. '°6 In addition, the affected
405. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1; see also discussion infra Parts IV.B.3, IV.B.4
(allowing the originating state to apply its own procedures for public participation and the
environmental impact assessment documentation).
406. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 15 (providing that "a State shall not
discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury might occur, in
granting to [affected natural or legal] persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to
judicial or other procedures to seek protection or other appropriate redress"); Knox, supra
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state should have access to the originating state's administrative and ju-
dicial procedures to resolve disputes regarding whether particular
information should be classified based on national security or commer-
cial confidentiality.
407
In the MOX dispute, for example, Ireland should have received the
notification of the proposed project and should have exchanged relevant
information with the United Kingdom before the preparation of the 1993
Environmental Statement. In addition, the United Kingdom should have
notified Ireland and en-route states of the planned maritime transports of
INF Code materials and should have disclosed to them at least basic in-
formation including the route and itinerary of the planned shipments.
Although the United Kingdom might have taken advantage of the recog-
nized exception to withhold information concerning details of business
arrangements and security measures for MOX shipments, its complete
refusal of prior notification and information exchange should have been
unacceptable. On the other hand, Ireland should have sought judicial
review before a municipal court of the United Kingdom regarding the
U.K. authority's invocation of the commercial confidentiality exception
to justify the suppression of particular pieces of information associated
with MOX production. 4°'
3. Public Participation in the Environmental
Impact Assessment Process
In the domestic context, public participation processes in environ-
mental impact assessments offer concerned individuals an opportunity to
be heard and considered in decision-making.409 The UNEP Guidelines
broadly encompass "government agencies, members of the public, ex-
perts in relevant disciplines and interested groups" as persons to be given
an adequate opportunity to comment on an environmental impact as-
sessment before the governmental authority makes a decision concerning
whether to authorize the proposed activity.4'0 The competent authority
should reach such a decision only after a sufficient period to consider the
submitted comments has lapsed.'
note 33, at 300 (stating that under the non-discrimination principle, the originating state
should provide nonresidents with opportunities to participate in environmental impact assess-
ments).
407. See Knox, supra note 36, at 300 (including equal access to all administrative and
judicial procedures in the participatory rights protected by the non-discrimination principle).
408. See OSPAR U.K.'s Rejoinder, supra note 273, at 5, 12 (indicating that Ireland, as
a natural or legal person, had a right to receive certain information under the Environmental
Information Regulations 1992, which is enforceable before the United Kingdom's courts).
409. Robinson, supra note 85, at 594.
410. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 7.
411. Id. princ. 8.
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In the transboundary context, the right of participation is extended to
the concerned persons in affected states.4 2 Under the Espoo Convention,
the originating state must implement an environmental impact assess-
ment procedure with a public participation process, in which concerned
individuals enjoy a participatory opportunity equal to those of the public
of the originating state.4 3 Concerned parties must ensure that the affected
persons in the affected state be informed of the proposed activity and be
given opportunities to submit their comments directly or indirectly to the
competent authority of the originating state.4"4 The Convention requires
the originating party to pay due regard to the comments received in
reaching the final decision.415
The public participation process in the Draft North American
Agreement is more extensive. In addition to the basic requirements in-
cluded in the Espoo Convention,4 6 the Draft Agreement provides that the
originating party must allow the concerned persons in affected states to
attend any domestic public hearing or meeting relating to the trans-
boundary environmental assessment.4 7 To compel the originating state to
put the public participation procedure into practice, the completed as-
sessment documentation must have a section on public participation
including (1) the summary of coordination between governmental agen-
cies and concerned persons in the originating state and the affected state
411and (2) a summary of substantive comments and responses.
The Antarctic Protocol includes provisions guaranteeing individuals
in affected states access to the transmitted information and assessment
documentation. Under the Antarctic Protocol, the originating state must
make a draft comprehensive environmental evaluation publicly available.
In addition, the draft evaluation must be circulated among all the parties,
who must make it publicly available. Each party must allow the public to
submit comments within a period of ninety days. 49 As in the Draft North
American Agreement, a final comprehensive environmental evaluation
must include the comments (or their summaries) and address the com-
ments' concerns. The final evaluation must be circulated among the
parties and made available to the public.
412. Knox, supra note 33, at 301.
413. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 2(6) , 30 I.L.M. at 804.
414. Id. art. 3(8), 30 I.L.M. at 806.
415. Id. art. 6(1), 30 I.L.M. at 806-07.
416. NACEC, supra note 341, art. 12.1(a).
417. Id. art. 12.1(b). This provision is subject to domestic immigration laws and regula-
tions. Id.
418. Id. art. 10.1(a), app. IV.6.
419. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 344, Annex I, art. 3.4.
420. Id. Annex I, art. 3.6.
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Similarly, the World Bank requires the borrower to consult with af-
fected persons and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as early as
possible during the environmental assessment process for all Categories
A and B projects. 2' To facilitate meaningful consultation, the borrower
must provide them with relevant information in a timely manner before
the consultation.4 2  For Categories A and B projects, the borrower must
make environmental assessment reports publicly available to the affected
persons and local NGOs.4 2 ' The Bank ensures the implementation of this
provision by making it a prerequisite for a project appraisal by the
Bank.424 The ADB and EBRD closely follow the World Bank's ap-
proach, with EBRD explicitly indicating that the Espoo Convention's
public participation procedures must be followed in the transboundary
context.
426
Although the ILC Draft Articles attach importance to public partici-
427pation, their provisions are quite vague. The Draft Articles require
concerned states to (1) provide the public with relevant information and
(2) ascertain their views on the proposed activity.4 Relevant information
includes the basic description of the proposed activity, the risks involved,
and the potential harm resulting from the activity. As to the second
step, the ILC's Commentaries ambiguously note that there are many
modalities for ascertaining the views of the public, one of which is to
review the factual, legal and policy basis of decision-making through
421. World Bank, supra note 84, 15. In a Category A project, for which a full-scale
environmental impact assessment is required, the borrower must consult with the persons
concerned at least twice. Id. The two consultation sessions must be held (a) shortly after the
screening process and before the adoption of the terms of reference for the environmental
impact assessment and (b) once a draft assessment report is prepared. Id.
422. Id. 16. For the first consultation in a Category A project, the borrower must pre-
pare a summary of the objectives, description, and potential effects of the planned project. Id.
17. For the second consultation, the borrower must provide a summary of the conclusions of
the environmental impact assessment. Id. The borrower must provide information in a form
and language that are comprehensible and accessible to the consulted persons. Id. 16.
423. Id. - 18-19.
424. See id. 19.
425. ADB, supra note 343, H 9-10. In addition, ADB provides for "120 day rule" in
which the environmental impact assessment documentation must be accessible by the public
at least 120 days before ADB's project appraisal. Id. T 10. EBD adopts a similar rule but the
period is sixty days for public sector projects and thirty days for private sector projects. EBD,
Policy, supra note 343, Annex 2, 11.4, at 18.
426. EBD Procedures, supra note 343, at 10-11, 2.3.4; EBD, Policy, supra note 343, at
20, Annex 2, 110 (outlining details of EBRD's public consultation process).
427. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 13, 10 (commenting that "public participa-
tion could also be viewed as a growing right under national law as well as international law.").
428. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 13; see also ILC Commentaries, supra note
33, art. 13, 1 (stating that without the second element of ascertaining the views of the public,
the purpose of Article 13 would be defeated).
429. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 13.
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administrative tribunals, courts, or groups of the persons concerned. 3°
The Commentaries make little efforts to elaborate on how to guarantee
the affected persons' right to be heard and actually considered in deci-
sion-making processes.
Although Article 206 of UNCLOS does not include any provisions
on the affected persons' right to participate in environmental impact as-
sessments, a draft protocol should incorporate the widely accepted norm
of public participation. As discussed, the Convention promotes the adop-
tion of generally recognized international standards to protect the marine
environment.4 3 ' Through the public participation process, the concerned
persons in affected states can express their concerns as well as offer
knowledge and expertise regarding the affected local marine environ-
ment to help the originating state make an informed decision. On the
other hand, to respect the originating state's territorial sovereignty, par-
ticipation by concerned persons in affected states should be subject to the
principle of non-discrimination. Under the draft protocol, concerned
individuals in the affected state should have the right to obtain informa-
tion, the right to make comments and objections, and the right to attend
hearings to the same extent as the public in the originating state.4 33 The
originating state need not implement additional procedural safeguards
concerned citizens in affected states. To effectuate the affected persons'
right to information, the affected state should make the information
received through the interstate processes of notification and information
exchange publicly available.43 4
To oblige the originating state to consider and address affected
persons' concerns, the originating state must create a record of public
participation, including at least the summaries of comments and
430. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 13, 6.
431. See supra notes 65, 70, 76, 78 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
433. In addition to the above environmental impact assessment instruments, a number of
legal documents provides for public participation. See, e.g., Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999); Rio Declaration, supra note 33, princ. 10; see also Carl
E. Bruch & Roman Czebiniak, Globalizing Environmental Governance: Making the Leap
From Regional Initiatives on Transparency, Participation, and Accountability in Environ-
mental Matters, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10428 (2002) (surveying extensively binding and non-
binding regional instruments on this subject matter).
434. See NACEC, supra note 341, art. 12.2; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.2. For
this purpose, as in the multilateral development banks' procedures, the originating state should
endeavor to provide relevant information in the language comprehensible to the ordinary citi-
zens of the affected communities as well as a language designated in UNCLOS. See supra
note 422; see also UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 320, 21 I.L.M at 1329 (making authentic the
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention). If the origi-
nating states have difficulty with translation, the originating state should provide information
at least in an official language of UNCLOS.
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response to them. The originating state may compile the record as part of
the assessment documentation, as in the Draft North American
Agreement and the Antarctic Protocol, or may produce it as a separate
document, as implied by the Espoo Convention (depending on specific
requirements in applicable domestic environmental assessment
procedures).435 In either case, the originating state should transfer the
record to the affected state, together with the assessment documentation.
The affected state should make the record and the assessment
documentation publicly available. In addition, applying the principle of
non-discrimination, concerned persons in the affected state should have
the same right to seek administrative and judicial review as the public of
the originating state has. Even though the affected state indicates its
intention not to participate in the environmental impact assessment
process, concerned individuals in the affected state should be given all
the rights under the above public participation procedures.
Indeed, concerned persons in both originating and affected states
have exhibited keen interests in MOX related activities. In April 2002,
93 percent of all Irish households participated in a grassroots postal
campaign against the operation of the MOX plant.36 In September 2002,
a coalition of Irish and U.K. environmentalists protested the arrival of
MOX return shipments at Sellafield.437 Under the proposed protocol,
those persons could have expressed their concerns through the public
participation procedure at the beginning of the authorization process,
when BNFL prepared the 1993 Environmental Statement.
With extensive rights to participate in environmental impact assess-
ment, concerned persons should refrain from employing physical
obstructions in their protests against planned activities. As mentioned
above, Greenpeace activists boarded a PNTL ship carrying vitrified
waste through the Panama Canal in 1998.438 These activists operated
without the right to be informed of the planned radioactive shipments
and the right to voice their concerns before the commencement of inter-
national transport. Although they successfully expressed their objections
and let the public know about the vulnerability of the ongoing activity,
the obstruction could have defeated both their goals and the purposes of
435. The Espoo Convention requires the originating state to transfer to the affected state
the environmental assessment documentation and the final decision "along with the reasons
and consideration on which it was based." Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 6(2), 30
I.L.M. at 807.
436. Annex VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 24, 1.67.
437. See Protest Flotilla Ready, supra note 1; Irish Students Stage Anti-Nuclear Protest
Outside British Embassy, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL
23602164.
438. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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UNCLOS had an accident occurred.439 While aggressive actions should
be discouraged, concerned persons should be allowed to orderly monitor
the commenced activity, supplementing the originating state's duty to
conduct monitoring under Article 204 of UNCLOS."40
4. The Required Contents of the Environmental
Assessment Documentation
When the originating state prepares an environmental impact as-
sessment, they are required to include specific categories of information
identified by applicable international instruments. The UNEP Guidelines
outline the generally accepted contents of the assessment documentation.
According to the Guidelines, an environmental impact assessment
should include, at least, (1) a description of the proposed activity and the
potentially affected environment; (2) practical alternatives; (3) "assess-
ment of direct, indirect, cumulative, short-term, and long-term effects"
of the proposed activity and alternatives; (4) available mitigation meas-
ures; (5) an identification of knowledge gaps and uncertainties; and (6) a
brief and non-technical summary of the above information. 44' In the
transboundary context, an environmental impact assessment should also
include the potential environmental effects of the proposed activities on
"the environment of any other State or areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion., 44'
The Espoo Convention adds several important elements to the UNEP
Guidelines. The Convention requires the environmental assessment
documentation to identify predictive methods, underlying assumptions,
and environmental data. 43 If appropriate, the documentation also in-
cludes monitoring and management programs and plans for post-hoc
analysis." These elements are also widely accepted in the environmental
impact assessment procedures of the Antarctic Protocol, the World Bank,
regional banks, and the Draft North American Agreement, although their
provisions vary in detail.45
439. See Pedrozo, supra note 57, at 221 (expressing the concern that anti-nuclear activ-
ists' action could have adversely affected the safe operation of the vessel).
440. See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 204, 21 I.L.M at 1309 (providing for
"[m]onitoring of the risks or effects of pollution.").
441. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 4.
442. Id. princ. 4(g).
443. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 4(1), app. II, 30 I.L.M. at 806, 814.
444. Id. app. II, (h) , 30 I.L.M. at 814. The Espoo Convention permits the parties to
adopt tougher domestic environmental impact assessment rules. Id. art. 2(9), 30 I.L.M. at 804.
445. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 344, Annex I, art. 3; ADB, supra note 343, 8; EBD
Procedures, supra note 343, Annex 2, at 23-25; World Bank, supra note 84, Annex B (content
of an Environmental Assessment Report for a Category A project); NACEC, supra note 341,
app. IV.
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Unlike other instruments, the ILC Draft Articles do not specify the
contents of the environmental assessment documentation. The ILC's
Commentaries merely identify "evaluation of the possible transboundary
harmful impact of the activity" on persons, property, and the environ-
ment to be included in the documentation." 6 The Commentaries simply
leave details to domestic laws. 4'7
To supplement the existing vague provision in Article 206 of the
UNCLOS, a draft protocol should require the originating state to include
in the environmental assessment documentation the items above that are
widely recognized in the existing instruments. In each item, a description
should focus on the effects of the planned project on the marine envi-
ronment. On the other hand, the originating state need not prepare a
report specifically tailored to marine environmental impact assessment.
To reduce administrative burden on the originating state, it may use a
general environmental impact assessment report prepared under its do-
mestic law for the purpose of fulfilling its obligation under Article 206,
so long as such a general assessment report is in conformity with the
requirements of the draft protocol. This approach is consistent with the
philosophy of UNCLOS encouraging states to adopt generally applicable
international standards, while respecting the originating state's sovereign
rights to regulate activities within its territory. 4
8
For example, the 1993 Environmental Statement should have in-
cluded details of the chosen and alternative methods of treating
radioactive effluents from the MOX plant, available mitigation measures,
and the data used to estimate radiation doses to the critical group. The
Environmental Statement should have discussed radiological impacts on
the biota and the ecosystems of the Irish Sea and, should have noted any
gaps or uncertainties in scientific knowledge on marine biology. The
Statement should have identified the probable increase of THORP re-
processing business and the international movements of radioactive
materials as a consequence of MOX production, and should have as-
sessed the cumulative effects of these related activities." 9 The United
Kingdom indicated that modifications in the existing reprocessing con-
tracts or any new contracts at THORP would be subject to a separate
review process, and therefore should be excluded from the environ-
446. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 7, 1 7.
447. Id.
448. In the case of states with federal systems, laws and regulations adopted by a compe-
tent sub-national governmental institution may be applicable provided that such laws and
regulations address the content requirements outlined in the proposed protocol. See Robinson,
supra note 85, app. 1, at 611-62, 616 (reporting that sub-national authorities in Australia,
Canada, and the United States have implemented their own environmental impact assessment
procedures by 1992).
449. See supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
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mental impact assessments of the MOX plant.4 0 However, future as-
sessments of related activities should not release the originating state
from its existing obligation to assess the cumulative impacts of the
planned activity. If this protocol had been introduced, Ireland could have
pointed to pieces of information the United Kingdom had been required
to supply in the environmental impact assessment of the MOX plant.
5. Interstate Consultation
After the originating state has prepared an environmental impact as-
sessment, the concerned states should enter into consultation. While the
UNEP Guidelines require their prior consent to establish the consultation
process, 45' the Espoo Convention does not require consent.4 2 The Con-
vention provides for mandatory consultations after the completion of the
environmental assessment documentation. The originating party must
enter into consultations with the affected parties regarding the potential
transboundary effects of the proposed activity and actions to minimize
its impacts, such as possible alternatives, mitigation measures, monitor-
ing, and other forms of possible mutual assistance.53 The final decision
on the proposed activity must take into account the outcome of the con-
sultations, as well as the environmental assessment documentation and
comments..4 ' The originating party must provide the affected party with
the final decision, together with the reasons and considerations that sup-
port the decision. 5
The Antarctic Protocol also provides for mandatory consultations
through the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, at which the draft
comprehensive environmental evaluation is considered. 6 The final com-
prehensive evaluation must include a summary of comments received
during consultation and must be circulated to all parties to the Treaty.
457
Under Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles, interstate consultation is
contingent upon a request by either of the concerned states. 45' Through
interstate consultation, the concerned states must seek acceptable
solutions regarding preventive measures to address significant
transboundary harm potentially resulting from the proposed activity.
459
450. Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at 110-11, 5.09.
451. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 12.
452. See Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
453. Id.
454. Id. art. 6(1), 30 I.L.M. at 806-07.
455. Id. art. 6(2), 30 I.L.M. at 807.
456. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 344, Annex I, art. 3.5.
457. Id. Annex I, art. 3.6.
458. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 9.1.
459. Id.; ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 9, 7 ("Article 9 may be invoked when-
ever there is a question about the need to take preventive measures.").
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The Draft Articles, nevertheless, do not make consultation obligatory at
the pre-decision stage. The concerned states may enter into consultation
either before decision-making or after the commencement of the
activity. 6° Reflecting its broader scope, the Draft Articles mandate that
the concerned states equitably balance environmental and other
considerations in crafting solutions.4 6' Accordingly, the concerned states
must take into account "all relevant factors and circumstances"
including, inter alia, the significance of environmental and other harm
and mitigation and prevention measures available; the socioeconomic
importance and economic viability of the proposed activity; the costs of
prevention to be borne by the originating state and, as appropriate, the
affected state; and the domestic standards applicable in the affected state
and in comparable regional and international practice.462
Unlike the above instruments, the Draft North American Agreement
contains no provision concerning interstate consultation prior to deci-
sion-making. The Draft Agreement only includes an incomplete
provision on on-going consultation, which is apparently designed to fa-
cilitate dispute settlement between concerned states."
UNCLOS itself has no explicit provision for interstate consultation
regarding a planned activity that lacks an imminent or actual danger.
Nevertheless, the originating state's duty to consult with the potentially
affected state is regarded as integral part of UNCLOS. ITLOS high-
lighted the importance of this duty by urging the concerned parties to
cooperate in devising measures to address potential risks from the pro-
posed activity within a short timeframe before the commencement of the
activity.4 The Annex VII tribunal not only reiterated the ITLOS ruling,
but also specifically recommended that the parties establish a framework
for effective bilateral coordination to deal with the disputed activity.
411
Accordingly, a draft protocol to UNCLOS should include a mandatory
interstate consultation provision at the pre-decision stage, as well as at
the post-decision stage of monitoring. As in the Espoo Convention and
the ILC Draft Articles, the concerned states should work together
through interstate consultation in formulating measures to prevent and
mitigate the potential effects of the proposed project. Like the Espoo
Convention and the Antarctic Protocol, the draft protocol should require
460. ILC Commentaries, supra note 33, art. 9, 1 6.
461. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 9.2.
462. Id. art. 10.
463. NACEC, supra note 341, art. 18 ("Any Party may request consultation regarding
any aspect of the operation of these recommendations including any determination, action or
inaction taken thereunder.") (provisions to be elaborated).
464. ITLOS Provisional Measures, supra note 12, at 19, 184.
465. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
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the originating state to consider the outcome of interstate consultation, as
well as the environmental impact assessment documentation, in making
a decision regarding the authorization of the proposed activity.
In the MOX plant dispute, the United Kingdom offered to have con-
sultations with Ireland before the justification of the MOX plant, as well
as after the ITLOS order. Nevertheless, as revealed in the ITLOS and
Annex VII proceedings, there has been almost no indication that the par-
ties to the dispute sought to reach a balanced solution." Under the
proposed protocol, the United Kingdom should have taken into consid-
eration not only economic viability of the MOX plant, but also potential
harm to the marine environment of the Irish Sea. The United Kingdom
should have cooperated with Ireland in crafting measures to monitor and
mitigate the direct and cumulative impacts of MOX production.
As to international transports of radioactive materials, the proposed
protocol should require the United Kingdom, as the flag state of PNTL
vessels, to enter into consultation with en-route states in order to develop
monitoring and contingency plans. 67 Although the United Kingdom
might claim rights to innocent passage and the freedom of navigation,
these rights should be qualified by the United Kingdom's responsibility
to prevent transboundary environmental harm to coastal states. When
UNCLOS was adopted, the parties to the Convention purported to strike
a balance by allowing coastal states to confine the innocent passage of
foreign ships carrying ultrahazardous cargoes to designated sea-lanes,
while not requiring maritime states to consult with coastal states regard-
ing shipments of ultrahazardous materials.4 68 However, this provision
does not reflect the consensus among the parties regarding the subse-
quently protested INF cargoes. A flag state's intentional disregard of
customary good faith obligations regarding a contested ultrahazardous
activity on its flagged vessel should amount to a willful act to cause seri-
ous pollution, which would make the passage of such vessels non-
innocent.469 In addition, the Convention mandates states to resolve the
conflict of interests in the use of EEZs "on the basis of equity and in the
light of all the relevant circumstances.,'470 Thus, the consultation re-
quirement should be applicable to international shipments of INF Code
materials through the territorial seas and EEZs of en-route states. With
466. See supra notes 259, 313 and accompanying text.
467. See Van Dyke, supra note 41, at 382; Van Dyke, supra note 34, at 400-02; Van
Dyke, supra note 165 (asserting that states assume the duty of prior notification and consulta-
tion by way of customary international law and Article 199 of UNCLOS regarding
contingency plans).
468. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
469. Van Dyke, supra note 41, 384-85; see also supra notes 92, 252-54 and accompany-
ing text.
470. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 59, 21 I.L.M at 1280.
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flag states' prior consultation and cooperation in implementing contin-
gency measures, coastal states should refrain from taking aggressive
actions to expel vessels loaded with INF cargoes from sea areas under
their jurisdiction. Such aggressive actions could result in disastrous con-
sequences to the local marine environment, as well as to the goals of
UNCLOS. On the other hand, en-route states should have the rights to
monitor INF shipments closely, which should complement the originat-
ing state's duty under Article 204.47'
6. Dispute Settlement Between the Originating
State and a Non-Notified State
The proposed marine environmental impact assessment process
could involve the following two types of disputes: (1) legal disputes con-
cerning the interpretation and application of relevant provisions and
(2) essentially factual disputes where a non-notified state believes that
the proposed activity may likely cause significant transboundary harm to
it, while the originating state does not regard the proposed activity as
such. Because judicial or arbitral tribunals, which are provided for in
UNCLOS,472 are incapable of resolving scientific and technical factual
disputes, a special mechanism is necessary. The Espoo Convention, the
Draft North American Agreement, and the ILC Draft Articles envision
such dispute settlement provisions.
The Espoo Convention provides for an inquiry commission, which is
comprised of three scientific experts.473 The requesting party and re-
sponding party appoint one expert each, and the two appointed experts
designate the third expert by common agreement.474 A party interested in
the factual nature of the subject matter and possibly affected by an opin-
ion in the matter may, upon the consent of the inquiry commission,
intervene in the inquiry proceedings. 475 The commission must issue the
final opinion within two months, unless it extends this time limit for a
period not exceeding two months.476
The Draft North American Agreement uses the information request
procedure for a non-notified party as a functional equivalent to the above
process in the Espoo Convention. If a potentially affected party has not
yet received notification but has a reasonable concern about the potential
transboundary effects of the proposed project, that party may request
471. Id. art. 204 (providing for the duty to monitor the risks and effects of marine pollu-
tion).
472. UNCLOS, supra note 10, pt. XV, 21 I.L.M at 1322-26.
473. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, art. 3(7), 30 I.L.M. at 805.
474. Id. app. IV, 2, 30 I.L.M. at 815.
475. Id. app. IV, 9111, 30 I.L.M. at 816.
476. Id. app. IV, 9113, 30 I.L.M. at 816.
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information on the proposed project. 7 The originating party must
promptly reply to such a request "to the extent possible. 478 Currently, it
is unclear whether non-notified parties can resort to the consultation pro-
cedure in a similar situation under the Draft Agreement. 9
The ILC Draft Articles incorporate the essence of the above informa-
tion request procedure in the consultation process for non-notified states.
When a state has reasonable grounds to believe that the proposed activity
may likely cause significant transboundary harm to it but was not noti-
fied by the originating state, the non-notified state may request the
originating state to give a notification. The request must enclose a docu-
mented explanation outlining its grounds. 8° If the originating state
nevertheless determines that the notification requirement is inapplicable,
it must inform the requesting state, within a reasonable period in a
documented explanation outlining its grounds. If the requesting state is
unsatisfied, upon its request the two states must enter into consulta-
tions. 81
For a draft protocol to UNCLOS, mechanisms to settle scientific and
technical disputes are essential because degradation of the marine envi-
ronment involves the cumulative effects of multiple and complex
sources, which may cause factual disagreements between the originating
state and potentially affected coastal states. In particular, the inquiry
commission similar to the Espoo Convention may be suited to resolve
disputes concerning the precise technical and scientific issues, as in the
MOX plant dispute. In addition, such mechanisms enable parties to settle
disputes at the early stage of decision-making processes when the origi-
nating state can make modifications in the proposed activity much more
easily. In the MOX plant case, the United Kingdom did not notify Ire-
land of the proposed construction of the MOX plant or BNFL's
preparation of the 1993 Environmental Statement, believing that MOX
production would not involve significant environmental effects. After
years of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts, Ireland initiated the legal pro-
ceedings well after BNFL completed the construction of the MOX plant
and just before BNFL commenced the plutonium commissioning of the
disputed plant. This raised the United Kingdom's stakes in the MOX
project and made dispute resolution much more difficult.
482
477. NACEC, supra note 341, art. 8.1.
478. Id. art. 8.3.
479. See id. art. 18.1. The consultation procedure appears to deal with materialized dis-
putes between the parties concerning the interpretation and application of its provisions. See
supra note 463 and accompanying text.
480. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 11.1.
481. Id. art. 11.2.
482. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
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However, the parties to the dispute should use the inquiry commis-
sion only after they fail to settle the dispute through negotiations. Article
283 of UNCLOS requires the parties to exchange their views before they
use a tribunal designated under Article 287.483 Similarly, the draft proto-
col should adopt a preference for negotiated settlements, which are
better suited to deal with generalized factual concerns arising from lack
of communication, like en-route states' objections to the marine trans-
ports of INF Code materials.4  In addition, prior information exchange
and consultation should help the parties better shape the terms of refer-
ence for the inquiry commission. As outlined in the Draft North
American Agreement and the ILC Draft Articles, the non-notified state
should request notification and information regarding the proposed pro-
ject, and the originating state should reply to such request as soon as
possible in good faith. If the non-notified state is not satisfied with the
originating state's response, it may request consultation. If the parties
fail to resolve the factual dispute, either of them may resort to the in-
quiry commission, which issues a binding factual determination as to
whether the proposed activity is likely to cause significant harm to the
marine environment of the non-notified state.
Had the proposed protocol applied to the MOX plant dispute, Ireland
could have requested notification and information exchange in 1993,
when it voluntarily initiated communication regarding the MOX plant.
4 5
With an unsatisfactory response from the United Kingdom, Ireland could
have demanded immediate consultation and ultimately could have re-
sorted to the inquiry commission under the proposed protocol before
BNFL completed construction of the disputed plant.
7. The Role of International and Regional
Institutions in the Marine Environmental
Impact Assessment Process
While each state bears the principal responsibility to administer its
own environmental impact assessment process, international and re-
gional institutions play an important role in facilitating cooperation and
coordination among states in the conduct of transboundary environ-
mental impact assessment. The ILC Draft Articles provide a general duty
483. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 283, 21 I.L.M at 1322; see also id. art. 286, 21 I.L.M
at 1322 (making available compulsory dispute settlements before a chosen tribunal "where no
settlement has been reached by recourse to section I [of Part XV]," which includes Article
283), art. 287, 21 I.L.M. at 1323 (allowing states to choose one or more of the following tri-
bunals: (a) ITLOS; (b) the International Court of Justice; (c) Annex VII tribunal; and (d) a
special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII).
484. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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for states to bilaterally cooperate, and if necessary through international
organizations to prevent significant transboundary harm.486 The UNEP
Guidelines reduce this general duty to more specific ones for the trans-
boundary environmental impact assessment process. Under the UNEP
Guidelines, states should endeavor to create bilateral, regional, or multi-
lateral arrangements for notification, information exchange, and
consultations regarding the potential transboundary effects of proposed
activities.487
The Espoo Convention further elaborates on the above provision and
encourages parties to cooperate through bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments to devise additional environmental assessment requirements, to
establish institutional, administrative, and other arrangements, and to har-
monize methods and standards used in domestic environmental impact
assessment processes. 88 Pursuant to this provision, the EU member states
entered into the process of harmonization. Under the 1997 EC Directive,
member states are required to make their domestic environmental impact
assessment procedures consistent with the requirements in the EC direc-
tive.49 The EU members must also adopt domestic rules to implement the
498interstate process.
International financial institutions assist information exchange
among interested states and the general public by serving as a depository
of the environmental impact assessment documentation. Under the
World Bank's procedure, the borrower must transmit environmental as-
sessment reports for Categories A and B projects to the Bank, which
then makes the reports publicly available through its InfoShop, an in-
formation center and book store accessible physically or via the
Internet.91 Similarly, the ADB requires that the summaries of environ-
mental impact assessment reports be disseminated worldwide through
the depository library system and on its website.492 EBRD also makes
environmental impact assessment reports and their summaries accessible
via its Business Information Center.493
In addition, these multilateral development banks attempt to coordi-
nate their environmental impact assessment processes with other similar
regional and international assessment procedures. For example, the
486. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 342, art. 4.
487. UNEP Guidelines, supra note 84, princ. 11.
488. Espoo Convention, supra note 338, app. VI, 30 I.L.M. at 817.
489. See 1997 EC Directive, supra note 220, arts. 2.2, 2.2a.
490. See id. art. 2.2; see also Gray, supra note 85, at 118-24.
491. World Bank, supra note 84, 19; see also World Bank, The InfoShop, at
http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
492. ADB, supra note 343, 110. An interested party must make a request to the ADB in
order to obtain the entire environmental impact assessment documentation. Id.
493. EBD Policy, supra note 343, Annex 2, 7 6, at 19-20.
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World Bank requires the borrower to comply with the environmental
assessment requirements of applicable international agreements.4 9"
EBRD specifically indicates that the Bank will "support the spirit, pur-
pose and ultimate goals" of the Espoo Convention and encourage
borrowers to incorporate rights and obligations under the Convention
(and other relevant international agreements) through project finance.495
UNCLOS requires that states cooperate internationally and region-
ally in formulating and elaborating marine environmental protection
measures. 4 As discussed, the regional seas regimes embody regional
cooperation in Part XII of UNCLOS .4 ' Accordingly, a draft protocol to
UNCLOS should promote cooperation among states in the environ-
mental impact assessment process through the regional seas regimes. As
in the Espoo Convention, the regional seas regimes should offer adminis-
trative support and assist states in developing additional environmental
assessment standards, if necessary, and assist harmonization of domestic
environmental impact assessment procedures if possible. Pursuant to
Article 202 of UNCLOS, the regional seas regimes, in cooperation with
multilateral development banks and donor states, should offer technical
assistance to developing countries in the implementation of the proposed
marine environmental impact assessment protocol.498 In addition, the re-
gional seas regimes, together with UNEP, should facilitate dissemination
of environmental impact assessment reports. Under Article 206, the
originating state must either publish the marine environmental impact
assessment documentation or circulate it through the competent interna-
tional organizations at appropriate intervals.499 Because UNEP, the
coordinator of regional seas regimes, has played a central role in promot-
ing environmental impact assessment through its Guidelines, it should be
qualified as the competent international organization to receive marine
environmental impact assessment reports. Like the multilateral develop-
ment banks, UNEP should publish the reports through its website and
transfer them to the commission of each regional sea regime, which
should serve as a local depository of marine environmental impact as-
sessment reports."
494. World Bank, supra note 84, 1 3, Annex B, 2(b).
495. EBD Policy, supra note 343, 1 8, 11 at 4, 42 at 13.
496. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 197, 207, 21 I.L.M at 1308, 1310; see also supra
notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
498. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 202, 21 I.L.M at 1309 ("States shall, directly or
through competent international organizations ... (c) provide appropriate assistance, espe-
cially to developing States, concerning the preparation of environmental assessment.").
499. Id. art. 206, 21 I.L.M at 1309.
500. For languages to be used in the environmental impact assessment documentation,
see notes 422, 434.
[Vol. 25:337
Lessons from the Protracted MOX Plant Dispute
In addition, there should be coordination between the draft proce-
dure and existing procedures for transboundary environmental impact
assessment. The originating state should fully take into account affected
coastal states' concerns on the marine environment in the environmental
assessment documentation and the interstate process under existing in-
struments including, inter alia, the Espoo Convention, the 1997 EC
Directive, and the Antarctic Treaty regime, if they are applicable.'O Then,
the originating state need not have a separate environmental assessment
process for the purpose of satisfying obligations under UNCLOS. In ad-
dition, international financial institutions should heed the requirements
in the proposed protocol and protect marine environments by administer-
ing their own environmental impact assessment procedures.
CONCLUSION
The Sellafield MOX plant has been a matter of controversy between
the opposite sides of the Irish Sea since the early 1990s. Substantively,
the controversy involves the potential environmental effects of direct and
cumulative radioactive discharges from MOX production and the poten-
tial hazards of frequent marine shipments of radioactive materials.
Almost a decade later, however, Irish concerns were crystallized into a
procedural dispute concerning the adequacy of environmental impact
assessments and associated interstate processes. Unfortunately, the dis-
pute between Ireland and the United Kingdom has been protracted and
aggravated due to ambiguities in the relevant procedural provisions of
UNCLOS. Although the competent tribunals have attempted to resolve
the dispute through flexible interpretations of the applicable instruments
and general international law, the tribunals are incapable of filling the
gap in the existing instruments.
To avoid repeating similar incidents in the future, an environmental
impact assessment protocol to UNCLOS must be developed to ensure
that the originating state prepares an environmental impact assessment
that takes into account the potential significant impacts of the proposed
activity on the marine environment within the territorial sea or the EEZ
501. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text (stating that after the construction
of the MOX plant, the 1997 EC Directive entered into force for both Ireland and the United
Kingdom). The Espoo Convention took effect for both parties on October 2002. See Annex
VII Ir.'s Memorial, supra note 5, at 104, 6.19 & n.28 (noting that the United Kingdom rati-
fied the Espoo Convention in 1997; Annex VII U.K.'s Counter-Memorial, supra note 102, at
119, 5.29(4) (pointing out that only on July 2002, Ireland did ratify the Convention, which
then entered into force for it on October 2002). See generally supra note 161 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the potentially harmful effects of INF shipments via Cape Horn and the
Cape of Good Hope on the terrestrial and marine environments of the Antarctica).
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of a coastal state. To make it operational, such a protocol should include:
(1) the list of covered activities and a set of criteria for non-listed activities
concerning the likelihood of potential significant impacts on the marine
environment; (2) provisions for notification and information exchange
before the commencement of the originating state's domestic assessment
process; (3) a procedure for public participation; (4) a list of items to be
included in the environmental impact assessment documentation;
(5) interstate consultations to achieve mutually agreeable solutions in
mitigation measures, monitoring schemes, and contingency plans;
(6) settlement of factual disputes between a non-notified state and the
originating state through interstate processes and an inquiry commission;
and (7) international and regional cooperation in marine environmental
impact assessment through UNEP and the regional seas regimes and coor-
dination with the environmental assessment requirements in the existing
instruments. The proposed protocol should accommodate the competing
interests of the states involved, as well as the distinct concerns of affected
persons, and help them cooperate in protecting the marine environment.
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